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My thesis aims to partake in the controversial and theoretical debates 
surrounding sight which can be traced as far back as Plato. It seeks to provide an 
overview of the cultural history of the gaze in order to set up a triangulated and in-
depth schema or triadic relationship between theatre, text and trauma through the lens 
of psychoanalytical, phenomenological and socio-theoretical frameworks. More 
specifically, it attempts to explore the various interactions, along the axis of 
representation, between theatrical metaphors and those of traumatic vision, as well as 
traumatic representations on stage of viewing and the multi-layered and socio-
political implications of various ways of looking (or non-looking), which often trigger 
traumatic responses.  
By examining two canonical plays – Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth – as well as the modern performances of artists such as Orlan 
and Franko B, I hope to show how visual trauma can transcend time and space and 
how the stage, as well as dramatic performances, can function as a body or body 
politic upon which various visuo-spatial and traumatic themes can be inscribed and 
re(enacted). The shift in emphasis, beginning with Freud and onwards, from physical 
to psychological trauma has often led to a blurring and obfuscation of the question of 
sight and the various lines of inquiry related to it. It has unfortunately often been 
overlooked in trauma theory, together with the issue of how certain sights/sites can 
often lead to broken, baffled and even traumatic responses when there is a failure to 
adequately interrogate, interpret and subsequently assimilate various events both on 





This failure is further compounded by various theoretical strands which view 
trauma as being non-representable. Thus by bringing trauma and vision to the fore, 
my research aims to inflect the cultural history of the gaze by showing how it 
contributes invaluably to a greater understanding of identity formation and 
hermeneutical activity in particular, as well as theatrical practices and even gender 
discourse analysis in general. By recourse to Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth, two canonical plays which draw heavily on notions of sight, 
blindness and the traumatic implications of viewing certain objects or events, as well 
as through an interrogation of various responses to the theatrical performances of 
more modern bodily-based performance artists such as Orlan and Franko B, who cut 
and refashion their bodies in front of a large audience, this work seeks to bring 
together various theoretical approaches ranging from psychoanalysis to 
phenomenology in order to shed light on how sight can lead to trauma both on and off 
the stage, thus contributing to the ongoing theoretical debates surrounding the body 
and the theatre.  
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The gaze as motif 
 
 
The question of the gaze has occupied a central position in both Western 
literature and philosophy since ancient times.1 René Descartes calls sight ‘the most 
comprehensive and noblest of [the senses]’ (65), whilst in his Passion and Excess: 
Blanchot, Bataille, and Literary Theory Stephen Shaviro points out: ‘Nothing is more 
important to Western tradition than the clarity and truth of vision’ (5). There has been 
a repeated preoccupation with the interrelationships between vision, knowledge and 
perception, a preoccupation which can be traced as far back as classical Greece. Plato, 
for example, creates an analogy between the sun, as a bearer of light, and the human 
eye. In Timaeus he remarks that vision is the greatest blessing or boon to have been 
bestowed upon mankind (47b).  
Preoccupations with sight can be evidenced in Ancient Greek theatre as early 
as the 5th century AD. As Martin Jay points out in Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of 
Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought, Greek art idealised the visible form and 
this ‘accorded well with their love of theatrical performance’ (23). Indeed, the 
etymological linkage between theatre and theory, which meant ‘to look at 
attentively,’ has often been remarked in the literature. 
Since the Greek gods and goddesses were visible entities, religious effigies, 
sculptures and temples were created to honour them. It is perhaps this privileging of 
sight in classical Greece that is responsible for a trickling down effect into numerous 
religious systems which pay tribute to the sun, sun gods and the all-seeing eye. In 
medieval and early modern times, ‘the medieval metaphysics of light’ was ‘in large 





in ocular allusions. In France, for example, the powerful intersections between 
political authority, religion and sight could be traced in the lavish display of Louis 
XIV’s processions and his extravagant interior decorations. Louis XIV, known as the 
Sun God, was – like Apollo – ‘the God-like source of all light and the eye that could 
see everything, a figure of specular identity par excellence’ (Jay 44, 89).2 In Hegelian 
philosophy, the sun functions as the true source of illumination and even becomes a 
metaphor for philosophy itself.  
Whilst the focus on the power of the eye, together with its physical, tangible 
materiality, was a staple of the Renaissance era, it was during the Enlightenment, and 
in the wake of the Cartesian dualism or mind/body split, that the notion of an ‘inner 
eye’ really came into its own. In his search for knowledge and clarity, and via 
deductive reasoning, Descartes turned to the notion of ‘ideas’ and how these can refer 
to inner, mental representations. Whilst the split between the mental idea of an object 
and its physical representation was certainly not a novel idea – Plato had already 
postulated the notion that material objects were merely imitations of an abstract or 
transcendent Idea or Eidos – Descartes’s dualism moves away from Plato by positing 
ideas as subjective entities rather than external realities. In Descartes, it is the mind 
that actually sees rather than the eye – hence the expression of seeing, almost literally, 
with ‘the mind’s eye.’ 
This notion of a representational mind was to be contested by the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson in the late nineteenth century: ‘We maintain that the brain 
is an instrument of action, and not of representation’ (qtd. in Jay 149). At the same 
time, Bergson moves away from what he deems a simplistic model of contemplative 
or reflective understanding and firmly grounds the body as the site and locus of 





be a vehicle of human choice’ (193) even though it may not always be granted human 
agency. An implicit assumption that can be made from this, when it comes to the 
question of the gaze, is that the very act of looking (or non-looking) is an actual 
choice. Setting aside the fact that there are several different ways of looking, ranging 
from a sweeping glance to a concentrated stare, one may, in fact, wish to look 
sideways, for example, or to avert the gaze and/or concentrate one’s scopic field 
elsewhere. This scopic field, as identified by the French phenomenological 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, deftly ushers in the question of the other, the 
other’s gaze, the Sartrean distinction between ‘for-itself’ and ‘in-itself,’ and the 
Lacanian split between the eye and the gaze, to which we shall now turn.   
 
The Eye/I and the Gaze of the Other 
 
In contrast to the liberties assigned to the Bergsonian subject, who may or may 
not choose to look at something freely, the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre was more 
sceptical and sought to destabilize the hegemonic position of the Western tradition’s 
linkage of the I/eye and the subject’s assumed autonomy and power over vision. In 
Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943) Sartre 
posits that the subject is never really free in any real sense of the term since he is 
always becoming the object of another’s gaze in a competitive exchange of gazes and 
intersubjective relationships. There is a non-reciprocity between the subject, or what 
Sartre calls the ‘for-itself,’ and the object or the ‘in-itself,’ in so far as they are caught 
up in a fundamental power struggle or antagonistic battle of wills. Instead of an 
autonomous subject, we now have a self constituted by, or even for, the other’s gaze: 





myself because somebody sees me (319). For Sartre, not even God himself can 
produce a totalizing view of the world.3 
This is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s contention that the world itself was 
flesh, a flesh of history that could not be encompassed by the view of God because it 
was ‘as unsurveyable as the flesh of the natural world’ (Jay 319). However, in 
contradistinction to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty rejects ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’ and 
replaces these with the ‘visible’ and ‘invisible.’ He goes further than Sartre, since for 
him perception is prior to being, and posits in The Visible and the Invisible a universal 
or ‘anonymous visibility’ that inhabits all of us, a vision or visibility of the flesh in the 
here and now which ‘radiat[es] everywhere and forever’ (142).  
This flesh of the world grounds the subject and object. Yet there is no radical 
split between the two viewing positions taken up between them. For Merleau-Ponty, 
even the subject is objectified because seeing is not seeing, ‘to see the other is 
essentially to see my body as an object, so that the other’s body object could have a 
psychic “side”’ (225). In other words, it is this conflation of this other body within me 
that allows me to experience the other’s experience.  
This reference to the object’s psychic side was taken up by Jacques Lacan, 
with his postulation of the desire for an object a or object of lack. The gaze itself is 
imaginary or a function of the desire for this object. Desire, in other words, is really 
the desire for the object. ‘The gaze I encounter – you can find this in Sartre’s own 
writing – is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other’ 
(Lacan qtd. in Jay 362). For Lacan, there is an intersubjective exchange in which the 
subject mistakenly assumes that it can see itself seeing itself through the other’s gaze.4 
In reality, the act of seeing comes after the state of being-looked-at-ness, a term I 





intersubjectivity, as it were, there is this uncanny sense of being looked at without 
being seen’ (160). Thus there is a split between the eye and the gaze, the gaze 
belonging solely to the object itself.  
Quite clearly, this imposes limits on the subject’s field of vision in the scopic 
realm, as well as more general limits on the subject’s ability to know something, 
limits which the cultural critic Slavoj Žižek will draw upon and delineate more clearly 
in his The Sublime Object of Ideology. As he points out by drawing on Lacan’s 
concept of the imaginary self, the subject is alien to itself. It is a self which ‘exists 
only on the basis of the misrecognition of its own conditions; it is the effect of this 
misrecognition’ (68). This is reminiscent of Paul de Man’s reading of Mallarmé’s 
work in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 
where he claims that hermeneutic understanding is never a complete process since 
there is a temporal disjuncture between understanding and history, which ‘forever 
eludes totalization’ (32). It is not a far cry from this to Foucault’s assertions of the 
conjunctures and disjunctures in history.  
It is the disjunctures between history and understanding which can explain, 
perhaps, Žižek’s relegation of the subject to an almost alien position even within his 
own essentialist substance. He postulates that the subject in society is faced with what 
he paradoxically calls ‘the forced choice of freedom’ in which making a choice 
consists in making the right choice as dictated by the community to which the subject 
belongs. If the subject makes the wrong choice, he will ‘lose the freedom of choice 
itself.’ This is really Hobson’s choice after all and the subject ‘must choose what is 
already given to him’ (165, emphasis in original). This having to choose what is 
always already given clearly creates a temporal fissure between the effecting of the 





The limits on subjective knowledge are such that transgression, the abolition 
of the subject’s ‘misrecognition’, necessarily exacts a high price, with access to 
knowledge leading to a ‘loss of enjoyment’ or jouissance – and even the subject’s 
total loss of his very ontological consistency’ (Žižek 68). Similarly, Shari Benstock 
notes in Textualizing the Feminine: On the Limits of Genre that jouissance ‘exceeds 
the limits of any definition: it goes beyond sexual pleasure, beyond pleasure itself, 
and can tip over into pain and psychic dissolution’ (16).  
I read jouissance as a discharge of energy, an excessive pleasure or orgasmic 
bliss intimately linked with loss and even death.5 As Lacan notes in Écrits: A 
Selection the body is capable of experiencing this jouissance through erogenous zones 
as loss. ‘Thus the erectile organ comes to symbolize the place of jouissance, not in 
itself, or even in the form of an image, but as a part lacking in the desired image’ 
(353).6 
Jouissance, then, occurs at the crucial boundary between the body’s surfaces or 
orifices and the outer world. It is that which lies beyond – beyond physical 
representations, and leaves behind its residual trace. In short, this residue of 
jouissance ‘escapes representative forms’ and ‘signals (uncannily) the threshold 
where identity recedes, where subjectivity vanishes, where the sign and object are 
traversed’ (Benstock 40).  
This threshold or liminal space, where identity is lost and where ‘sign and object 
are traversed,’ is where the rupturing of signifier from signified occurs. In a similar 
vein, the psychoanalyst and literary critic Julia Kristeva posits a ‘thetic phase,’ a 
textual and psychical boundary which signals rupture and opens out onto desire. 
According to Kristeva, the thetic phase ‘posits the gap between the signifier and the 





jouissance that exceeds them’ (The Portable Kristeva 42). This forecloses the single 
possibility of any stable one-to-one correspondence of signifier and signified, word 
and thing. Endowed with polysemy, this space of indeterminacy, marked as it is by its 
own liminality and transience, can provide a useful and strategic way to read texts, 
which are seen as opening out onto desire and exceeding representation. The ‘eye’ or 
eyes in the text resist closure under the subject’s interpretative gaze and assimilative 
efforts to reach understanding. (I shall return to this idea of excessive jouissance in 
Chapter Four when examining the critical moment of Oedipus’s self-blinding.) 
For now, suffice it to say that desire is desire for the other and that this is 
intimately tied with the notion of the gaze – even scopophilia. In Western tradition 
especially the gaze is often identified as being masculine. This intuitive understanding 
also trickled down into psychoanalytic theory in the nineteenth century; it will be 
recalled that even for Freud, whose theories were not particularly conducive to the 
ocularcentric discourse, it is apparently the young boy who sees and what he ‘sees’ is 
that the girl lacks a penis, which is subsequently interpreted as a deficiency in her (or 
rather, there is ‘nothing down there’ for the curious boy to actually see). As we shall 
see later on, Laura Mulvey problematizes this clear-cut binary of male/female, viewer 
and viewed, while other feminist writers such as Jill Dolan (who posits a lesbian 
spectator), Rebecca Schneider, Elin Diamond, and many others, have also destabilized 
the neat distinctions between viewing and perception through their writing.  
One major area where this has taken place is in theatre, where the associations 
between the specular representation of women and the erotic – often fetishistic – gaze 
of the male have been interrogated, pressured and in many cases subverted by 






Theatre as spectacle and site of resistance 
 
                 All I describe is theatre even where theatre is not the subject.  
                                                                                                  (Barker 2) 
 
We have already noted how theatre, theory and sight are etymologically 
linked. In Ancient Greece theatrical performances were grand, spectacular events 
which were part of religious festivals, symbolized Athenian democracy and involved 
the entire polis or city state in active participation. As Susan Bennett points out, 
‘Greek theatre was also clearly inseparable from the social, economic, and political 
structures of Athens’ (2). The city itself actually became a theatre, ‘a space in which 
all the citizens were actors – as the city itself and its leading citizens were put on 
display’ (Goldhill qtd. in duBois 68). While such grand spectacles were effected to 
worship divinities, with the spectacular effect designed to create communal solidarity 
and augment the religious aspect of these festivals, Louis XIV’s lavishly extravagant 
train was designed as a spectacle which, through transfixing the gaze of the populace, 
invested power solely in the sovereign’s person. Queen Elizabeth’s grand court at 
Shakespeare’s theatre is another case in point. 
Although it has been claimed by certain critics that there were no women in 
the Athenian audiences, this seems counterintuitive to the accepted claim that the 
theatrical performance involved the majority of the city. A more feasible claim would 
seem to be that women were excluded from the stage rather than from the actual 
auditorium. This tradition was handed down to later generations, as is evidenced in 
the well-known example of Shakespeare’s theatre in Elizabethan England, where only 
young, male actors could act on stage and perform female roles.7  
In line with theatre’s etymological linkage to sight, and given the fact that the 





curious and surprising that feminist writers, critics and performance artists should 
have used the space of the theatre as a sight/site or medium of resistance to what Jay 
calls phallogocularcentric discourse. Yet women’s glaring absence from the stage 
may have been the real prompt or trigger, instigating women to use the theatre in 
general and the theatrical space in particular as a powerful tool in their struggles of 
resistance against patriarchy.  
Although antitheatrical tracts can be traced as far back as Plato, who thought 
one of the reasons that theatre was dangerous was because it effeminized men, it was 
still men who were the privileged actors in theatrical performances. Whilst certainly 
not being the major reason for Plato’s distaste of the theatre, his notion of theatre’s 
feminising capacities is part and parcel of the antitheatrical tradition. In his 
Impersonations: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare’s England Stephen 
Orgel traces, pace Plato, this antitheatrical discourse by showing how several writers 
were afraid that theatre would lead to a kind of ‘universal effeminization’ and arouse 
homoerotic feelings or sexual licentiousness in its spectators (29).  
Such deep-seated fears and anxieties attest to the influential power of theatre. 
It is this dynamic power perhaps which many feminists are taking advantage of in 
their theatrical performances. What further aids their project is the conduciveness of 
theatrical space to flexible, malleable representations.8 Indeed, the stage itself has 
often been represented as a feminine body, a tendency which has been resisted, 
incidentally, by critics such as Gilles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard, who – indebted as 
they were to Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty and his depiction of a machinic 
body, the body without organs – view the body as a technological abstraction or 





  By recourse to Plato’s notion of the chora in his Timaeus, it is possible to 
view the theatrical stage as ‘a labile and unstable notion with undeniable feminine and 
maternal resonances’ (Bianchi 124).9 It is a space which functions ‘as a zone of 
creativity where dwelling, living, being as becoming, is always already taking place 
(142). According to Anne-Marie Smith-Di Biasio, there is a phantasmatic, dream-like 
quality to this chora, this ‘mode of perception like dream, in which the image hovers 
phantom-like and transitional between reminiscence and existence, reminiscence of 
things past and the existence of the day’s residues where it embeds itself’ (217). In 
Kristevan terms, it is also a semiotic, almost prelinguistic space marked by its own 
motility and cadent rhythms which precede the Lacanian Symbolic or its laws of 
signification.10 Hence the theatre can be viewed as a space which exists prior to 
language and representation. 
In Difference and Repetition (1968) Deleuze in fact posits the existence of 
such a theatre in a dynamic model of the theatre as repetition, which ‘is opposed to 
the theatre of representation just as movement is opposed to the concept and to 
representation which refers it back to the concept.’ In such a theatre, nature and 
history come together in ‘a language which speaks before words, with gestures which 
develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and 
phantoms before characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as a “terrible power”’ 
(11-2, italics mine).  
In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and his collaborator 
Félix Guattari posit that such a theatre is opposed to that of representation through a 
psychiatric practice which they call schizoanalysis, which serves to destroy ‘beliefs 
and representations, theatrical scenes’ (314). Whilst such a theatre may seem 





speaks ‘before’ words, since it illustrates Deleuze and Guattari’s attempts to move 
beyond representation – to shatter all representative forms – in the search for a 
mechanistic body of origins which is linked to the repetitive processes of its own 
desiring-production and ‘disengage[s] the deterritorialized flows of desire’ (314).  
Interestingly, Kristeva’s semiotic can also be interpreted in this way. ‘Rather 
than [being] a system of signifiers,’ it can be read as ‘a system (a machine) of breaks-
flows, constantly separating from and connecting with the machine(s) of the 
symbolic, continually grafting onto its body-parts their process of production.’ This 
would explain the irruption of jouissance in the thetic phase, as well as the inscription 
of this phase ‘within a logic of repetition and renewal’ (Margaroni 88). 
Such a logic of repetition implicates desire and trauma in a mimetic 
reproduction of discourses – the constant search for origins which defies historicity – 
without grounding the body firmly in a materialized subjecthood. Unlike feminists 
such as Luce Irigaray, who reads Plato’s description of a cave/chora in his The 
Republic ‘as the womb, from which imprisoned men are led up to the sun of 
enlightenment by the philosophy tutor’ (Hodge 104), Kristeva resists the nostalgic 
urge to return the subject to his or her ontological, embodied consistency. There is no 
unified subject or unified history of the subject, despite Irigaray’s desirous attempts to 
posit a maternal womb as source of origins. Desire for this other/mother is 
mechanistic and remains always already deferred, constantly pointing to the traumatic 
and glaring gap between subject and object, origin and historicity, and the 
impossibility of suturing them.  
Whilst this may be a source of angst for Irigaray, many feminist performers 
actually celebrate this suture, using it to create dramatic effects in theatrical 





and the viewed, can heighten the theatrical experience. Anne Ubersfeld, for example, 
remarks that the desired object, desire itself, constantly eludes fixity of meaning or the 
subject’s definitive grasp. If desire ‘stop[s] and fix[es] on a particular object, then the 
role of spectator is relinquished, the theatrical experience denied’ (Bennett 73).  
In recent years, and especially after the 1960s, various lines of inquiry 
regarding sight (or the site of theatre) have also tried to take account of the 
performative and traumatic ramifications of viewing particular events, both on stage 
and in real life, and how the space of theatre can offer itself as a site of resistance or a 
powerful, political tool in its mediation of various ideologies. This is also tied to 
considerations regarding semiology, the aestheticization of theatre and the general 
issue of spectatorship and audience response. 
 
Aesthetics and the material body 
 
Although post-structuralists like Deleuze and Kristeva insist on the body as a 
de-materialized entity, it is difficult to do away with the physical and biological 
realities of the body, the Western metaphysics of presence. This is what led Herbert 
Blau to assert that, in contrast to all the other performing arts, it is the theatre which 
‘stinks most of mortality’ (83). For the poet T.S. Eliot there is a concrete, actual body 
behind verse in Greek drama: ‘Below the dialogue of Greek drama we are always 
conscious of a concrete visual actuality, and behind that of a specific emotional 
actuality’ (qtd. in Shepherd and Wallis 30).  
The body on stage, the performing body, is also a social body that is inscribed 
in its own historical and political moment. Additionally, there is a body who performs 
and a set of bodies who see and interpret the performance, either via recourse to 





For the psychoanalyst André Green, for example, it is the spectator’s ‘movement of 
identification with the hero (pity, compassion) and his masochistic movement (terror)’ 
which compound his [sic] own pleasure (qtd. in Ellmann 53). Such subjective 
identification adds to the heightened theatrical effect.  
In phenomenological terms, the audience have both an ‘I’ and a roving ‘eye’ 
which can detach itself from an objective and scientific gaze and perceive the world 
through a direct, lived experience with the physical environment. While Green is 
certainly not a phenomenologist – his work seems more indebted to Freudian analysis 
and Wilfred Bion’s theory of projective identification than to anything else – it is 
worth noting that he does not seem troubled by his apparent conflation of the material 
reproduction of the subject’s performance (the scripted and theatrical habitus or 
imitation) with the performative event itself, or with his identificatory one-to-one 
correspondence between the performer and actual ‘hero’ lifted from the written script, 
in an ideological transference in which emotional values are intromitted in a straight 
line and without inflection from character to actor to members of the audience.12 
Additionally, it will be recalled that Freud himself makes a similar ideological move 
or transference when he postulates that the key to interpreting Sophocles’ play 
Oedipus Rex is based on identification, in a heightening of dramatic effect which is 
achieved when the spectators-cum-readers (unconsciously) identify with Oedipus the 
character-cum-actor, since they too wished to kill their father and sleep with their 
mother in childhood yet managed to suppress these desires in order to progress to a 
‘normal’ sexual development as evidenced in later life. 
In opposition to phenomenology, which addresses the physical and material 
realities of the performance situation and the experience of the lived body, semiotics – 





(and of course the body) as imbricated in semiology or a system of cultural signs 
rather than perception. The audience receives pleasure from interpreting a multiplicity 
of semiotic signs, the physical gestures and performative elements of the theatrical 
event. This is tied to Hans Robert Jauss’s theory of audience reception and what he 
famously terms ‘the horizon of expectations,’ the implicit, cultural assumptions which 
the audience are thought to have and which they bring to bear in their interpretation of 
theatrical performances. By way of example, it will be recalled that many Greek 
audiences, via recourse to oral tradition, already knew the story of Oedipus long 
before Sophocles’ dramatization of it. The same, of course, can be said of modern 
audiences who go to the theatre nowadays to watch theatrical performances of 
Shakespeare’s plays with a horizon of preconceived expectations.13 Thus, by 
manipulating and orchestrating an audience’s emotional responses, a director could 
achieve dramatic effects, even directing the audience towards an Aristotelian 
catharsis or the purging of strong emotion. 
In the 1980s and 1990s semiotics, which concerned itself with how meaning 
was constructed and modified in society, was seen as being one of the main driving 
forces in dramatic theory, displacing phenomenology and leading Ubersfeld to note 
that pleasure derived from the theatre is semiotic to the extent that it fills in the gap of 
the absent signifier, be it in the form of ‘a god, the spool of thread for the mother, the 
stage for an absent ‘reality.’ Theatre as sign of a gap-being-filled’ (qtd. in Bennett 
73).  
Thus, through the lens of performance, cultural and psychoanalytic theory 
many theorists have either tried to bridge the gap between the theatrical signifier 
(gesture) and its signified (meaning), between vision and perception, message and 





by recourse to various theories concerning the theatre, the self and the other. One 
strand of this, as we have already mentioned, can be discovered in the work of 
feminist theorists on performance, notably the work of those such as Jill Dolan, 
Rebecca Schneider and Elin Diamond, to name a few, who have pursued this line of 
inquiry by examining the intricate relationships between viewing and perception in 
what is typically identified as phallogocentric theatre and how performance is 
inflected with intersubjective permutations and assumptions about the material body, 
gender, race and even class, assumptions which can be challenged or interrogated 
through aesthetic, theatrical forms in order to undercut – even subvert – phallic 
discourse.   
Diamond, in particular, asserts the possibility of a ‘gestic’ feminist discourse 
by drawing on Brechtian aesthetics and, more specifically, Bertolt Brecht’s theory of 
the gestus, ‘the moment in performance when a play’s implied social attitudes become 
visible to the spectator’ (Unmaking Mimesis xiv). Although she is aware that ‘Brecht 
exhibits a typical Marxian blindness toward gender relations’ (44), she attempts to 
recuperate some of his theories such as the ‘alienation effect’ in order to show the 
payoffs it can have for feminist theory and discourses on gender. Indeed, Brecht’s A-
effect, which stipulates the alienation of the actor from the character he is performing 
– and thus helps ground the character’s historicity ‘in contrast to the actor’s own 
present-time self-awareness on stage’ (50) – can be useful, according to Diamond, in 
dismantling the male gaze from its fixed locus of fetishizing the female body in 
representation. 
Certain performance artists such as Orlan, whom I consider later on in my 
argument, could also be seen as dismantling this gaze through her surgical practices, 





parts, thus positing – in true postmodernist fashion – her fragmented body as text, the 
body-in-pieces which resists conforming to the typology of beauty standardized in the 
Western literary and artistic canon. Since Orlan claims to feel no pain during these 
operations, her performances may be read as attempts to alienate her spectators. 
Additionally, her invocations to theological cosmogonies and her attempts at 
reincarnation can be interpreted as an achievement of what Elaine Scarry calls the 
aversiveness of pain, the ‘sign of pain’s triumph’ (4).14 Such an identification of 
materiality and discourse, the body as text or textual referent, may alert us to the 
stakes involved in eliding the ‘aesthetics’ of Orlan’s perfomative acts.  
As we have seen, the body – whether it is seen as being a material, substantive 
entity or dematerialized, semiotic sign – is caught up in a discourse at the intersection 
of art and body politics, where social and political structures are often (re)enacted and 
(re)produced through individual acts and practices. The gendered body, historicized 
body, performing body, fragmented body, objectified body and the body in pain all 
point to the ineluctable, historical discursivity surrounding the body, from a Western 
metaphysics of presence to a de-subjectified semiotics to a postmodernist revision of 
notions of embodiment, where the body (as well as identity) is relegated to fictive, 
dialogical or constantly emerging and shifting positions.15  
As aforementioned, the fact that the body can also function as a powerful sign 
of absence or loss within the discursive domain is especially prevalent in theatrical 
practices in which the female body is either not represented or comes dangerously 
close to being under constant erasure, suspended as it is ‘between the polarities of 
presence and absence’ (Phelan qtd. in Wray 193). The dialectic of absence/presence 
can be a very powerful political tool in augmenting the hegemony of male desire, with 





Medusas: Reclaiming Hysteria, typically being linked to the hysterical body (221) and 
where even the very visibility of the female body can be seen, paradoxically, as a 
succumbing to phallogocularcentric visual culture.  
Having said this, it is worthwhile noting that this visual realm is never 
completely secure. There is always a space beyond the visual medium or field which 
remains as lack, ‘which cannot be controlled, the unsymbolizable [Lacanian] Real’ 
(Lowry 280). The real can be read as a spatial or psychic category and has been linked 
to trauma since it resists both categorization and symbolic representation. Whatever 
the case, there is always an enigmatic residue which alerts us not only to the limits of 




Enigmatic and visual signifiers  
 
My work is informed by the work of several performance artists and theorists 
in a wide range of fields who examine the relationships and disjunctures between 
vision and perception. It also draws on trauma and psychoanalytic theory in order to 
show how such disjunctures in theatrical and dramatic performance can often lead to 
trauma or an unbridged gap between message and gestural or visual sign. 
Additionally, it points to how this gap can potentially be assimilated by 
acknowledging the ‘other’ both literally and metaphorically, on stage and in 
discourse, by recourse to a wide range of conceptual notions, with the psychoanalyst 
Jean Laplanche’s theory of the ‘enigmatic signifier’ occupying centre stage.  
By revisiting and reformulating Freud’s theory of ‘anaclisis’ (as James 
Strachey translates it) or ‘leaning-on’ or ‘propping’ (Anlehnung), in which Freud 





functions and sexuality, Laplanche draws it away from its hidden latency and gives it 
its due prominence, foregrounding the early mother/child relationship as central to the 
child’s future development. He also posits the notion of an enigmatic signifier or 
message which is transmitted from the adult caretaker – who is, in most cases, the 
mother – to the child and for which the child lacks an interpretative code or system. 
Embodied in extraverbal gestures, signs and physical expressions, these signifiers, 
which are partly sexual in nature and have both semantic and affective content, cannot 
be translated adequately by the child. Indeed, they cannot even be translated by the 
adult since they are simultaneously enigmatic and unconscious, ‘in so far as they are 
not transparent to themselves, but compromised by the adult’s relation to their own 
unconscious, by unconscious sexual fantasies set in motion by his [sic] relation to the 
child’ (Essays on Otherness 79-80). The child will belatedly attempt to translate or 
assimilate these signifiers with their referential signifieds in order to escape, or at least 
mitigate, their traumatic effects.  
Since vision is primarily linked to non-verbal and extra-linguistic cues which 
often escape representation and semanticity, the Laplanchean signifier can, in my 
view, provide us with fruitful ways of reading metatheatrical space, the visible 
performance itself and even the scenes enacted off-stage, which glaringly point to an 
absence or lacuna in visual terms which can forcefully be brought back to the fore of 
our optical terrain and consciousness. For the audience is constantly bombarded by 
clusters of signs and enigmatic signifiers both on and off-stage, signifiers which are 
only fully assimilated afterwards. As Bennett points out, there is a ‘combination and 
succession of visual and aural signs which the audience receives and interprets, some 
fixed but the majority in flux, and which […] signify on a number of possible levels’ 





signs intimately linked to an actor’s performance, which involves movement, 
costume, make-up, and facial and bodily expressions.  
The French film theorist Christian Metz also suggests a relationship between 
the spectatorial and psychic economy of the audience which can be applied to a 
theatrical model of communicative transmission. He proposes that the spectator 
effects a ‘mental leap which alone can lead him [sic] from the perceptual donnée, 
consisting of moving visual and sonic impressions, to the constitution of a fictional 
universe, from an objectively real but denied signifier to an imaginary but 
psychologically real signified’ (qtd. in Bennett 39). It is this mental leap which the 
child must also make in order to arrive at a ‘psychologically real signified.’ 
While clearly the signifiers in theatrical performance are not denied, it is often 
the case that the spectator needs to re(imagine) or (re)construct them in their mind’s 
eye. As Green points out, the spectator’s gaze is denied ‘access to the invisible space 
off-stage,’ that part of the stage which functions as a transgressive space or ‘a 
radically uncrossable limit’ (qtd. in Ellmann 43). This is especially pertinent for my 
analysis of the Ancient Greek play Oedipus Rex by Sophocles, where the audience 
does not see Jocasta’s self-strangulation or even Oedipus’s self-blinding but only 
hears about these events from the Chorus. It is also evident in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, 
where the audience does not see the battles which take place in Act I or Lady 
Macbeth’s assumed suicide. King Duncan’s murder is not enacted on stage and it is 
possible that the same applies to Macbeth’s own death at the hands of Macduff. As 
D.J. Palmer points out in relation to this Shakespearean play, ‘there are degrees of 
visibility, and the language of the play, with its powerful appeal to the visual 
imagination, mediates between the seen and the unseen’ (54). As Merleau-Ponty 





between the eye and the mind, as if the mind were the eye’s metaphor.’ For to look 
‘means postulating a given performance, a constituted space’ (Pontalis 60-1).   
As we have already seen, this space is always limited by the naked eye’s 
capacities to assimilate the visual realm. After all, we can only see the world as it 
stands directly in front of our view rather than the entire world which surrounds us. 
Even the actor on stage is subject to a blind spot which is invisible and unperceived, 
for the subject who mimes ‘cannot see himself miming another at the moment he is 
miming, just as he cannot say that he is playacting precisely while he is acting’ 
(Borch-Jacobsen 39). This has led to several theorists denigrating, even demonizing, 
vision and destabilizing the equivalence of eye/I, knowledge and sight, by pointing to 
the illusory nature of our visual perceptions. This is what Jay has referred to as the 




   I shut my eyes in order to see.  
                            (Paul Gauguin) 
 
There has been an unsettling anxiety about the illusory powers of deception 
surrounding the eye since ancient times. It will be recalled that in The Republic Plato 
points to the deceptive nature of sight by giving his famous example or allegory of a 
shadowed cave in which people are enchained, and in which they can see shadows 
reflected and projected on its walls through a fire which is behind them. Once the 
philosopher leaves this cave to turn towards the sun, he comes to the realization that 
these shadows are only reflections of the real rather than ‘true’ forms of reality, 
showing Plato’s uncertainty and distrust when it came to relying solely on our sensory 





with mimetic arts such as the theatre in The Republic, for the cave functions very 
much like an operating theatre, with its own illusionistic apparatus or set-up of 
shadows, lights and perspectives, which compels the chained men to only see forward 
rather than the fire – the actual method or mode of production – which is behind them.  
It will be recalled that the postmodern feminist Irigaray takes up a critique of 
Plato’s cave and transforms it into a womb-theater, materializing Plato’s worst fears 
about theatre and its mimetic nature, the antivisual and female duplicitousness by 
positing no originary source of mimetic representation. She criticizes the supremacy 
of the male gaze in a predominantly phallocratic culture, claiming that ‘the eye 
objectifies and it masters. It sets at a distance, and maintains a distance. In our culture 
the predominance of the look over smell, taste, touch and hearing has brought about 
an impoverishment of bodily relations’ (qtd. in Vasseleu 129).16 
It is evident that in Greek culture Plato was not alone in his anxieties about the 
illusory nature of sight. The story of Narcissus is a case in point, as is the myth of 
Medusa, the Gorgon whose transfixed stare petrified into stone those who looked at 
her directly.17 There were very real fears lurking in people’s minds about the 
malevolent power of the evil eye. ‘The frequent existence of apotropaic amulets and 
other devices to disarm the evil eye (which the Greeks called the baskanos opthalmos) 
also suggests how widespread the fear of being seen existed here as elsewhere’ (Jay 
28). The distrust of literal sight and normal vision was also responsible for the 
privileging of the figurative and metaphorical sight of the seer, who was seen as 
having ‘inner vision’ and who could see truths which were denied to the naked eye. It 
is this which leads Oedipus to say of the blind prophet Tiresias that he is the ‘master 





and that his mind can see how the city of Thebes is faced with a plague only he can 
cure.  
Plato’s anxieties regarding sight are taken up by the German philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche in the nineteenth century, who rereads Plato and effects a 
powerful critique that was to become highly influential in philosophical circles in 
France in the 1960s and 1970s. With Nietzsche comes the death of the Sun-God, that 
source of fiery illumination par excellence which illumines ‘a reality of forms,’ only 
to be ‘replaced by a thousand and one suns shining on a multitude of different 
realities’ (Jay 190). This view saw vision as being both passive and active and 
implicated in a multiplicity of different angles and perspectives. Hence the death of 
God and the God’s-eye view in favour of a multiplication of eyes and a multitude of 
ways of looking at the world.   
The metaphor of the sun as being a source of knowledge was also taken up by 
Georges Bataille, who shattered any Hegelian illusions of an absolute and 
transcendental knowledge by positing both a ‘solar’ anus and a ‘rotten’ sun (Jay 223). 
His works are marked by the violence which is repeatedly done to the eye. One of 
Bataille’s contemporaries, the Surrealist painter Salvador Dali (about whose work 
Bataille in fact wrote) shares a similar, materialist bent, with paintings such as ‘The 
Stinking Ass’ (1928) and others where the violence of imagery and the depictions of 
dismembered or decomposing bodies, images of castration, ejaculation and fellatio, 
even excrement, are quite prevalent. I shall return to the relationship between Bataille 
and Dali in my examination of Dali’s Un chien andalou (1929) in Chapter One.  
Even the late Merleau-Ponty, in his revisions regarding the importance of 
perception, contributed to the antiocularcentric discourse. By positing a flesh of the 





everywhere, Merleau-Ponty posits an inhuman gaze and overthrows the subject’s 
observatorial position, for ‘it is not I who sees, not he who sees, because an 
anonymous invisibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general’ (142). Such a 
presupposition, with its post-humanist inflections, unroots vision from its subjective 
base and places it in an impersonal Being, the flesh of the world. ‘What I want to do is 
restore the world as a meaning of Being absolutely different from the “represented,” 
that is, as the vertical Being which none of the “representations” exhaust and which 
all “reach,” the wild Being’ (253).  
The French social theorist Michel Foucault was to renounce phenomenology 
altogether, since for him, unlike Merleau-Ponty, ‘the light-Being refers only to 
visibilities’ (Deleuze qtd. in Jay 387). For Foucault, who draws on Jeremy Bentham’s 
famous example of the Panopticon in his Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, there can be no ‘benign interaction of the visible and the invisible in the flesh 
of the world’ (Jay 382). This is so because society is tightly imbricated in an 
authoritative and hierarchical structure of constant, controlled surveillance. Foucault 
states:  
       Our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance […] We are much less Greeks 
than we believe. We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic 
machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are a part of 
its mechanism (217). 
                                                                    
Even when there are spectacles or regal processions, where many can view the 
few or even the one embodied in the person of the king or monarch himself, these are, 
according to Foucault, tightly regulated and subsumed under this strict mechanism of 
surveillance and social control. There is no way out of this round-the-clock and 
mechanistic apparatus of control. As Jay notes, ‘There was therefore no real escape 
from the “current empire of the gaze” into a more benign heterotropic alternative. For 





hostility]’ (416). With the advent of new forms of technology, which could improve 
and extend the eye’s field of vision, the power of such scopic regimes could be further 
compounded. 
 
Eyes mediated through technology 
 
In Illuminations Walter Benjamin discusses the power of the camera to 
mediate between the seen and unseen. For the camera is seen as ‘penetrating’ into the 
human unconscious, and drawing forth an ‘unconscious optics’ which would 
otherwise have remained invisible to the naked eye: ‘Evidently a different nature 
opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye – if only because an 
unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored by 
man’ (230).  
In late industrial and postmodernist culture technological machines or visual 
apparatuses are read as prosthetic extensions of the body’s capabilities.  What is more, 
the boundaries between bodies and machines, interior states of subjectivity and the 
external world, come crashing down only to be reconfigured in new ways, in ‘stylized 
assemblages of bodies, mechanisms, and landscapes.’ By drawing on ‘the logic of the 
modernist industrial design of streamlining,’ machine culture replaces the natural 
body with the naturalized body, and the machine itself becomes ‘anthropomorphized 
and domesticated’ (Seltzer 242). The body itself is no longer seen as simply being an 
image or semiotic sign; it is an inner machine covered with outer skin. ‘Under the 
skin, the body is an over-heated factory’ (Artaud qtd. in Seltzer 242).  
This inside/outside divide has led to an obsessive desire to rip or tear the skin 
apart in order to see what lies underneath it. In her discussion of Gothic horror and 





through which inner identities emerge and upon which external readings of identity 
leave their impression.’ In horror movies the viewers are provided with what 
Halberstam refers to as skin shows or ‘a virtual skinfest’ whose main focus is ‘the 
shredding, ripping, or tearing of skin as a spectacle of identity performance and its 
breakdown’ (141). For critics such as Baudrillard, this description would hardly seem 
virtual in an era of post-industrial capitalism, where the wounded, fragmented or torn 
body can be found everywhere and is merely an abstract sign divorced from any 
anatomico-physiological setting, a mere symbol in ‘a world where all value has been 
reduced to the symbolic exchange of signifiers and as a result is fated to ‘indifference’ 
and equivalence, or rather the loss of all value’ (Harris 74).  
Whatever the implications of Baudrillard’s bleak and ‘valueless’ postmodern 
outlook, I would like to hold on to Halberstam’s notion of identity performance as 
spectacle, as well as her focus on skin shows since it can help us to shed some light on 
modern dramatic performances such as those of Orlan and Franko B, whose radical 
skincutting in front of an audience, what I call blood play, allows us to 
reconceptualize the relationships between the body and the skin, materiality and 
consciousness.  
Indeed, some critics such as Steven Connor have even tried to refute this 
relationship. As Connor notes in The Book of Skin the skin is not the body but can be 
viewed as ‘the body’s twin, or shadow.’ The skin ‘is always in excess of, out in front 
of the body, but as another body. The skin is thus always in part immaterial, ideal, 
ecstatic, a skin that walks’ (29). This notion of a walking skin is reminiscent, perhaps, 
of Orlan’s assertions that her body is merely a ‘vehicle’ in her search for her own 






What is elided or downplayed in such accounts is the acknowledgment of 
trauma. Connor only provides one reference for it in his index, and we have already 
seen how Orlan refuses to admit that her performances involve psychic and physical 
pain. Yet viewers of her performances who come to identify with her may disagree 
with her admissions. The following section fleshes out the relationship of vision to 
trauma and how performance and spectacle can function as explicitly traumatic 
events.  
 
Scopic regimes and traumatic visions 
 
      According to Juliet Mitchell, trauma creates a gap in signification because it ‘is a 
breaking through of protective boundaries in such a violent (either physical or mental) 
way that the experience cannot be processed: the mind or body or both are breached, 
leaving a gap or wound within’ (Siblings 9). In effect, trauma is a crisis, even a 
dissolution, of representation. By definition it ‘cannot be represented’ (206). It severs 
the signifier from the signified at the time of its occurrence such that any attempts to 
belatedly represent or reconstruct the meaning of the traumatic event or experience 
are met with linguistic resistance, fraught as they are in ‘a language that defies, even 
as it claims, our understanding’ (Caruth 5). Indeed, for certain eminent clinicians such 
as Bessel van der Kolk, trauma itself cannot be tackled via narrativized mechanisms 
of recall and memory retrieval. As Ruth Leys points out in her descriptive and critical 
analysis of van der Kolk’s theorizations regarding trauma, traumatic memory is 
‘iconic’ rather than subject to procedures of narrativization, ‘by which [van der Kolk] 
means that it is dissociated from all verbal-linguistic-semantic representation. 
Traumatic memories are “mute,” because they cannot be expressed in verbal-





memories, images and emotions rooted in the body can only be retrieved ‘by therapies 
of a nonlinguistic or “iconic” kind,’ which involve painting and drawing (249).  
Quoting the physician van der Kolk, Eric Rosenberg uses his theories on 
trauma to elucidate Walker Evans’s work on photography in view of the Great 
Depression in the early 1930s. As van der Kolk points out, trauma has the capacity to 
create speechlessness and what I would like to call ‘a regression’ to imagistic or 
‘iconic’ representations: ‘Experience cannot be organized on a linguistic level, and 
this failure to arrange memory in words and symbols leaves it to be organized on a 
somatosensory or iconic level: as somatic sensations, behavioural reenactments, 
nightmares, and flashbacks’ (Rosenberg 41).  
Although Leys makes valid claims in her criticisms of van der Kolk’s 
approach to trauma, in its treatment of ‘pictures and visual images as if they were 
inherently nonsymbolic’ (249), I would still like to hold on to this concept of 
traumatic memory as being primarily visual. Additionally, I would also like to hang 
on to the idea of trauma as a gap in signification, as well as its resistance to belated 
narrativization, since it is precisely these aspects which allow us to come full circle 
and reinstantiate Laplanche’s theory of the enigmatic signifier. For what is the 
enigmatic signifier if it is not an instance of the failure to assimilate and narrate the 
visual sign, that critical moment when the non-linguistic signifier as image fails to 
bind itself to a signified (meaning/concept) or signifieds? Trauma occurs at precisely 
this juncture, between assimilation and its resistance, between what is assimilated and 
what remains as an untranslatable residue, that is, ‘between what is symbolisable and 
what is not in the enigmatic messages supplied to the child [or adult]’ (Essays on 





infant from the very beginning ‘as a blasting out, an annihilation of the proto-subject, 
a gap in its existence’ (Siblings 42).  
This is important for two major reasons. Firstly, because it allows us to link 
trauma to nonverbal/visual and theatrical representations (for, after all, theatre is 
invariably linked to sight) and to posit a theatrical model in which the actor supplies 
enigmatic signifiers to the audience which the audience must then belatedly attempt to 
assimilate if trauma is to be averted or at least mitigated.18 Secondly, it allows us to 
bring in (or rather to bring back) the other into the model of trauma, to move, that is, 
from ‘a generalized Ptolemaic model of endogenous development’ towards ‘a 
Copernican, other-centred, exogenous model of traumatic seduction’ (Fletcher 26). 
For ‘one’s own trauma is tied up with the trauma of another’ (Caruth 80). It is not an 
intrapsychic affair and hence ‘it is unrealistic to separate the individual’s 
psychological state from the multiple social forces by which it has been shaped, and 
in which it continues to be embedded’ (van der Kolk 153).  
Yet, to begin with, ‘trauma’ (taken from the Greek and meaning ‘wound’), the 
very notion of trauma itself, curiously wavers between the intrapsychical and the 
social, the physiological and the psychical. Thus while medicine had, in the main, 
recognized trauma as purely physical, Freud’s psychoanalytic framework brought 
psychical trauma onto the scene also, in the form of an ‘internal foreign body,’ a 
shock to the system, which originates primarily from without and attacks – 
secondarily – from within. As he points out in Studies on Hysteria, which Laplanche 
quotes, the psychical trauma ‘acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must 
be continued to be regarded as an agent that is still at work’ (Life & Death in 
Psychoanalysis 42). Thus there is an internal-external bind or double logic here – 





curiously wavers between inner and outer worlds (42). Thus while the shock of a car 
crash, for example, is an external event, the trauma (or rather the memory of the 
trauma) which it produces in the subject is at once physical and – although belatedly – 
psychical. 
The internal-external bind also allows us to posit an ineluctable collapse 
between private and public boundaries, which is in itself a traumatic affair, and this is 
borne out by the trauma of the wound itself, which serves as an ambivalent marker on 
the cusp between the private and the public, perception and representation. As Caruth 
points out, the wound attempts to reach out to the other, to speak to the other and 
make it bear witness to its trauma. It is ‘the encounter with another, through the very 
possibility and surprise of listening to another’s wound’ (80). Whether this listening 
actually materializes is another matter altogether. 
I would like to hold on to this idea of trauma as wavering between the internal 
and external, since it is precisely this wavering or oscillation of trauma which, in my 
view, lends the wounds or cuts in Orlan’s and Franko B’s performances – mediated as 
they are through technological apparatuses – such an ambivalent status, making them 
appear at once psychical and social, virtual and real, a matter of both representation 
and perception at the same time. For while critics such as Baudrillard see wounds as 
being primarily ‘symbolic’ and semiotic, as disembodied artefacts or signs which 
circulate in a meaningless semiotics, the gaping wounds of Orlan’s face and Franko 
B’s body seem to specify otherwise. For they may be abstract signs, but they are also 
embodied, ‘real’ events. ‘They [describe] an exact language of pain (emphasis mine) 
and sensation, eroticism and desire’ (Ballard 90).  
And, as we have already seen, wounds, like eyes, are the switch-point between 





they are private. As such, they do not meaninglessly circulate in a scopic, symbolic or 
erotic economy; they mark an event, a traumatic event which in itself has made 
possible this endless circulation and play of signifiers. And, what is more, it is 
precisely in this endless circulation that trauma is to be located. Hence the logic of 
trauma mimesis is played out. It is not simply that the wound-signs evidence the 
trauma; trauma comes back; it recurs in the circulation of wound-signs. More 
precisely, the recurrence of the trauma itself is traumatic in this endless circulation of 
signifiers.  
It is the very mimetization of trauma which reproduces the trauma once more, 
‘a trauma within a trauma,’ trauma mimetized. Yet, on another level, this very 
mimetization of trauma has the curious effect of also dispelling, even obliterating, the 
trauma (an effacement which serves once more to reawaken the trauma in an endless, 
repetitive cycle). As Jacques Derrida has occasion to remark in one of his interviews, 
to date a work of art such as a poem is to inscribe it with a wound which is 
straightaway effaced, since the date itself marks the poem’s singularity as an event at 
the same time as that singularity is necessarily lost in the date’s very iterability. And 
this is the same for all experiences in general:                                                                
                 Given that all experience is the experience of a singularity and thus is the desire to keep this    
              singularity as such, the “as such” of the singularity, that is, what permits one to keep it as what 
              it is, this is what effaces it right away. 
                                                                                    (Passages - from Traumatism to Promise 378) 
 
Thus at the same time as the traumatic event attempts to mark its singularity, 
there is a countermovement which constantly puts this singularity under erasure. 
Wounds are never quite singular events: they are iterable, repeatable, reproducible. 
They are concrete markers of pain that may also function as abstract, disembodied 
signs. As such, they are disseminated along the semiotic system like signatures, 





in Margins of Philosophy, signatures function only in so far as they are repeatable or 
iterable, and thus able to be repeated in several different contexts (that is, the very 
fact of the signature’s grounded repeatability ensures precisely that it can be repeated 
elsewhere). ‘In order to function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a 
repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to detach itself from the present and 
singular intention of its production’ (328). Hence a signature, like a wound, can be 
endlessly counterfeited, imitated and simulated. This is nowhere more powerfully 
depicted than in Orlan’s constant reproductive simulation of injuries through the 
mediation of her photographic images.  
As Mark Seltzer documents in Serial Killers, there has come to be an 
increasing fascination with trauma as a form of public display, a fascination which has 
led to the creation of what he calls a ‘wound culture’, a ‘public fascination with torn 
and open bodies and torn and opened persons, a collective gathering around shock, 
trauma, and the wound’ (1). Orlan’s and Franko B’s performances are certainly a case 
in point, where performative wounds become not merely private but social, a public 
exhibit which is opened out for others to see. The wounds are not just a focal point 
which is often invested with erotic desire, religiously admired to the point of mystic 
idealization, but a contact-point or switch-point between inner and outer worlds. ‘The 
switch-point, or crash-point, between inside and outside is, above all, the wound’ 
(Seltzer 264).19  
Wounds have clearly always been invested with religious significance. The 
wounds of Christ, for example, have often been visualized in paintings and Armando 
Favazza clearly shows how self-mutilators often draw on ‘powerful religious and 
shamanic symbols’ in their ritualized practices of self-cutting (46). Even Orlan, who 





purports to subjecting herself under the knife in order to attain reincarnation or a state 
of transcendent nirvana – a point to which I shall return. 
Thus the image of the wound resonates with religious and mystical 
undertones. As Favazza acknowledges, ‘Through the spilling of blood and the 
removal of limbs, the garden of relationships among humans, god, and nature is 
watered, pruned, and cultivated.’ Harmony and equilibrium are maintained and 
reestablished through the eternal struggles between individuals and by way of 
religious ‘myths and personal dramas of dismemberment and reassembly, of 
wounding and healing’ (322). Paradoxically, cutting the body into pieces is seen as an 
entry into wholeness, rebirth and renewal, a fulfilment of the subject’s nostalgic desire 
to attain unified wholeness. 
This somewhat optimistic reading is echoed by several trauma theorists who 
deal with the psycho-physiological aspects of trauma. As Peter Levine notes: ‘In the 
theater of the body, trauma can be transformed. The fragmented elements that 
perpetuate traumatic emotion and behaviour can be completed, integrated, and made 
whole again. Along with this wholeness comes a sense of mastery and resolution’ 
(189). Although Levine is specifically referring to psychical rather than physical 
trauma, it is important that he returns once more to the body, to the ‘theatre of the 
body,’ as the starting point of discourse and as the cathartic site of resolution. Theatre, 
trauma, vision – all three of them come together in the body.  
* 
 
As Judith Herman points out: ‘The study of psychological trauma has a 
curious history – one of episodic amnesia. Periods of active investigation have 
alternated with periods of oblivion’ (7). She traces three key moments in history when 





movement in France in the late nineteenth century, the shell shock of World War I 
and Vietnam War veterans and the sexual and domestic violence against women 
which fuelled the feminist movement (9).  
Yet while trauma, or rather the study of trauma, is marked by moments of 
historical prominence, its oversight in other periods of history does not preclude its 
earlier existence. Thus my work employs a transhistorical approach because it is 
informed by a model of trauma which transcends time and place and also seeks to 
explore the convoluted relationships and permutations between sight and trauma – on 
both a literal and performative level – through time. It attempts to trace a cultural 
history of the gaze and of theatre, which, as we have already seen, is already 
intimately linked to theory and vision.  
Theatre has clearly existed since prehistoric times. Yet the material and social 
conditions of dramatic performances and theatrical events have changed throughout 
time, permitting us to view the theatre with fresh eyes and from a myriad of 
theoretical and ocular positions. Thus my work draws not only on the work of 
phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty but also on the work of a wide 
range of diverse critical scholars and cultural and feminist theorists on trauma, vision 
and performance such as Cathy Caruth, Laura Mulvey, Juliet Mitchell, Martin Jay, 
Elin Diamond, Rebecca Schneider and Jill Dolan, amongst others. It also draws quite 
heavily from psychoanalytic theory in order to flesh out the relationship of vision to 
trauma and how performance and spectacle can function as explicitly traumatic 
events.  
The theoretical background of this relationship is elaborated in great detail in 
Chapter One, which serves as an introduction into the associative links between 





backdrop to the subsequent chapters. Through an examination of Sophocles’ 
canonical play Oedipus Rex in Chapter Two and Shakespeare’s Macbeth in Chapter 
Three (both of which are examined by Freud), as well as an examination of their 
similarities in Chapter Four by recourse to their subversive potential in performance, 
and on to more recent self-reflexive performances of trauma like those of Franko B 
and the French performance artist Orlan, which are elaborated in great detail in 
Chapters Five and Six, respectively, I hope to show how the theoretical background 
on performance and vision, and through the lens of trauma theory, can shed light on 
and sharpen our understanding of these performaces/plays. In short, an analysis of 
these performances will serve to illustrate the performativity of trauma through sight, 
that is, how vision (and nonvision) can become a traumatic and repetitive event when 
the signifier or gestural sign resists assimilation or incorporation into the figural space 
of definitive signification and meaning by both the character/performer/actor and the 
audience.  
While my choice of dramatic plays and performances may seem somewhat 
arbitrary, I have chosen them specifically because it is my contention that this model 
of trauma – a model which transcends time and space and is produced when the visual 
sign is wrested away or dislodged from a meaningful signified or system of 
signification – is powerfully evidenced in them. It is the viewing which enacts the 
trauma for both the actor/character and the spectator. While clearly not all acts of 
looking are traumatic, it is performances and plays such as these which can, in my 
view, attest to the breakdown in signification precisely because they are so heavily 
saturated and preoccupied with the sight (site) of trauma as a gruesome, ghastly event 
and the failure to suture or even register the frightening gap or chiasmus between 





In order to develop this idea of a breakdown in signification in more concrete 
terms I have chosen to use Laplanche’s psychoanalytic theory, or rather his 
metapsychology, of the ‘enigmatic’ signifier, which serves as a reformulation of 
Freud’s theory concerning the self and (m)other. Although Freud relegates women 
and their sexuality to some dark and obscure Minoan age of civilization, Laplanche 
brings back the female other into the forefront of his conceptual framework. It is my 
contention that it is precisely this theory which can bring back the other on the stage20 
and serves to unmoor the subject’s/actor’s/audience’s assumptions of wholistic 
identity and meaning. Additionally, it may be used by feminist and critical theorists 
on gender and performance in order to further our understanding of theatrical 
conventions and activities.  
From a feminist point of view, it would certainly go a long way towards 
bringing back the female other in performance and reclaiming her subjective status or 
presence, a presence which was, incidentally, non-existent in antiquity on the Ancient 
Greek stage and in Renaissance theatre. It would be a fruitful enterprise to pursue the 
idea further of how the enigmatic, usually genderized signifier can function on stage 
in order to disrupt the male subject’s phantasy of phallocentric power.21 Additionally, 
the enigmatic signifier may also point us towards a potentially fruitful reading of 
metatheatrical space and the scenes enacted off-stage. To consider the theory of the 
‘enigmatic signifier’ is to attempt to locate the trauma beyond tragic representation.  
Thus I shall attempt to use the concept of this enigmatic signifier in order to 
‘wed’ psychoanalysis with performance, cultural and feminist theories. However, it is 
important at the outset to make clear that while my work may be seen as developing 
from within psychoanalytic theories of trauma and sight, I am much more interested in 





and categories (which is why my reading will encompass thinkers and philosophers as 
diverse as Adam Smith, Georges Bataille and Paul de Man). Like all theories, I am 
not blind to the fact that Freudian psychoanalysis does have its limits and 
shortcomings, a point which will become explicitly clear in the chapters which follow. 
Thus I find it more worthwhile to examine Oedipus and Macbeth, together with 
Franko B and Orlan, as actors for the most part rather than patients. For by taking the 
latter approach, and by torturing the patients ‘unto death’ through extensive analyses, 
the literature has consistently come up against blindspots.  
‘All the world’s a stage,’ says the pessimist Jaques in Shakespeare’s As You 
Like It, ‘And all the men and women merely players’ (2.7.139-40). It is only by 
acknowledging that these characters are also actors caught up in their own destiny that 
a more dynamic reading can materialize, a reading which sees visual acts and gestures 
as truly performative and traumatic events. More importantly, such a reading would 






























The Fractured I/Eye and the Traumatic Gaze in Theatre 
 
 
…for me to have not an idea, an image, nor a representation, but as it were the imminent 
experience of them, it suffices that I look at a landscape, that I speak of it with someone. 
Then, through the concordant operation of this body and my own, what I see passes into 
him…There is here no problem of the alter ego because it is not I who sees, because an 
anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial 
property that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of radiating everywhere and forever, 
being an individual, of being also a dimension and a universal.  
                                                                                                                  (Merleau-Ponty 142) 
                                                                                                                               
 
What Merleau-Ponty so rightly illustrates in his ground-breaking work on vision 
and its dynamics is that the very question of seeing is not only intimately linked, in 
Kantian terms, to representation and perception but is also a bodily experience which 
is inscribed on the flesh.1 Yet the very process of this inscription presupposes not just 
a viewing subject who sees (in the sense of either mentally perceiving an object or 
having it readily available to sight through physical and tangible representation) but 
also a viewing subject who can iterate, in the ‘here and now’, through what Julia 
Kristeva calls a state of flesh, what he sees to an other outside himself, the not-I which 
serves to moor the subject’s scopic vision to the realm of concrete experience.2 
Thus a two-fold process is ensured whereby the thing that is seen is also iterated 
in and through language, mediated through my flesh to ‘pass into’ the other. Yet even 
before this idea-image-representation passes through the semiotic system of signs, 
that is, before I can even begin to verbalize that which I see and hence enact a folding 
into the other’s skin through my own body’s ‘semiotic function,’ I need to be able to 
assimilate the concatenation of symbols which pass before my field of vision into a 
kind of semantic coherence.3 This is precisely why sight itself has such mesmerising 





realm of recognition. As John Berger aptly points out in Ways of Seeing, ‘seeing 
comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can speak’ (7).4 Thus 
assimilation of the scopic field and recognition of its existence precede experiential 
knowledge that is acquired via recourse to a linguistic system.   
Undoubtedly this field of vision itself encapsulates both the perceived object as 
it is mentally imaged and the physical object per se in all its materiality. That there is, 
to begin with, a split between the mental idea of an object and its physical 
representation in reality is not a novel idea. Plato, for example, postulates in his 
philosophical writings that material objects are merely imitations of a ‘real’ form or 
idea which is both abstract and transcendent, a form which breaks with spatio-
temporal boundaries and subsists along the axis of representation as both a mental 
image and a pure archetype beyond the sphere of mental consciousness.5  
Certainly it is noteworthy that Plato’s pupil Aristotle expounds on the faulty 
reasoning which is implicit in the Platonic Idea, insofar as it manifests itself simply as 
a pure and transcendental entity that is divorced from individual sense-perception and 
anchored in a public domain of universals. Yet what interests me here is not so much 
whether the image can exist independently of the mind or the perceptual apparatus. 
Nor is it a question of whether the image functions as a concrete representation of 
some universal archetype or is subsumed under the realm of individual sensory 
experience and thus subsequent knowledge. To pose such a bipolarity would, in 
effect, be a disservice; all images can be detached from spatio-temporal contexts and 
relegated to some conceptual sphere of abstraction, yet this is not to say that these 
images cannot be brought to bear on an individual’s sensory perception within the 





Hence, whereas it is undoubtedly the case that individual sense-perception 
precedes the universal or public domain of reality (either as abstract or concrete), it is 
the subsequent interaction of individuals with this domain which consolidates their 
knowledge of the outside world as constituted in and through ideas and 
representations. Thus one mode of reasoning leads on inevitably to the next in a 
coexistent series, and it is the constant interaction between these two modes which 
allows for what Merleau-Ponty defines as both ‘a dimension and a universal.’  
In terms of dimensional self-reflexivity, the visual image first inscribes itself as 
sense-perception in the mind’s eye.7 As Simon Goldhill points out, this concern with 
self-reflexivity is certainly not a new concept; it can be traced as far back as the 5th 
century in Ancient Greece. The Greeks had established the connection between 
knowledge and sight through their common etymological derivation: ‘Since in Greek 
the word “to know” (eidenai) is semantically and morphologically cognate with the 
word “to see” (idein), the “analytique du regard” is always already an anatomy of the 
subject’s claim to know’ (20).8 Thus the visual image’s sensory inscription in the 
mind always already assumes its assimilation and incorporation into consciousness. 
However, for the image to gain its full semantic impact, in other words, for the image 
to be fully able to cloak itself in invested meaning, it needs to be mediated through 
an-other’s field of vision. As Sartre explains in Existentialism and Humanism (1946): 
‘I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of 
another. The other is indispensable to my existence’ (45). As Berger aptly observes, 
‘soon after we can see, we are aware that we can also be seen. The eye of the other 
combines with our own eye to make it fully credible that we are part of the visible 





Yet since the mental image itself is only an imitation of its actual physical 
representation, it necessarily follows that what is incorporated or internalized within 
the mind’s eye is only a referential and disembodied sign of the material image.9  
Thus on a scopic level, this schism between perception and representation creates an a 
priori fracture between the organic eye which sees and the mental eye which 
perceives, a disequivalence between the I/eye. This schism or disjunction has led 
critics such as Lacan to posit a split between the gaze/eye by recourse to a visual 
theory which incorporates the other and hence destabilizes the observing subject’s 
privileged, ocular position. Since the gaze becomes externalized in an other or other 
object, ‘the viewing subject becomes merely a function of the visual field’ who is 
divested of his mastery and ‘becomes the object in and of a spectacle’ (de Bolla 68).  
Other critics have tended to either fetishize or objectify the eye, while at the 
same time maintaining a wary apprehension of its deceptive and illusory powers. 
Disillusioned by the First World War and its visually disorienting effect, with its 
‘bewildering landscape of indistinguishable, shadowy shapes, illuminated by lightning 
flashes of blinding intensity, and then obscured by phantasmagoric, often gas-induced 
haze’ (Jay 212), many critics such as Bataille and Surrealist artists such as Dali tried 
to provide complex, often violent, interrogations of vision after the war. As E. Ann 
Kaplan notes in Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and 
Literature, ‘French surrealism dealt with the unconscious and with terror in the wake 
of World War I in painting and visual culture’ (85). Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928), 
which came out in four editions, and Dali’s filmic masterpiece Un chien andalou 
(1928) are postwar attempts to interrogate this visual culture.10 
In his graphic Story of the Eye, which borders on pornographic art and 





see. In it, the heroine Simone is seen playing with the enucleated eye of a strangled 
priest and inserting it ‘into the profound crevice of her arse,’ as if it were some 
fetishized object or dildo. When the narrator, as onlooker, slides Simone’s thighs open 
he sees the eye ‘gazing’ back at him, and he discovers that he ‘even felt as if my eyes 
were bulging from my head, erectile with horror’ (Bataille 66-7, italics mine). The 
eye thus becomes a phallic symbol, erect and tumescent. Yet it is not merely 
eroticized or fetishized but rooted out of the material body to become nothing more 
than a spherical sign circulating in an endless chain of signifiers. As Roland Barthes 
makes clear in his analysis of Bataille’s story, it cannot be said ‘that the metaphor sets 
out from the genital to end up with such apparently asexual objects as egg, eye, or 
sun.’ There is no predominant sign, not even the eye, because all signs slide into other 
signs so that the story becomes ‘a perfectly spherical metaphor: each of its terms is 
always the significant of another term (no term being a simple thing signified) without 
it being possible ever to break the chain’ (The Metaphor of the Eye 122).  
This gives rise to a collage of Surrealist images – interlinked metaphors such as 
egg, eye, sun and testicle – which possess the ‘metonymic freedom’ to spill or slip 
into an endless ‘exchange [of] meanings and usages.’ Thus suns can cry, beams of 
light can turn into streams of urine, eggs can be sucked like breasts and the bull’s 
testicle can be bitten ‘like an egg’ or inserted into the body (The Metaphor of the Eye 
125). Unlike James Thomson’s ‘bleeding eyeless socket’ (12) in The City of Dreadful 
Night (1870-4), which represents blindness and the horror or resignation of the loss of 
religious faith – a symbolic foreclosure of the signified avant la lettre – Bataille’s eye 
wanders endlessly across Simone’s thighs in an endless chain of signification. 
Yet the story of the enucleation of the eye and the often violent separation of 





(1929) by Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dali, which Bataille had seen, there is a well-
known, opening scene of Buñuel sharpening a razor and then using it to neatly slice 
through a woman's eye. This graphic scene is shot in an extreme close-up as the eye’s 
vitreous fluids ooze down like jelly.  
 
 
Plate 1.1 Un Chien Andalou – Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dali, 1929. Xianart. 
Photo: Christian Stalley.  
 
Since Buñuel was acquainted with Freud’s work, the act of enucleation can also 
be seen as a substitute displacement for the fear of castration.11 In ‘The ‘Uncanny’’ 
(1919) Freud points to the relationship between the eye and the male genitalia:  
 
     A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has taught us that anxiety about one's eyes, the fear   
of going blind, is often enough a substitute for the dread of being castrated. The self-blinding of   
the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a mitigated form of the punishment of castration.   
                                                                                                                                                  (352)  
 
It is also known that Freud and the artist Dali briefly met in 1938. This meeting 
is documented by Gilbert Rose in Trauma and Mastery in Life and Art (1987). As 





[and] fascinated with Dali’s combination of passion and control’ due to his inner 
conflict ‘between derogatory and idealizing attitudes’ in relation to art (13).  
For Dali’s work is marked by overflowing images of dismembered bodies which 
can barely be contained within their referential frame, and deals with anxieties 
relating to vision and the chiasmus between representation and perception. Of course 
such anxieties have also been depicted by other painters and artists as well. They are 
captured and interrogated quite powerfully, in fact, by the Mexican painter Frida 
Kahlo (who was influenced by Dali) in many of her sketches. Kahlo was obsessed 
with trauma and vision, as well as photography, and several of her sketches depict the 
third eye or spiritual chakra, which represents the inner eye of wisdom in several 
religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism. Like Dali, her work is saturated in 
surrealist images of the dismembered body, as well as wandering or multiple eyes 
dislocated from their sockets (Plate 1.3). In a piece entitled The Watching Eye (1934) 
she shows the disjunction between perception and representation, as the eye attempts 
to arrogate and imprint onto itself all the things within its visual domain. Yet, as Plate 
1.2 shows, these images cannot be contained and sip out into the sclera. 
 
 
Plate 1.2  The Watching Eye, 1934, Pencil on paper, 8” x 12”. Collection of Juan 








Plate 1.3  Karma II, 1946, Pencil and ink on paper, 8½” x 11¼”. Private Collection, 
New York. 
 
Vision is multiple and fractured. What is more, this fracturing of vision, 
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s multitudinous suns, is further proliferated by the mediation 
of the eye of the other, which serves to split subjective markers of vision into 
supplementary fragments. This is always mediated through a discourse of desire. As 
Irit Rogoff notes, there are two critical traditions of the gaze. Whilst one is concerned 
with the gaze as an instrument in the investigation and validation of scientific and 
technological Western post-enlightenment processes, the other implicates desire and 
spectatorship through a mediated other. Thus ‘the gaze as desire’ divides 
‘spectatorship into the arena of desiring subjects and desired objects, a separation 
increasingly tempered by the slippages between the ever-eroding boundaries of 





The subject, constituted as it is by the other’s gaze and desire, is caught in a 
traumatic exchange or dialectic of gazes. The body is thus objectified and, like the 
actor on a stage, put ‘on display to the gaze of the Other’ (Jay 289). In this display the 
body constantly slips, according to Rogoff, between ‘exclusive objecthood and 
coherent subjecthood.’ Since the gaze is often conceived of as being masculine, there 
has been a growing interrogation amongst feminist artists of how the gaze, which is 
often fetishistic, attempts to objectify and master the female body as object. In an 
attempt to subvert the hegemonic hierarchy of the masculine gaze, artists such as 
Carolee Schneeman and Barbara Kruger have attempted to resituate the gaze in a 
dialectic interplay between viewer and viewed, subject and object.  
In her installation Eye/Body (1963), which was performed in her own attic, 
Schneeman attempts to reclaim her own agency and naked body as an artist by 
placing herself ‘into the environmental frame of her art’ and ‘painting, greasing and 
chalking herself’ in a kind of stylized, shamanistic ritual. She becomes not only a 
body which can be seen but also ‘a bodily eye’ which sees (Schneider 33).  
 
 





In the same way, Barbara Kruger’s photograph or ad-scape Your Gaze Hits the 
Side of My Face (1981) depicts a woman’s bust in profile with the collaged slogan-
title on the left-hand side. In an ironic twist, the viewer, who is presumably male, does 
not simply ‘hit’ his gaze across or against the (objectified) object. The object itself, 
which is also an instance of the commodification of desire, ‘hits the face of the 
viewer, in the way that commodities, such as cars or women’s bodies, careen across 
ads repeatedly to grab us, catch us, implicate us in the lure of their constructed 
vanishing points’ (Schneider 90-1).  
 
 
Plate 1.5  Untitled (Your gaze hits the side of my face). 1981. Photograph, 55” x 41”. 
Reproduced in Schneider, 91.  
 
Schneider’s reference to a vanishing point is not incidental. It is linked to ‘a 
theory of optics based on the illusion that parallel lines converge at a point in the 
distance.’ Whereas the vanishing point is located within the frame there is ‘a parallel 





constructed (Phelan 23-4). The body is located at this ‘vanishing point of vision, the 
hole into which the eye cannot penetrate’ (39).12 The male gaze always attempts to 
insert itself in the viewing position and to ‘penetrate’ the feminine body. As E. Ann 
Kaplan makes clear, ‘The gaze is not necessarily male (literally), but to own and 
activate the gaze, given our language and the structure of the unconscious, is to be in 
the ‘masculine’ position’ (qtd. in Davy 140).  
Even the theatrical stage, which is often metaphorically associated with the 
feminine, makes women into the object of a predominantly male, spectatorial gaze. 
As Kate Davy points out, the stage itself, which is ‘the site of the spectacle, the 
artificial, the histrionic, the site of deceit, conceit, and disguise,’ is ultimately linked 
to woman herself as spectacle (140). At the same time, women have often been absent 
from representation. We have already noted how in Ancient Greek and Renaissance 
theatre women were missing from the stage, yet even in modern society it is possible 
to find examples of the absent woman who is not seen on stage, in filmic and 
cinematic representations, as well as other art forms. Even when the woman does 
appear, her role is either often downplayed or she risks being done away with or killed 
by the end of the artistic representation – like Lord Alfred Tennyson’s The Lady of 
Shalott or Alexandre Dumas’s The Lady of the Camellias – because of her excessive, 
often sexual, and potentially dangerous desires. As Olga Taxidou points out in 
Modernism and Performance: Jarry to Brecht the demimondaine or latter heroine, 
Marguerite Gautier, is the ‘dying romantic heroine who epitomises the difficult 
relationship between women and the stage’ (96).   
Thus the feminine is seen as being an enigma or Sphinx’s riddle, ‘represent[ing] 
a boundary, a space to be traversed, similar to the limen inhabited by the Sphinx’ who 





solving the enigma of sexual difference, Oedipus does away with the maternal Sphinx 
and his mother Jocasta, who also commits suicide ‘after Oedipus has learned who she 
is.’ Thus it is that ‘the murder [or rather the suicide] of the primitive mother, who is 
represented in the form of a monstrous riddle (the Sphinx), acts as the gateway to the 
realization of Oedipus’s trajectory’ (Jacobs 58). It is a ‘metaphorical’ murder, for 
Oedipus kills the mother with words – or rather with one word – ‘Man’ – instead of 
shedding her blood, thus paving man’s entry into the symbolic order. Thus Ellmann 
makes the general point that it is fundamentally crucial for the play to be perceived as 
‘a tragedy of words rather than a tragedy of deeds’ (8).  
As Goux points out, it is this moment – the moment Oedipus speaks the word – 
which leads to his downfall since in attempting to define himself auto-referentially 
and auto-ontologically and to vanquish the Sphinx by recourse to autonomous and 
reflective reasoning, ‘by the sole power, the consummate power, of his reflection,’ he 
has not managed to dispel the alterity of the other (73). He has also defied the gods by 
‘making man the measure of all things’ and hubristically assuming that the ego can 
achieve complete mastery ‘without any transindividual alterity’ (134).  
Thus Oedipus makes the fundamental error of assuming that there can be only 
one subjective (or linguistic) position from which to view or say things and that the 
word – which is, in true Hegelian fashion, the philosophical word of enlightened truth 
and reason – is powerful enough to make the Sphinx disappear from his sight. As 
Mitchell notes, although the struggle between the Sphinx and Oedipus has been seen 
as ‘a physical contest’ between the mother and baby, in which the baby devours the 
mother’s breast in retribution because of imaginative fears that the mother ‘will eat 
the infant,’ it has also been suggested that the Sphinx is Oedipus’s sibling ‘and would 





but a sister and whom, being a sister, Oedipus must vanquish’ due to sibling rivalry 
(Siblings 54). As Goux points out, the Sphinx has also been symbolically linked to ‘a 
devouring dog’ as well as being a seductive temptress or femme fatale (36-7). She is a 
kind of sacred dog, a reversed God (or Goddess) of the third sex, whose representative 
form is highly reminiscent of the Egyptian god Anubis, part dog and part man, who 
carried off the souls of the dead to the underworld for cleansing. For Pierre Vidal-
Naquet in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece she ‘is not the female monster 
disgorged by the earth’ but ‘simply the “horrible singer” who asks the riddle’ (326). 
That the Sphinx can be seen or read in several different ways attests to the 
multiplicity of vision and the impossibility of firmly locating the Sphinx in any one 
place of signification. Paradoxically, it is through the divisive slippage or prismatic 
chaos of different visual markers that substantive meaning can be created. Through 
the chain of non-linguistic signifiers which instantiate the mediation between self and 
other, object and idea, a unified and coherent narrative is formed which – although 
prelinguistic at the outset  – firmly and a posteriori roots itself in language. It is this 
unified narrative which Oedipus elides by eliding the Sphinx and its alterity.  
It has often been claimed that through the mediation of the other the I/eye is able 
to assimilate the fractured and fragmented signifiers into a cohesive whole and to give 
utterance to that which is seen. Through such assimilation we can achieve what 
Griselda Pollock calls ‘new pleasures, a ‘new language of desire” (qtd. in Rogoff 
199).13 
Yet one may ask what happens when this assimilation fails to take place, that is, 
when the process of signification does not lead to a coherent and unifying narrative? 
Indeed, what happens when the non-linguistic signifier as image fails to bind itself to 





French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche, whose seminal work Essays on Otherness 
denotes a landmark in psychoanalytic theory in its revisitation and reformulation of 
Freudian precepts. Although Laplanche deals, for the most part, with non-verbal and 
gestural modes of expression that a parent addresses to its child, his notion of an 
enigmatic signifier that leaves behind it a residue or surplus is, in my view, highly 
suggestive. For Laplanche the child attempts to assimilate or ‘translate’ the enigmatic 
cues or gestures which it receives from its primary caretaker into an understandable 
code. The term ‘translation’ is, to all intents and purposes, a pertinent one, for the 
process of translation necessarily implies that there is both an addressor who transmits 
a message and an addressee who receives it and attempts to assimilate it. When 
assimilation fails, something is necessarily lost in translation, and what is lost is the 
absolute meaning of the signifier. I should like to hold on to Laplanche’s model here 
precisely because it is a dynamic and interpersonal one of human contact and deftly 
ushers in the notion of trauma.14 
In short, Laplanche locates an originary moment of trauma in the scene of 
primal seduction – a psychical scenography which keeps returning in Freud’s work 
even though he abandons it – that occurs between a child and an adult, where the 
adult supplies the child unconsciously with enigmatic, for the most part sexual, 
messages that the child fails to assimilate or translate into a known formula. These 
messages are then repressed, yet it becomes possible to quantitatively gauge ‘the 
measure of the quantity of the trauma’ by estimating the discrepancy – or ‘the 
measure of the difference’ – between what the child assimilates and what remains as 
an untranslatable residue, that is, ‘between what is symbolisable and what is not in the 
enigmatic messages supplied to the child’ (Essays on Otherness 130). Yet what is at 





‘transferred’ onto new chains of signifiers in an attempt to assimilate or bridge the 
traumatic gap between signifier (word/gesture) and signified (message/meaning).15 
As Laplanche points out in his examination of Freud’s seduction theory, what 
Freud had originally posited was a primary scene in which the mother seduces the 
passive and sexually immature child. The child is unprepared for this seduction, an 
unpreparedness which of itself initiates the trauma. Laplanche makes the astute 
observation that this is comparable to the ‘traumatic neurosis in adults, where the 
essential feature of the trauma relates to the fortuitous character of the accident, to the 
fact that the subject [or child] was not prepared for it’ (New Foundations for 
Psychoanalysis 107). Since the first scene of seduction cannot be understood or 
assimilated by itself, it is the superimposition of other subsequent scenes onto this 
first scene which later allows for the restructuring of a coherent narrative; all other 
scenes must be seen as engaging in a dialogue with this first scene. In the same way as 
it is possible to retrace the first written layer in the palimpsestual and layered scribbles 
of the Ancient Egyptian papyri, the palimpsestual layering of scenic topographies that 
are imbued with sexual traces could also thus be unearthed to recover this originary 
first scene of primal seduction. As Laplanche indicates, Freud ‘works backwards’ in 
order to identify ‘the true primal scene’ (109). 
As Laplanche indicates, this Freudian notion of a primal scene of seduction has 
both its weaknesses and its strengths; the fact that Freud kept abandoning it and 
returning to it suggests his inherent desire to locate an originary and defining moment, 
what Laplanche calls an ‘apophantic’ scene, that will in and of itself be ‘self-
explanatory’ and serve to reveal ‘the meaning of the whole sequence [of scenes]’ 
which succeed or postdate it (New Foundations for Psychoanalysis 115). The word 





ushers in an element of mystery. It is perhaps also slightly reminiscent, in terms of its 
phonetic structure, of a revelatory epiphany or moment of profound self-discovery. 
Whatever the case may be, Freud’s insatiable search for a specific moment in 
which to definitively locate trauma – a scene, that is, which can be positively 
identified as forming the locus of both trauma and originary desire, is doomed to fail 
(and thus become an intangible illusion). Desire, like trauma, is mimetic; there is no 
moment or scene which marks either of them as specific precisely because they are 
deferred ‘imitations’ or reproductions of feelings of loss and absence. Certainly the 
desire for an object is the desire for the lost object. Yet it is also, as Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen stipulates, an ‘effect’ which is derived from the imitation of others’ desire.  
Thus ‘the desire for an object is a desire-effect; it is induced, or at least 
secondary, with respect to the imitation – the mimesis – of the desire of others.’16 
Hence this model of desire, in my view, posits it at once at two removes from an 
originary or specific, identificatory moment. Not only is desire already an imitation in 
so far as it is triggered by the loss of its referential object, but it is also always already 
mimetic in its imitative and compulsive identification with the desire of another. This 
desire remains always already deferred along the axis of representation, constantly 
pointing to the traumatic and glaring gap between subject and object and the 
impossibility of suturing it.17 This explains why trauma is compulsive mimesis, and 
mimesis itself is always already mimetized. I shall pick up on this idea of the logic of 
trauma mimesis once more in my examination of certain dramatic and theatrical 
performances. For now, suffice it to say that trauma recurs and replicates itself in so 
many scenes or moments that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to locate the very 





Yet this failure to locate an originary moment, which resonates perhaps with 
man’s illusory desire to retrieve a lost Edenic paradise that is always foreclosed to 
him due to his fall from divine grace, is not meant to signify that all attempts at 
signification or desire are forever doomed to result in disillusionment. Although 
Artaud attempts to redeem and resurrect a body which cannot be redeemed, there is, 
arguably, a certain pleasure to be derived from both the deferral of desire and the 
mimesis of trauma, since their very inability to lead to complete satiety and total or 
momentous signification ensures the subject’s constant quest for meaning and 
identity. What is more, it is precisely this breach or fracture in the subject’s identity, a 
fracture which already bespeaks the loss of stable meaning, which marks him or her 
as human and moors the subject precisely as a desiring or traumatized individual in a 
social network of endless others who are ultimately faced with the same destiny. 
Rather than simply lead to utter disappointment, therefore, such a state of affairs is 
liable to open out a plenitude of possibilities. 
Drawing from Laplanche’s general ideas on translation and the enigmatic 
signifier, it is actually possible to formulate a notion of trauma as being that very gap 
or suture between the image and its signified which resists closure. In a similar vein, 
Rosenberg has noted that trauma ‘is what it is because […] it disallows narrative 
closure’ of ‘conscious experience’ and resists integrating ‘meta-experience’ (41).18 
The fact that closure is short-circuited implies that trauma’s destiny is to be forever 
caught between assimilation and dissolution, representation and indecipherability, in 
its repeated attempts to make the traumatic fragments or enigmatic signifiers of a 
person’s life history into an assimilable and coherent narrative. There is certainly a 





is, of traumatic scenes through the power of story-telling and the art of recall in an 
attempt to make sense of them.  
The whole process of trauma treatment centres in fact on the ability of the 
traumatized patient or analysand to tell and retell the story of his or her trauma in 
order to make sense of the enigmatic signifiers and subsequently assimilate them. 
Arguably this retelling of his or her traumatic story will allow the patient to gain some 
degree of mastery over it without much recourse to the analyst’s help or guidance. As 
Colin Wastell points out, due to ‘the fragmentary nature of traumatic memory’ the 
analysand will have to retell his or her story to the therapist ‘a number of times in 
order to build up a picture of the [traumatic] event which is sufficiently coherent’ in 
order that it may ‘be able to integrate the event into their life narrative’ (80).19 
The trauma is thus played out over and over again, a phenomenon which Freud 
describes as the compulsion-to-repeat in his seminal essays ‘The ‘Uncanny’’ (1919) 
and ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920). In his references to clinical experience 
with patients, Freud asserts in the latter essay that ‘a possibility of pleasure’ is turned 
– via the processes of repression – ‘into a source of unpleasure’ (221). What is more, 
this unpleasure is constantly repeated, ‘under pressure of a compulsion’ (231). 
Furthermore, by revisiting the former text ‘The ‘Uncanny’’ (which was written by 
Freud slightly earlier in time) in light of these assumptions of a compulsion-to-repeat, 
it becomes possible to trace Freud’s germinating idea of a repetitive drive – the drive 
for/of death – which incidentally harks back to repressed reality and unconscious 
desires and fears. 
Certainly I shall return to these two critical essays later on in my examination of 
the dramatic plays and performances. For the moment, however, I would like simply 





since it is precisely this repetition compulsion which makes itself felt both in analysis 
in a strictly psychoanalytic sense (in the analysand/analyst scenario) but also in 
analysis as interpretative performance. Trauma is a specifically performative event 
and by turning once more to Laplanche’s model it is possible in fact to link Freud’s 
notion of the compulsion-to-repeat to the repetitive attempts of both the child and 
later on the analysand to assimilate the enigmatic signifiers received by both the 
primary caregiver and the therapist (who acts, in certain respects, as a surrogate 
parent).20 In a similar manner, the actor-cum-performer transmits enigmatic signifiers 
or visual gestures in performance which the spectator-cum-analyst is called upon to 
decipher and subsequently assimilate. 
Before engaging with the performative aspects of these enigmatic signifiers, 
however, and thus spelling out the stakes more clearly, I would like to examine 
Laplanche’s model in a bit more detail. For if in its reformulation of Freud’s theories 
the Laplanchean model of assimilation between primary caregiver and child is to be 
taken at face value, then the traumatic signifiers which fail to be intromitted into the 
child’s perceptual awareness are later transposed in adult life into the analytic frame 
in an attempt to bind them. Thus analysis belatedly attempts to bind these traumatic 
signifiers.21 Since according to Freud it is common for the primal scene to be replete 
with such traumatic signifiers it serves as the perfect example. The originary scene is 
marked by an untranslatable residue precisely because the child is unconsciously 
faced with what it sees as the potential loss of the primary caregiver or love object to 
the father. Viewed in this light, the process of transference becomes a repeated 
attempt to play back an originary primal scene of seduction and desire in an effort to 





driving force which fuels the entire circuit or system, the force of implosive repetition 
– the compulsion-to-repeat – which surfaces as both cause and symptom.  
In this way, transference itself becomes always already liable to transference, 
what Laplanche calls ‘the transference of the transference,’ since the primal 
transference is always transferred, re-opened and re-constituted anew (Essays on 
Otherness 131). That there is in fact a primal transference which always repeats itself 
points us in the direction of Laplanche’s reconfiguration of the Oedipal structure so 
that it can account for both primal seduction and genetic transmission. As he points 
out in Life & Death in Psychoanalysis, when reconstructing ‘the child’s oedipal 
complex as a triangular situation,’ it must not be forgotten ‘that at two vertices of the 
triangle each adult protagonist is himself the bearer of a small triangle and even of a 
whole series of interlocking triangles’ (45).  
Hence if transference induces and is induced by transference, a two-way 
relationship of this kind can account for the transferral and passing on of the 
triangulated Oedipal schema of mother/father/son – together with all that this implies 
– from one generation to the next. Although Freud fails to engage adequately with 
inter-generational transmission, a topic which Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok 
explore in great detail in their postulation of a silent, alien and transgenerational 
phantom which is transmitted ‘from the parent’s unconscious into the child’s (173)’ 
and thus haunts the subject’s mental topography, the originary primal scene where the 
child sees its parents having sex is later replayed and reworked into a more complex 
and definitive psychic scenography of Oedipal relations – Freud’s famous Oedipal 











In Dread of the Wandering Eye: Oedipal Visions, Enucleated Eyes and the Scopic 
Regime of Malveillance in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex 
 
   It is a terrible thing to see and have no vision.  
                                                    (Helen Keller) 
 
Sophocles’ tragic drama Oedipus Rex, from which Freud draws his Oedipus 
complex theory, centres around the well-renowned story of Oedipus, the King of 
Thebes who unwittingly kills his father Laius and marries his mother Jocasta. Upon 
discovering what he has done Oedipus is horrified and blinds himself with his 
mother’s golden brooches which he has seized from her dead body. In his reading of 
the story Freud attaches a great deal of significance to the dual events of the parricide 
and incest, and extrapolates from them that the reason why they exert such emotional 
valence is because they reflect the unconscious wishes and desires that any young boy 
experiences in his early formative years. In short, boys unconsciously desire to 
possess their mothers and to kill their fathers, who function as rivals for the mother’s 
love and affection. Both events are thus inextricably linked according to Freud.  
In ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’ (1927) he stipulates that the boy-child’s first 
love object is his mother and that the father ‘is felt as a disturbing rival and not 
infrequently viewed with strong hostility.’ In his mind the boy strongly desires to 
procreate with his mother and kill his father, and it this phenomenon which Freud 
labels the Oedipus complex. ‘We give the whole of this mental structure the name of 
‘Oedipus complex’, after the familiar Greek legend’ (32).  
In his first postulation of the Oedipus complex in The Interpretation of Dreams, 
Freud makes the by now famous assertion that Oedipus’s ‘destiny moves us only 





sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish 
against our father’ (364). This tendency is universalized so that it implicitly becomes 
a question of ‘recognizing’ these repressed sexual wishes which lie dormant in all of 
us. As Freud ardently stipulates, the drama of Oedipus is so psychologically 
compelling precisely because ‘there must be something which makes a voice within 
us ready to recognize’ (emphasis mine) its full and resonating power (364).1 The 
concept of recognition or ‘anagnorisis’ is certainly tied in with Ancient Greek 
dramaturgy in so far as the classical dramatists utilized stories which were familiar 
and easily recognizable to their audiences. According to Rachel Bowlby, recognition 
‘is one of the components of tragic plots in Aristotle’s definition in the Poetics.’ In the 
same way as the audience of antiquity were called on to recognize their repressed 
Oedipal wishes, the ‘modern audiences (are compelled to) ‘recognize’ the relationship 
of their childhood impulses to Oedipus’ destiny’ (15). Thus the Oedipal complex 
effectively allows for a shared past between the audience of Sophocles’ time and 
more modern audiences, a shared past of repressed guilt which moves, along the axis 
of representation, from one generation to the next in the same way as Laplanche’s 
series of interlocking Oedipal triangles discussed above.  
In The Shell and the Kernel Abraham and Torok lay claim to a transgenerational 
phantom which is formed in the unconscious and transmitted from the parent to the 
child. It is the cryptic and alien inclusion of an other, whose presence points to an 
unspeakable gap which was unconsciously transmitted to the subject and bespeaks the 
effects of carrying down familial secrets for generations. It is a phantom which returns 
to haunt the living and ‘bears witness to the existence of the dead buried within the 





not, eludes rationalization’ (175). The summoning of this transgenerational phantom 
can be used to explain intergenerational trauma in and even across cultures. 
In terms of the recognition of an actual Oedipus complex, it would thus be too 
simplistic to base Freud’s preference for this term on the preconceived notion that the 
child is in full awareness of such desires. After all, as Michael Feldman points out, 
even ‘in the original story Oedipus did not make a conscious decision to kill his father 
and marry his mother; the choices that presented themselves to [him and] all the 
participants seemed to be the best ones at the time’ (104). As Juliet Mitchell explains 
in Psychoanalysis and Feminism, the Oedipus complex institutes culture, ‘is 
expressed within the specific context of the nuclear family’ and points to desires 
which ‘are repressed into the unconscious’ (377). It would appear that these selfsame 
desires are apparently repressed at childhood and seem to be almost ‘forced’ into 
adult consciousness. In opposition to Laplanche’s more formalist and extralinguistic 
theories – and in a similar humanistic and mythological take on Freud as that 
employed by Bowlby in her Freudian Mythologies – Bruno Bettelheim points out that 
the term Oedipus complex is a rich metaphor specifically chosen by Freud because it 
evokes ‘the child’s anxiety and guilt for having patricidal and incestuous wishes, as 
well as the consequences of acting on these wishes’ (22). According to Bettelheim, in 
Sophocles’ play Oedipus unconsciously repressed these childish wishes well into 
adulthood. Since as a baby his actual parents, the King and Queen of Thebes, had cast 
him out to die, Oedipus’s unconscious feelings of anxiety and guilt are projected onto 
his substitute parents, the King and Queen of Corinth. When the Delphic Oracle seals 
his fate by decreeing that he will kill his father and marry his mother, Oedipus 
naturally assumes that the reference is to his surrogate parents. He flees in fear, as 





he could murder the father who had raised him so well, and marry the mother who 
loved him as a son’ (23). 
Yet although Bettelheim neatly conflates the actual and surrogate parents in this 
manner, thus allowing for Oedipus’s identificatory projection of his unconscious 
desires onto the latter to function as the trigger which serves to bring on their actual 
realization in the former, this only serves to blur the distinctions between space and 
time by posing the fact before the event, in an a priori logic which dislocates Oedipus 
from the very act which he is meant to have instantiated. If he fears for his surrogate 
parents and unconsciously harbours an Oedipus complex which he has suppressed 
from childhood, then on what grounds are we to extrapolate that having unconscious 
sexual feelings for his surrogate mother was identical to having these selfsame 
feelings for his real mother who did not, after all, nurse him from infanthood?  
Although certainly Freud deals with the question of what he calls the incest 
taboo in his ‘Totem and Taboo’ (1913), a seminal work which examines to what 
extent Oedipal desires are genetic or biologically determined, his emphasis on a group 
of brothers deflecting blame onto the father and subsequently committing parricide 
(and hence ousting the father in order to have full access to the mother) seems to 
suggest, as Bowlby astutely points out, that ‘in the beginning was the battle of the 
brothers’ rather than ‘the struggle between father and son’ (27). This would ultimately 
undermine the notion of an Oedipal complex by accenting sibling rivalry more – in 
true Abel and Cain fashion – than any pre-existing primal fantasies to kill the 
biological or surrogate father of the tribe and sleep with the mother.  
As Juliet Mitchell points out, Freud repeatedly ‘made everything come back to 
the Oedipal or pre-Oedipal parents, in order to avoid [his] dead brother’ and the 





psychoanalyze Freud in this manner and feel that there is a problem with 
extrapolating this theory of sibling rivalry onto Oedipus’s familial circumstances. For 
while it is clear that Oedipus had daughters who were also his sisters, there is no 
mention of a rivalrous brother, unless we are to assume that his uncle and brother-in-
law Creon functions as a substitute brother. 
Whatever the case may be, Bowlby suggests further on in her argument that 
since Oedipus did not know his real parents, he ‘cannot have wished to do what he 
did, and the play gives no support to the idea of unconscious ‘Oedipal’ impulses in 
relation to parent figures’ (174). This leads to the paradoxical situation where Oedipus 
becomes divorced from the Oedipus complex which Freud attributes to him. In a 
similar vein, John Fletcher points to the ‘gap’ or lacuna that is created by what he 
defines as the ‘dislocation’ between Oedipus’s wishes and their fulfilment, between 
event and protagonist: 
 
    The man he has killed turns out to have been the father he has never known and the 
woman he has married his unknown mother, but Oedipus himself is strangely absent from 
both these actions of which he is the ostensible protagonist. In the gap created by this 
dislocation between protagonist and the tragic actions he turns out, only in retrospect, to 
have performed, the question of the Oracle insists with its brutal announcement in advance 
of Oedipus’s fate (24).2 
 
 
This dislocation occurs precisely because Freud (and Bettelheim in his turn) 
fails to properly account for the other. Fletcher’s Laplanchean reading thus serves to 
illustrate the fundamental error Freud makes by foreclosing the other (mother?) and 
moving away ‘from a Copernican, other-centred, exogenous model of traumatic 
seduction’ towards ‘a generalized Ptolemaic model of endogenous development’ 
(26).3 The stakes here are obviously quite high, since a shift from an exogenous to an 
endogenous model would clearly deflect desire from the adult onto the child. This 





seducing, or in some cases even physically abusing the child, to an Oedipal theory in 
which ‘children desire their parents, not necessarily the other way round, and 
fantasize these scenes of abuse or seduction’ (Vice 20). Thus Freud’s move towards 
an endogenous model of selfhood is reminiscent of what Claire Stocks has defined as 
the tendency in Western tradition to delimit and construct identity as a singular, 
monolithic entity so that the self is not mediated or permeated by the other or others.  
As Stocks illustrates, ‘fragmented identity’ is not ‘deemed healthy or desirable’ 
in Western culture (77). Thus it must be expunged and it is often seen as the task of 
trauma theory to do so by integrating the fragments. Thus trauma theory in and of 
itself ‘implicitly reinforces ethically weighted distinctions between ‘good’ Western, 
healthy conceptions of self and ‘bad’ pathological, fragmented ‘others.’ Furthermore, 
these distinctive ‘categories are mutually exclusive and function to reinforce the 
boundary between self and other which confirms the belief in individual integrity’ 
(77). 
In stark opposition to this view Laplanche, as we have seen, posits an exogenous 
model of trauma. It will be recalled perhaps that Cathy Caruth explicitly states that 
trauma is not simply the trauma of the self or the one but also the trauma of an other. 
In Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History she refers to a wound that 
has a voice and the power to ‘speak’ its own trauma, and posits that the story of one’s 
own trauma is linked to the trauma of another (8). The reference to the voice of the 
other is reminiscent perhaps of the voice which Freud mentions in his The 
Interpretation of Dreams as the voice within us which is ready to recognize our own 
Oedipal desires. Whatever the case may be, any story of trauma must therefore 





Stocks is particularly illuminating in this respect in her deployment of Abraham 
and Torok’s theories to foreground the incorporation of the other in theories of the 
self. For Abraham and Torok ‘one’s identity is inherently formed around a kernel of 
an ‘other’ lodged in the unconscious,’ a psychical schema which almost seems to hark 
back to the earlier Laplanchean model of the enigmatic signifier which is transmitted 
from the primary caretaker to the child and registers or ‘lodges’ itself in the child’s 
unconscious (78). When there is a failure or disjunction between the incorporated 
object and its introjection – that is, where there is a failure on a psychic level to 
actually register the other or parts of the other – a ‘gap’ is created ‘in the unconscious 
where the introjection should have occurred’ (80). As we have already seen, this gap 
refuses to be assimilated and forms what Abraham and Torok define as the 
transgenerational phantom, since it is a gap that is replicated and passed on from one 
generation to the next. This also accords with Laplanche’s views, discussed earlier, on 
the primal transference as being constantly reconstituted and repeated throughout the 
generations (which is also a reminder, perhaps, of Carl Jung’s notion of a ‘collective 
unconscious’).  
Thus we have come full circle. Yet what these theories of Laplanche or 
Abraham and Torok seem to imply certainly has grave implications for our 
(re)reading of Freud’s reading of Sophocles’ play. It is only by moving back to a 
Copernican model which resituates the self in a dialectical position to the traumatizing 
other that the full dimensions of the play’s thematic function can be understood. To 
put it more simply, Oedipus’s wishes cannot be foreclosed in some internal vacuum 
within his own psyche, in the same way as ‘Apollo and the Delphic Oracle’ cannot be 
‘treated merely as materializations of Oedipus’s own wishes and their inevitability’ 





Deleuze and Guattari deprecate in their Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
For them the child is not simply involved in its own narcissistic wishes, nor is it 
attached only to its parent(s). The child is part of a social field or network which 
regulates and is regulated by capitalist desire, or what they call ‘the machines of 
desire’:  
    From his very earliest infancy, the child has a wide-ranging life of desire – a whole set of 
nonfamilial relations with the objects and the machines of desire – that is not related to the 
parents from the point of view of immediate production. (48) 
 
In the same way as the child is inevitably part of the relational nexus between 
the self and larger social networks outside the family, so is Oedipus inevitably part of 
the social and inter-generational networks of his time which link the human will of the 
self to the Delphic other. To put it differently, the transgenerational phantom of the 
Delphic Oracle itself, which is also bound to Ancient Greek beliefs about the shaping 
of human destiny through divine intervention, is handed down to Oedipus through a 
long and generational trajectory. Oedipus’s tragedy lies, in fact, in his failure to 
introject this phantom and thus close the gap between the Oracle’s 
prophetic/enigmatic message and his own life history.4 
Furthermore, this failure to suture the gap registers itself not only on a psychic 
level. It literally becomes a traumatic register which is physically inscribed on his 
flesh or body through his act of self-blinding, the final act which actually serves, 
paradoxically, to bind him – even if metaphorically – to the other’s flesh (since it is 
his dead mother’s brooches which he uses as lethal instruments to effect the deed). 
Yet what is it that actually spurs Oedipus to commit this atrocious act of self-
mutilation? Can it be, for instance that it was borne out of a desire to assuage his 
guilt? Or was it perhaps an attempt to suture the gap between the other and himself 





Indeed, I would argue that out of the compellingly diverse range of 
interpretations which have been offered by literary critics and theorists to account for 
Oedipus’s act of self-blinding, none are more riveting than those which seek to liken 
this self-blinding to an expressly sexual act which is a virulent doubling of Oedipus’s 
original sin (αμαρτία) of parrincest.5 When Oedipus blinds himself he certainly does 
more than simply enucleate his eyes with his mother Jocasta’s brooches; for when he 
repetitively strikes the brooches into his eyes what he lets loose is not only ‘a stormy 
rain of black blood [that] burst like hail’ (Sophocles l. 1279) but also a flood of 
interpretations surrounding the ghastly deed. 
As Richmond Lattimore points out, ‘Oedipus’s self-blinding can be seen from 
various angles’ (47). He further provides two such ‘angles’ of vision. Oedipus’s self-
mutilation is a form of self-punishment for his evils but also serves to complete the 
last stage of the Sphinx’s riddle. And, to this it must also be added that it fulfils 
Teiresias’s earlier prophecy that Oedipus’s figurative blindness in seeing the facts will 
later on develop into a blindness in a literal sense. As Bettelheim notes, the literal and 
figurative are finally bridged in this atrocious act. ‘Oedipus acted out his metaphorical 
blindness – his blindness to what the oracle had meant, based on his lack of 
knowledge of himself – by depriving himself of his eyesight’ (23). It is the blind seer 
who truly cuts to the heart of inner truth and knowledge, sees with his blind eyes that 
which Oedipus cannot.  
That Oedipus blinds himself as a form of self-punishment is already clear. His 
self-blinding expresses ‘a deep-seated urge to make reparation’ (Brown 111). As he 
says before his committal of the deed, it is to be done so that his eyes should no 
longer ‘see in the dark those he should not have seen’ (l. 1273), and even when he 





not simply as a retribution for past deeds but also because in his futural death as he 
envisions it those deeds must not come back to haunt him in spectral form. When, like 
a visionary, he looks to his descent into Hades, he poignantly declares that he will not 
‘see my father with these eyes’ nor even ‘see my poor unhappy mother [Jocasta]’ (l. 
1272-3), for now his eyes – those shameful perpetrators of sin – can no longer see 
what they must not. In other words, the meeting which is to occur between Oedipus 
and his parents in the afterlife is averted – and with it the potentiality for a re-
enactment of Oedipus’s original crimes – through the intervention of Oedipus’s act of 
self-blinding. It is extremely telling that as soon as he evokes this fatal and 
unwelcome meeting between himself and his parents in his mind, he quickly conjures 
up with it an image of children sprouting like ‘new shoots,’ as though it were 
impossible to curb his involuntary Oedipal desires – at least, that is, until the removal 
of his sight: ‘Or is the sight of children to be yearned for, to see new shoots that 
sprouted as these did? Never, never with these eyes of mine!’ (l. 1375-7).  
In these lines then, quite clearly, there is an explicit linkage of vision to sin and 
the horrific sexual act of incest, a linkage which is seen to recur throughout the play.6 
As Freud points out in his ‘The ‘Uncanny’’ (1919), this linkage can be shown to exist 
in ‘dreams, fantasies and myths.’ Drawing in particular on the myth of Oedipus, Freud 
stipulates that his self-blinding ‘was simply a mitigated form of the punishment of 
castration – the only punishment that was adequate for him by the lex talionis [the old 
Biblical injunction of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth]’ (352). 
Thus the eye is substituted for the penis as bodily organ and all feelings of guilt 
and anger are deflected from the latter to the former. Indeed, if this Freudian 
interpretation of the blinding as a displaced form of castration is coupled with Mark 





as Mark Kanzer points out, the blood which oozes out of Oedipus’s eyes ‘like hail’ is 
in reality the mirror image or double of the semen ejected in the act of coition, with 
Jocasta serving as an image of the phallic mother: ‘in this fantasy of coitus and 
orgasm, the sexual act is depicted as a sadistic and castrating attack from the maternal 
phallus’ (qtd. in Rudnytsky 262).  
While the implicit sexual connotations in Oedipus’s act are certainly not to be 
denied, there are a number of problems that arise with Kanzer’s interpretation. The 
first of these is that for Freud, at least, it is precisely the fetishistic fantasy of the 
phallic mother that is meant to ward off feelings of anxiety about castration. While it 
is true that ambivalence remains in relation to the child’s fear of castration from the 
phallic mother, the boy-child actually identifies himself with her and even refuses to 
believe in her castration or lack of a penis. In his essay ‘Fetishism’ (1927) he notes 
the child’s thoughts: ‘No, that could not be true: for if a woman had been castrated, 
then his own possession of a penis was in danger’ (153). In later life this idea of the 
phallic mother or woman is still retained through a substitution of other objects for the 
fetishized object or phallus.  
Thus Oedipus’s phallic fantasy, as Kanzer would have it, is an exact reversal of 
Freud’s instantiation of the maternal phallus as fending off castration anxiety. Not 
only does this fantasy not ward off castration but it also actually serves, in point of 
fact, as an uncanny mirroring itself of the compulsion-to-repeat the incestuous deed.  
The second problem which arises from Kanzer’s reading is that it accords 
primacy, or rather agency, to the mother, thus deflecting from Oedipus’s active role in 
his own castration. In this strange transposition, it is the phallic mother who is seen as 
attacking Oedipus and effectually castrating him, thus robbing Oedipus of his own 





is this which triggers his feelings of guilt. He is aware that the deed he has committed 
is so horrific that he should now no longer ‘see in the dark those he should not have 
seen’ (l. 1273) and needs to avert his parents’ gaze in the afterlife. He shudders when 
he imagines this encounter with his parents, for he dreads the look of the other that 
will undo him. It is the look of malveillance or hostility which Foucault saw 
everywhere and which Oedipus attempts to escape from through his literal blindness. 
According to Lacan, it is Oedipus’s curse to negate his own existence, a negation 
which reveals the ‘true subsistence of a human being, the subsistence of the 
subtraction of himself from the order of the world’ (qtd. in Staten 173). 
Whatever the case may be, when the protagonist Oedipus is affronted with the 
frightful ‘possibility’ of seeing his parents in the afterlife, such ghostly (re)visitations, 
which objectively mark an unseen event, manifest themselves as an interior reality in 
his psyche, marking the traumatic or mimetic moment where meaning and 
representation break down along the axis of interpretation and the traumatic gap or 
lacuna between signifier (word/gesture) and signified (message/meaning) widens. It is 
at this moment that the eye/I of vision is transposed from objective reality into ‘inner’ 
vision – or, more metaphorically and topographically, the mind’s eye. The sight/site 
of the tragic event, even if it is only imagined, serves as an ambivalent and traumatic 
marker on the cusp between perception and representation.  
In effect, the audience watching the play is called on to imagine this frightful 
encounter between Oedipus and his parents. Within the play vision occupies an 
ambivalent status, making it appear at once psychical and social, virtual and real, a 
matter of both (traumatic) representation and perception at the same time. This is why 





by the reader or audience.7 His (re)presentation necessarily precludes the audience’s 
perception of him. Jean-Pierre Vernant aptly points this out: 
 
As soon as Oedipus has been “elucidated,” uncovered, presented as a spectacle of 
horror for all to see, it is no longer possible for him either to see or to be seen. The Thebans 
turn their eyes away from him, unable to contemplate full in the face this evil “so frightful to 
behold,” this distress the description and sight of which is too much to bear (119). 
  
This frightful event or ‘spectacle of horror’ is, of course, Oedipus’s self-
blinding after he has discovered that he has unwittingly killed his father Laius and 
married his mother Jocasta. Interestingly, this event, together with Jocasta’s suicide, 
takes place off-stage and is only belatedly reported by the messenger to the audience. 
That this event takes place off-stage is telling. It alerts us to the fact that this event is, 
perhaps, too obscene to be represented visually, since we know that the very word 
obscene, in its Greek etymological roots, points to precisely such a state of affairs. 
However, why would Sophocles relegate such an evidently dramatic moment, full of 
momentous import, to such a position, forcing the audience to necessarily imagine 
this event rather than see it performed? It is certainly not the case that Greek 
tragedians shied away from enacting violent events in full-blown view of their 
audience. Rush Rehm alerts us to this fact, informing us that we should not subscribe 
to ‘the mistaken notion that all violence in Greek tragedy takes place off-stage.’ He 
cites a number of instances where violence and bloodshed are enacted onstage:  
        Physical pain, brutality, and even bloodshed do occur within sight of the audience – the 
hero commits suicide on stage in Sophocles’ Ajax, the suppurating wound of the title 
character in Philoctetes is constantly before us, the tormented Heracles exposes his pain-
wracked body in Women of Trachis, and a battered son dies in the arms of his father in 
Euripides’ Hippolytus (62). 
 
Thus it is not that violent or bloody events were censored from the stage. It is 
simply that, in a play so heavily entrenched with issues of vision and sight, the 





audience who are averted from this event’s literal and actual performance and are 
called upon to visualize Oedipus’s self-blinding in their mind’s eye. This is in keeping 
with another theme which runs parallel to the play’s motif and trope of sight and 
serves as its reversal – that of blindness, in both a literal and metaphorical sense.  
At the same time as the audience is not granted access to certain events off-
stage, they can see and understand things which Oedipus cannot, a circumstance 
which does not in any way diminish the powerful force of the play. As Thomas Gould 
points out in his appendix to Sophocles’ text, Sophocles enriches the play with so 
many double meanings that Oedipus’s final discovery of his sins is overwhelming, 
even for ‘the audience, which thought itself in possession of the secret from the 
beginning’ (175). This creates a kind of double vision. 
I use the word ‘double’ here precisely because I wish to bring out this sense of 
recurrent doubles and opposites such as vision and blindness throughout the play. Yet 
the word also has relevance in another sense as well. It is ironic that Oedipus should 
remove his eyes with Jocasta’s brooches after he has seen the truth. It is almost as if 
he needs the other in order to enact this traumatic self-blinding. Thus his act of self-
blinding is not an isolated or intrapersonal event; it involves the other, or rather, it 
needs the other for its physical materialization. 
That Oedipus is driven accidentally to discover the truth of his origins does not 
detract from his subsequent and insatiable desire to find out, or rather to see, the 
horrific truth. Like the psychoanalyst, his roving and wandering eye looks back into 
the past in order ‘to decipher the mysteries of the present’ (Ellmann 9). Yet, whereas 
earlier on his single, monolithic gaze had caused him to ignore Teiresias’s prophecy, 
figuratively blinding him to misrecognition of his very identity, it is ‘the act of 





truly is. As Leslie Hill notes, the act of looking can thus function as ‘an undecidable 
interplay of proximity and distance founded on the constant merging together and 
coming apart of bodies’ (163). 
Although we have already seen the problems which persist in Kanzer’s reading, 
in which Jocasta is portrayed as being the phallic mother, it is worth mentioning that 
such a reading does effectively point to the paradox inherent in Oedipus’s act. Even 
though Oedipus wishes to punish himself for his crimes, if the letting of blood in his 
mother’s bed-chamber is seen as an orgasm, then entering the mother’s bed-chamber 
once more is literally a repetition of the original sin of parrincest. It is noteworthy that 
Jocasta invokes the dead king’s name before she takes her life – ‘she called to Laius, 
dead so many years’ (l. 1245) – and that Oedipus, before bursting into the chamber, 
should ‘[ask] for his spear and for his wife’ (l. 1255-6). Although certainly this 
outburst could be seen as an intention on his part to ‘kill’ the already dead Jocasta, to 
wound her with his phallic spear in a ghastly and necrophilic coming together, there is 
also the added implication that the father fantasmatically returns and needs to be re-
killed in order to maintain the dyadic mother/son relationship. As Peter Rudnytsky 
aptly points out, ‘the self-blinding … is a ghastly repetition not only of Oedipus’s 
incest but also of his patricide’ (262, italics mine). The two acts are inseparable from 
each other. Yet their inevitable return (both in fact and in fantasy) again and again, 
their constant repetition, seems to suggest that there is no way out of this virulent and 
circuitous impasse of the triangulated Oedipal schema. Indeed, Ronald Britton puts it 
very eloquently when he states that ‘in this phantasy the arrival of the notion of a third 
always murders the dyadic relationship’ (100). 
Additionally, while there is little, if any, evidence in the play to support 





the imago of good mother than anything else), he may not be completely wide of the 
mark in invoking ‘the maternal phallus’ as somehow implicated in Oedipus’s act of 
self-blinding. Yet it is not Jocasta who takes centre stage ‘in this fantasy of coitus and 
orgasm’ (even though Oedipus uses her golden brooches to induce this ‘orgasmic’ 
hail of blood). If there is an ‘attacking’ maternal phallus, it is embodied in the figure 
of the Sphinx, ‘the winged maiden’ (l. 508) who, as Thomas Gould points out in his 
footnote to the line, with her deadly talons ‘killed her victims in a sexual embrace.’ 
While Oedipus destroys her by solving her riddle, that riddle is really the riddle of his 
own destiny: he will soon have three feet since his blinding shall cripple him such that 
he will need a ‘third foot’ or walking stick to support himself. Hence the Sphinx’s 
riddle to Oedipus is an ominous warning, a prophecy which is effectually fulfilled at 
the moment of Oedipus’s blinding. If, in Freudian terms, blinding is the equivalent of 
castration, then it would logically follow that if the Sphinx blinds Oedipus she is the 
castrating mother in embodied form, significantly returning in metaphorical (if not 
visual) fashion to ‘attack’ him through Jocasta’s brooches (which can, perhaps, be 
read as displaced metaphors for the Sphinx’s talons) and thus carry out her prophecy. 
In the popular imagination she may even have been linked to the evil eye. As Gould 
points out in his commentary to line 508 of the play: ‘The Sphinx was used on shields 
and helmets, exactly as the Gorgon’s head and the great apotropaic eye’ (73).  
Even if Jocasta is now dead, she rises once more from the grave like the many-
headed Hydra, whose heads would grow as soon as they were cut. Oedipus finds 
himself yet again in a situation where the (m)other fantasmatically returns to take her 
place in the re-enactment of the tripartite schema of Oedipal relations, just as 
Oedipus’s previous desire for his phallic spear also invokes the dead father to rise 





cum-Jocasta can obviously be interpreted on one level as a reproduction of the 
recurring scene of triangulation (father/mother/son), with ‘the double mother-field’ (l. 
1257) serving as the cross-roads for a cross-insemination by both father and son. 
Indeed, this would accord well with Deleuze’s understanding of repetition as both 
marked by and dependent on the ‘displacement’ of the virtual object (of affection).8 
Yet on another level, this tripartite schema can even be retraced, as Karl 
Abraham indicates, in ‘another [uterine] fantasy, that of encountering the father inside 
the mother’s body before birth; the fantasy of observing coitus from within the womb’ 
(qtd. in Rudnytsky 262). Certainly the play supports Abraham’s claims in its 
description of Oedipus’s violent lunge ‘through the double doors’ and ‘hollow bolts’ 
(l. 1261-2), which as Thomas Gould notes in his comments effectually ‘suggest[s] that 
the violence is also somehow sexual.’ Interestingly enough, John Hay makes a similar 
observation in his anatomico-structural analysis: ‘It may be pointed out, at the risk of 
seeming too clinically exact, that the two doorways through which [Oedipus] passes 
… symbolize both vaginal and cervical entrances respectively’ (qtd. in Rudnytsky 
260). Thus the very bed-chamber of Jocasta can be read as a symbolic manifestation 
of the womb itself which Oedipus must performatively open. Harking back to André 
Green’s ideas on theatrical space, the womb-chamber is the ‘transgressive’ and 
‘invisible space off-stage,’ that ‘radically uncrossable limit’ which the audience 
cannot see (qtd. in Ellmann 43). The audience is not allowed to see what transpires or 
takes place in Jocasta’s chamber, neither are they given a glimpse of her actual 
suicide. Like the enigmatic signifier, there is a visual lacuna or gap in performance, an 
untranslatable residue which the audience is called upon to decipher.  
When Oedipus blinds himself it is almost as if he regresses to a state of helpless 





scene of sight in the same way as a boy-child who assumes his mother is in possession 
of a penis would avert his eyes in horror from the wound of his mother’s imagined 
castration. That Oedipus must plunge into an undifferentiated state of death by re-
entering the maternal womb in order to do this is highly suggestive. I deliberately 
employ the term ‘death’ here because the fantasy of returning to the womb seems to 
me to imply a return to a quiescent or inorganic state. It is certainly not to imply that 
the foetus is inanimate, only to point out that the reversal of this process, that is, the 
regressive return to an earlier state of things, must necessarily imply a loss, the most 
extreme form of this being the loss of life itself.9 It is only through this loss that 
Oedipus’s body can be symbolized or even represented onstage. As Mitchell reminds 
us again and again in Mad Men and Medusas, ‘A representation of the body depends 
on the body being first lost and then regained as a symbol’ (211). 
In other words, Oedipus is punished precisely because he tried to foreclose the 
other in his answer to the Sphinx’s riddle. The m(other) resists erasure. She is needed 
in order to provide meaning to Oedipus’s history, in the same way as an audience is 
needed in order to provide interpretative meaning to Oedipus’s performative act of 
self-blinding. The performative action of saying ‘man’ to the Sphinx was ‘a heresy, an 
error, or an illusion’ since not only did it fail to kill the monstrous mother, but it also 
failed as ‘a radical gesture of anthropocentering that suppresses her monstrosity and 
makes man the measure of all things’ (Goux 157). For Oedipus attempts to kill the 
Sphinx by recourse to reason and only through the power of a single word and 
without shedding her blood. As Jacobs points out, it is an attempt to expel the 
maternal body without spilling her blood. ‘Jocasta’s suicide by hanging is a blood-
free affair, as is the Sphinx’s leap from the mountain – she simply disappears’ (58-9). 





forecloses the other. And to do this is to ultimately foreclose interpretation and gloss 
over the enigmatic signifier of sexual difference. 
Having said this, it is important to remember that a Greek audience would have 
perceived and interpreted the actor Oedipus, together with his deeds, in a very 
different light from a more contemporary audience. The murder of the mother here is 
only metaphorical. Certainly murder is murder, and the literal murder of a father is 
enough to stigmatize the doer and shock the spectator. However, it must not be 
forgotten that Oedipus’s father Laius struck the first blow, leaving no choice for 
Oedipus but to retaliate in self-defence. If this does not mitigate the circumstances of 
his crime, one should also add that he is unaware of who Laius really is. Over and 
above this, there is also the important question of the gods to consider. Goux makes 
the pertinent observation that ‘it is Apollo who punishes Oedipus’ for his hubristic 
arrogance in assuming that he can answer the Sphinx’s riddle by solely using his own 
intelligence, and thus without the help of the gods (94).10 This message would 
certainly have struck home in the minds and hearts of its Athenian audience in a way 
that it cannot do so for more contemporary audiences.  
Through the lens of performance, cultural and psychoanalytic theory many 
theorists have either tried to bridge the gap between the theatrical signifier (gesture) 
and its signified (meaning), between vision and perception, message and conceptual 
sign or to widen it and open out a plenitude of interpretative possibilities by recourse 
to various theories concerning the theatre, the self and the other. What must be borne 
in mind is that such interpretations are modern and would have had little place in 
Sophocles’ tragic theatre. The notion of subjectivity was certainly unheard of in his 
time, yet it is my firm belief that if we are to appreciate the full richness of Sophocles’ 





order to do this, we can only have recourse to theory. And, as Taxidou rightly points 
out in Tragedy, Modernity and Mourning, theatre is intimately linked to theory. 
‘Tragedy is theatre and theatre is etymologically linked to theoria (theorein, to 
contemplate, to reflect)’ (34).  
To consider the theory of the ‘enigmatic signifier’ is to attempt to locate the 
trauma which lies beyond tragic representation. Obviously there are various ways of 
perceiving and looking in theatre and in culture. Indeed, one may even consciously 
choose not to look at a particular event, to avert one’s gaze, in order to avert trauma or 
interpretation.11 One may consciously choose to avoid assimilation of the 
performative aspects of the enigmatic signifiers themselves. Thus, while my work is 
informed by assumptions about the overt content of Sophocles’ tragedy which is 
within the audience’s visual, perceptual field, it also attempts to avert the spectator’s 
(and reader’s) gaze from this field in order to examine what lies beyond tragic 
representation, and how this sense of ‘beyondness’ has very real repercussions for the 
drama’s material and aesthetic representation, as well as for the various responses of 
its audience.  
That there is a limit or partial sealing-off of the visual field for the audience 
points to the gap between vision and knowledge, creativity and insight. In a similar 
vein, a process of regressive creativity can be seen at work in Oedipus’s solving of the 
Sphinx’s riddle. As Marshall McLuhan points out, ‘The Greek dramatists presented 
the idea of creativity as creating, also, its own kind of blindness, as in the case of 
Oedipus Rex, who solves the riddle of the Sphinx.’ According to McLuhan, ‘It was as 
if the Greeks felt that the penalty for one break-through was a general sealing-off of 





It is almost as if Oedipus regresses to infantilism after having solved the enigma, 
what Lacan, as we saw earlier, defined as ‘the subsistence of the subtraction of 
himself from the order of the world.’ In psychoanalytic terms, Oedipus’s regression 
can perhaps be seen as a quiescent state which is accomplished through what Freud 
calls the ‘death drive.’ In his seminal essay ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920) – 
henceforth abbreviated to BPP – Freud posits a biologically determined ‘death drive’ 
which leads organic life to its originary inertia; it is the goal of each living organism 
to tend towards death in order ‘to restore an earlier [more primitive] state of things’ 
(244), a state of ‘quiescence’, and where all inner chemical tensions evaporate:  
          If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for 
internal reasons – becomes inorganic once again – then we shall be compelled to say that 
‘the aim of all life is death’ and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed before 
living ones (246). 
 
Thus, by recourse to some biological ‘truth’ (whose validity, incidentally, 
cannot be affirmed through any sound principles which relate to organic matter), 
Freud postulates the compelling – albeit controversial – notion of a regressive death 
drive which is linked to concepts of entropy in thermodynamics and serves to unbind 
the lease on life, ‘to undo connections and so to destroy things.’ Hence that the 
organism should strive towards its own destruction, or rather that it should desire it, is 
seen as the ‘expression of the most fundamental principle or psychical functioning’ 
(qtd. in Laplanche and Pontalis’s The Language of Psychoanalysis 103). Although in 
itself an inherently paradoxical formulation, Freud attempts to shore it up by leaning 
on what he calls ‘the pleasure principle,’ which simply maintains that the organism 
seeks to increase its pleasure by ‘keep[ing] the quantity of excitement present in it as 
low as possible or at least to keep it constant’ (BPP 220).12 Thus it would logically 
follow that the greatest pleasure is to be found in that state where the quantitative 





although the death drive seems at first to be diametrically opposed to the pleasure 
principle – or, more effectively, and as the title would suggest, it is a moving beyond 
the pleasure principle – Freud’s final assumption is that ‘the pleasure principle seems 
actually to serve the death instincts’ (BPP 268). 
In effect, such a proposition tends to blur the distinctive boundaries between 
what, on the whole, is conceived as pleasure and what is not. Indeed, the fact that 
Freud does not resolve the two tendencies but actually blurs them suggests that the 
analysand – or, for our purposes, the protagonist – is perpetually doomed to retell 
stories which trigger the pain and horror of the initial trauma in order to try and 
recoup some pleasure out of the telling and retelling, and perhaps also to construct a 
meaningful narrative out of a past which was missed precisely because it was not fully 
assimilated in the first place.13 As Caruth has occasion to remark, the threat of death is 
a missed experience. It is only through repetition that one is able to confront the actual 
trauma of near death and integrate it into one’s own history of survival. ‘Repetition, in 
other words, is not simply the attempt to grasp that one has almost died but, more 
fundamentally and enigmatically, the very attempt to claim one’s own survival’ (64). 
And in blinding himself Oedipus paradoxically awakens into the traumatic realization 

























The Horror of Oedipus’s Vision: Deathly (Re)visitations, Incest and Desire in 
Macbeth  
 
Shakespeare’s tragedies ‘are rooted in the tradition of ancient Greek theatre’ and 
its aesthetic or diegetic framework (Vernant 241). In the same way as Sophocles’ 
Oedipus parries death by gouging out his eyes, Shakespeare’s Macbeth attempts to 
ward off death by ‘trammel[ling] up the consequence’ (I.VII.3) of his dreadful deed 
and effecting his own metaphorical self-blinding. In the case of Macbeth, to trammel 
the consequences of murder is to efface all the traces or clues which lead to his 
person. And, not only to efface these traces of guilt in himself but also to transplant 
them elsewhere – in the unwitting guards or ‘spongy officers’ (I.VII.71) sleeping by 
King Duncan’s (death)bed. 
 As James Calderwood points out in his If It Were Done, any acknowledgement 
of guilt on Macbeth’s part after he murders King Duncan will literally translate itself 
into physical death. He must kill the guards because ‘this staves off his own “death” – 
that is, the revelation of his guilt’ and serves as ‘the outside physical equivalent to his 
spiritual self-blinding’ (96). Thus, killing King Duncan is not enough. As Lady 
Macbeth points out, the guards who are by Duncan’s bedside must perforce ‘bear the 
guilt/ Of our great quell’ (I.VII.71-2).  
That Lady Macbeth should speak of guilt when referencing Duncan’s murder is 
extremely apt, and not only for the ironic associations which it later bears on her own 
fate, which is literally sealed by the doom of her own guilt. As we have seen from 





child’s patricidal and incestuous wishes, as well as the dreadful consequences of 
acting on these wishes, are liable to stir in the child feelings both of guilt and anxiety.1 
 Yet if the child merely kills the father in fantasy, Macbeth does so in fact. He 
will not merely be sated by ‘black and deep desires’ (I.IV.51) or ‘horrible imaginings’ 
(I.III.138); he will commit the primal deed that will unleash evil and darkness into 
Scotland and ‘ineluctably wound and pollute [its] world’ (Long 46). For the murder is 
not merely the killing of the father in both fantasy and fact – it is the killing of life and 
light itself. As Shakespeare is at great pains to show, Duncan is the source or fountain 
of light.2 He is the bright eye that shines over the ‘sunlit world’ of Scotland with its 
green forests and racy rivers. As Michael Long points out, ‘the loss of the eye’s 
brightness is a key image of the world’s darkening.’ By murdering the eye, or 
‘stabbing at the beautiful, intricate pattern of things,’ the world is plunged in a horrific 
and dizzying darkness (46).3  Thus after Duncan’s death all hell is let loose and chaos 
reigns supreme. As G. Wilson Knight points out, Duncan’s murder and its aftereffects 
‘are essentially things of confusion and disorder, an interruption of the even tenour of 
human nature.’4 Men, beasts and elements alike are affected by what Knight calls this 
‘deed of disorder (165).’ Like Oedipus’s killing of Laius, who is both king and father, 
Macbeth commits ‘the most terrible crime against the sacred order that governs 
human life’ (Vernant 121). It is apt that even before Duncan’s noble subjects receive 
knowledge of his bloody death, they can sense that something is awry. As Lennox 
notes, it was an ‘unruly’ night with:  
 
Lamentings heard i’ the air; strange screams of death, 
And prophesying with accents terrible 
Of dire combustion and confus’d events 
New hatch’d to the woeful time. The obscure bird 
Clamour’d the livelong night: some say the earth  
Was feverous and did shake.       
                                                                   (II.III.38-43) 





Indeed, it is ironic that Lennox should talk of ‘new hatch’d’ events and a 
‘woeful time’ since only a few moments later it will be revealed that his words, 
insubstantially floating in mid-air as a play of signifiers, will hit their referential mark 
or signified in the newly hatched event of Duncan’s murder. It is a woeful time indeed 
when nature goes amiss, and where a falcon can be killed ‘by a mousing owl’ or 
horses can break out of their stalls ‘contending ‘gainst obedience’ to self-destruct and 
eat their own flesh (II.IV.13;17). Shakespeare is faithful in this instance to Raphael 
Holinshed’s Chronicles from whence he drew his inspiration for the play. As 
Holinshed recounts, after the ‘heinous murther’ not only did the sun disappear for ‘six 
moneths togither’ but the murder itself led to ‘monstrous sights’:  
           Monstrous sights also that were seene within the Scotish kingdome that yeere were 
these, horsses in Louthian, being of singular beautie and swiftnesse, did eate their own 
fleshe, and would in no wise taste anie other meate…. There was a sparhawke also strangled 
by an owle (186).5 
 
This reference to such unnatural events obviously resonates with Biblical 
undertones. On one level, the imagery is dark and hellish; on another, it is reminiscent 
of the Egyptian Pharaoh’s dream in Genesis of seven lean cows gorging on the flesh 
of seven fat ones. To my knowledge, such a religious connection has not been made 
in the literature, yet it serves to illustrate the impending catastrophe of doom that 
prevails when animals devour their own species. As Joseph interprets the Pharaoh’s 
dream, he points to its prophetic slant in foreshadowing the seven years of famine and 
suffering that would plague the land of Egypt, since the fat cows which represent 
abundance and plenty are to be engorged by the symbolic lack which the lean cows 
represent. Lack of meat for such a long period of time is a grave catastrophe indeed.6 
In a similar vein, once the god-king dies, ‘then the sun dies, the crops wither, 
winter comes, animals violate their natural bonds, order collapses’ (Calderwood 83). 





the epidemic plague which marks the inception of theatre. ‘Once the plague is 
established in a city, normal social order collapses … The streets are already choked 
with crumbling pyramids of the dead, the vermin gnawing at the edges’ (14). Like 
Thebes, Scotland is in the throes of a violent miasma and needs a pharmakon or 
katharma to purge it. This is where the tragic actor/hero, pace Girard, steps in to take 
the place of the original katharma. According to René Girard, it is only the violence 
of a sacrificial crisis which can cleanse a community of its contagion, and it is a crisis 
which is allegedly modelled on an original and primal reproduction of human 
sacrifice with similar cathartic functions. Aristotelian catharsis is achieved both 
retroactively through the original act of communal violence and sacrifice of a victim 
on the altar and also anachronistically on the stage. Histrionically, the temple and altar 
in olden times on which the victim was sacrificed, and which ‘substituted for the 
original act of collective violence’, is now replaced by ‘an amphitheatre and a stage 
on which the fate of the katharma, played out by an actor, will purge the spectators of 
their passions and provoke a new katharsis, both individual and collective’ (290).7   
Paradoxically, this collective ‘katharsis’ is achieved through the expunging of 
one chosen individual who functions as scapegoat or pharmakon. For the community 
to expel its own violence it must replicate violence, or rather misplace or transfer it 
elsewhere. ‘The whole process of mythical formulation leads to a transferral of 
violent undifferentiation from all the Thebans to the person of Oedipus’ (Girard 77). 
Indeed, the very nature of this aporetic transferral is exemplified by the 
precariousness of the term pharmakon itself, which wavers ambivalently in Ancient 
Greek between its signified meanings, ‘both poison and the antidote for poison, both 
sickness and cure’ (95). The encapsulation of both meanings signifies that it is neither 





I would argue that a similar process is at work in Macbeth. The tragic hero 
Macbeth functions as a pharmakon for Scotland’s ills, yet it is his indeterminate status 
between butcher and hero, both sickness and cure, which stymies the audience’s 
reactions, making it impossible to sympathize with him to a large degree or condemn 
him outright. From the very beginning of the play he is ‘brave Macbeth’, the valiant 
warrior who fought the Norwegians ‘with his brandish’d steel/ Which smok’d with 
bloody execution’ (I.II.16; 17-8). As Marilyn French aptly points out, ‘Macbeth lives 
in a culture that values butchery. Throughout the play manhood is equated with the 
ability to kill. Power is the highest value in Scotland, and in Scottish culture, power is 
military prowess’ (244).  
Hence Macbeth is very much a product of his own culture. French makes the 
acute observation that Macbeth is not condemned for being a murderer. Rather, ‘his 
crime is a failure to make the distinction his culture expects among the objects of his 
slaughter’ (244). Macbeth cannot stop killing. King Duncan’s murder is certainly a 
fatal crime committed against the divine, primal father. We are called upon to see it in 
sacred terms as a breach in nature. Yet, as mentioned previously, Macbeth is a bloody 
warrior who has just come back from battle as well. King Duncan is not the first 
person he has killed and he is already steeped in blood in a culture which defines its 
terms on war and bloodshed. Just like Girard’s model of mimetic violence, the 
virulent cycle of violence which Macbeth unleashes is already a mimetized 
re(presentation) of earlier events. However, because Macbeth’s tragic flaw is that he 
does not distinguish between those that he kills he must necessarily fall.  
Like Artaud’s plague which ‘takes dormant images, latent disorder and suddenly 
carries them to the point of the most extreme gestures’ (18), Macbeth takes his own 





Scotland of its miasma, at least for the time being, because he broke moral and 
community laws which circumscribed and targeted violence outside the community.8 
Even within the world of Scotland, ‘a world that maintains itself by violence,’ there 
must necessarily be a cordoning off of ‘some segment – family, the block, the 
neighbourhood, the state – within which violence is not the proper mode of action’ 
(French 244).  
Shakespeare alerts his audience of the far-reaching consequences which can 
result from a breaching or infraction of community rules. Clearly the Elizabethan 
audience would have been aware of the gross magnitude of Macbeth’s crime. Not 
only would they have had some possible foreknowledge of the actual story via 
Holinshed’s Chronicles before its stage performance, but it is also quite probable that 
they would have already come prepared with certain expectations regarding the play’s 
outcome and Shakespeare’s aesthetic technique and handling of tragedy. To kill a 
king, a father or supreme ruler – what Elizabethans viewed as God’s divine 
representative on Earth – is a serious crime indeed, and with it must perforce come 
serious consequences. Yet while according to Murray M. Schwartz Shakespeare 
skilfully uses ‘theatrical space in tragedy to enact the violent interruption of 
ceremonial order’ and its bloody aftermath (29), it is arguable whether the final 
catharsis at the end of the tragedy, where order is supposedly restored and Macbeth 
triumphantly beheaded, is a satisfactory one. Indeed, does a catharsis even take place 
at all? 
This is a complicated question, not least because how catharsis takes place has 
been a subject for endless discussion. When it was revived as a concept in the 
Renaissance it encapsulated a wide range of definitions, ranging from the most 





Stephen Orgel tend to read catharsis as something which is endemic to the actual play 
as text instead of an outer reaction or psychopathological symptom of the actual 
audience. ‘The catharsis takes place within the structure of the drama: it is Thebes or 
Athens, the world of the play, that is purged, not the audience’ (134). This leads him 
to the conclusion that the Aristotelian doctrine is not at work in Macbeth and that ‘it is 
clear that Shakespeare is far less convinced […] that the experience of catharsis 
leaves us in any way reconciled, calm, or happy’ (The Play of Conscience 145). 
While this is a plausible conclusion, especially in light of the fact that this 
reading concurs with Orgel’s arguments that Aristotle definitively uses the word in 
this manner elsewhere in his work, such a reading would clearly diminish the 
politically incisive brunt of a dramatic text like Oedipus Rex, for example. It is 
difficult to reconcile oneself to the idea that great dramatists such as Sophocles or 
Shakespeare would leave their audience’s reactions to pure chance instead of 
manipulating them. As I mentioned earlier, it is highly probable that the audience 
would have come to the theatre with preconceived expectations of the actual 
performance of Macbeth through Holinshed’s Chronicles.10 Oral tradition in Ancient 
Greece suggests clearly that the same would have been true of a play such as Oedipus 
Rex.  
Additionally, an awareness of the audience’s central role can be attested to from 
the earliest dramatic performances. It would go against the grain to depoliticize or 
take lightly the role of theatre audiences in Ancient Greek theatre. Not only the size of 
the auditorium but also the sheer magnitude of the architectural design and its location 
bespeak an ideological and political involvement with the polis itself. As Richard 
Schechner points out, ‘The Greek amphitheatre is open, beyond and around it the city 





that is tightly boundaried geographically and ideologically’ (qtd. in Bennett 3). The 
audience is actively engaged in the performance. Even in Renaissance theatres during 
Shakespeare’s time the audience was actively engaged in the performance. As Bennett 
notes, although ‘medieval and sixteenth-century audiences did not enjoy the power of 
the Greek audiences,’ they ‘still functioned in an active role’ and could participate ‘as 
actors in the drama’ (3). Surely the political implications of this are not to be 
deemphasized or glossed over.  
What is more, it is important to stress at the outset that my reading certainly 
does not attempt to conflate Ancient Greek with Renaissance theatre. As C. L. Barber 
points out in ‘The Family in Shakespeare’s Development: Tragedy and Sacredness,’ 
the Renaissance theatre was a ‘new repertory theatre’ or ‘a new organ of culture, a 
novum organum’ which ‘was an agent in the historical shift of the Renaissance and 
Reformation from a ritual and ceremonial view of life, with absolutist assumptions 
about meaning and reality, towards a psychological and historical view’ (195). 
According to Barber, Shakespeare’s tragedies exemplify ‘the post-Christian situation’ 
where God and the Holy Family are supplanted by the human family. Clearly this 
view of theatre is removes away from the Greek notion of theatre and its heavy 
investment in religious ceremonies and the vengeance of the gods.    
As Page duBois laments in her article ‘Toppling the Hero: Polyphony in the 
Tragic City,’ our modern readings of ancient plays focus on characterization and ‘not 
on praxis, on action, nor on mutability of fortunes.’ In a sense, we are forcing the 
modern concept of a tragic hero onto an ancient, tragic experience which had no place 
for subjectivity, and thus ‘transferring to the ancient form what soon becomes a 
modern, individual, internal, and psychological self’ (69). This is what Vernant in fact 





manner, that his downfall is brought about ‘not as the result of external constraints or 
his own perversity or vices, but because of an error, a mistake such as anyone might 
make’ (247).  
Yet, while an authentic or pre-existing subjectivity cannot be established, this is 
not to say that the ideological and political implications of these plays should be 
ignored. As Leslie Kurke astutely observes in Coins, Bodies, Games and Gold: The 
Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece we should perhaps, as modern readers, ‘see 
tragedy as a privileged site for competing, multiple constitutions of subjectivity 
through practice’ (335). Although this effectively isolates tragedy from its context, it 
is a potential way (paradoxically) of recouping some of the ancient, tragic experience. 
At the same time, and setting aside the issue of whether any performance can 
actually lead to concerted political action, actuating or inciting its spectators to 
revolutionary acts, I would suggest that the very question of viewing, even before the 
possibility of action, is in and of itself a political act, and it is this act of viewing 
which informs and shapes a particular response to the aesthetic and theatrical event.11 
This response is assumed to be a cathartic one. As Elin Diamond notes of catharsis, it 
is an embodied and collective process, a process whereby ‘the subject is seized by her 
[sic] shuddering body, which mars her [sic] rational vision and produces an unhealthy 
division of self and social being – a division which only catharsis itself can heal and 
regulate.’12 Thus the very process of being seized by what Diamond calls ‘the shudder 
of catharsis’ – a concept she borrows from Theodor Adorno – is not ultra-
individualistic but socially contingent, dependent on the other for its embodiment. For 
‘catharsis marks and remarks a sentient convergence of body and meaning.’ It is the 





incarnation of the body: that is, an embodiment’ involving both the actors and the 
audience (The Shudder of Catharsis 154, emphasis mine).  
This embodiment is achieved first through the assignment of ontological status 
and hermeneutic visibility to the body, and then through a (re)marking of this body as 
a social body which sees the theatrical event. Phenomenologically speaking, ‘the 
activity of watching is an ongoing process of physical adjustment and response to 
other physically present bodies’ (Shepherd and Wallis 194).13 Thus social catharsis is 
achieved through the implicit recognition of the audience – via the embodied act of 
watching events unfold both as an individual and collective, social body – that 
Macbeth’s crimes have broken the sanctified laws of both man and God and that 
retribution is imminent. The actor playing Macbeth must transfer his internal anguish 
onto the audience if there is to be any emotional release or catharsis. As Marilyn 
French suggests, Macbeth as actor is called on to convey the objective reality of his 
emotional turmoil to the audience’s perception. ‘His sufferings must be suggested by 
gesture as well as intonation, and understanding of the play is dependent very much 
on audience perception of his emotional loss and deprivation’ (242). 
Like Oedipus, Macbeth has killed the father/king and taken his place. What is 
worse, he has usurped the throne by killing the king in his own house, a gross 
violation of the Greek laws of hospitality or philoxenia since Macbeth’s castle was 
meant to offer the king sanctuary and shelter. Macbeth knows this and so his crime is 
redoubled. He says of King Duncan: ‘He’s here in double trust:/ First, as I am his 
kinsman and his subject,/ Strong both against the deed; then, as his host,/ Who should 
against his murderer shut the door,/ Not bear the knife myself’ (I.VII.12-6).  
There are similar precedents of this double bind of philoxenia in Ancient 





the offering of hospitality and friendship from one male to another, was a ‘great male 
concept of Greek thought,’ it was ‘tested and contested’ time and time again (124-5). 
Derrida conflates the Latinized root of host with hostility and Taxidou cites the 
example of Euripides, who was allegedly ‘attacked by dogs and dismembered by 
them, at the orders of Archelaos, the King of Macedon, his host turned enemy.’14 
While the concept of philoxenia in Ancient Greece extended to foreigners who came 
to the host country from faraway lands, I find it an apt example for Macbeth’s 
contravention of the laws of hospitality.  
Whatever the case, it is quite clear that for Shakespeare (and the audience) 
Macbeth’s crime is great indeed. It is an unnatural deed which leads to unnatural 
events. So terrible and unnatural in fact is this deed that it must of necessity be done 
in the dark. In an apt causality and circular tautology which links the dark 
consequences of the murder to its sinister cause – the darkness of desire – Macbeth 
proclaims that light must not ‘see my black and deep desires;/ The eye wink at the 
hand; yet let that be/ Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see’ (I.IV.51-3). 
Darkness breeds darkness, and so horrid is the deed that it must be shunned from 
sight. If it is allowed to see the light of day, then Duncan’s virtues will rise up like 
angels to ‘blow the horrid deed in every eye,/ That tears shall drown the wind’ 
(I.VII.24-5). 
Hence the deed is to be done at night, when the bright eye shuts itself in 
peaceful repose and the angels sleep. As Caroline Spurgeon points out, ‘the evil 
which is being done is so horrible that it would blast the sight to look on it, so 
darkness or partial blinding is necessary to carry it out’ (166). It is fitting indeed that 
this pivotal event in the play is neither scripted nor enacted on stage in numerous 





murder in their mind’s eye (as well as the murder of Lady Macduff’s son), in the same 
way as they must do for other unscripted events such as Jocasta’s self-hanging or 
Antigone’s acts of covering her brother’s grave with earth in complete defiance of 
Creon’s edict.15  These are obviously crucial – even climactic – events, yet they are 
not scripted and must necessarily be envisioned in the mind’s eye if they are not 
performed on stage. Upon receiving the news of her husband’s impending coronation, 
Lady Macbeth calls upon the night to come and pall itself ‘in the dunnest smoke of 
hell,/ That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,/ Nor heaven peep through the 
blanket of the dark,/ To cry, ‘Hold, hold!’ (I.V.50-2).  
 This blanket of hell and dark will envelope the whole of Scotland. In Ross’s 
words: ‘That darkness does the face of earth entomb’ (II.III.9). It is as if this darkness, 
this godless universe which Lady Macbeth invokes, must inevitably come. And not 
only is it inevitable, but unstoppable in its tracks as well. It is almost as if Macbeth, as 
tragic hero, is compelled to his destiny by some higher power and pushed to 
extremities by an engulfing force which is greater than (and beyond) him. In tragedy 
it is often supernatural or divine agents which lead to the hero’s tremendous self-
destruction. In Macbeth Michael Long remarks: ‘The play’s conception of the savage 
powers that prey on human beings is as awesome as any conveyed by Greek tragedy 
where […] we find human beings brought to nothing by forces of irresistible 
magnitude’ (119). This is indeed a very poignant and compelling description. In this 
case ‘the savage powers’ which bring about Macbeth’s destruction are evidently the 
supernatural witches who harness the same destructive power as the violent gods in 
Greek tragedy. Indeed, Long actually refers to Sophocles and his depiction of ‘human 
victims who, like Oedipus or Deianira, are enmeshed in things too powerful for any 





Thus Macbeth unleashes destructive powers through his actions, a criminal error 
or hamartia which, as Jean-Pierre Vernant points out, ‘envelops him and carries him 
away, swallowing him up in a power that must perforce be beyond him since it 
extends, both spatially and temporally, far beyond his own person’ (qtd. in Shepherd 
and Wallis 168). The bloody violence he unleashes is destructive and self-
propagating, ‘too impersonal in its workings, too brutal in its results’ (Girard 47).  
As Long points out, the witches have implanted something in Macbeth – an 
overleaping or ‘vaulting ambition’ (I.VII.27) – which ‘begins to ‘unfix’ his hair and 
‘knock at’ his ribs, with brute, physical force.’ He seems driven and compelled by 
some supernatural power to act out his destiny. Thus he is a tragic hero precisely 
because he ‘is being pulled apart by ‘supernatural soliciting’ while his agitated 
silences separate him from his fellows’ (71). 
Like the Sphinx, the witches occupy a liminal space in the desert heath. They are 
shadowy, bearded and unearthly creatures whose normal existence is obscure and 
invisible. As Stopford Brooke points out, they are the ‘fearfully anomalous of 
physical nature, the lawless of human nature, – elemental avengers without sex or kin’ 
(160). They ‘incarnate ambiguity of gender. They are female, but have beards; they 
are aggressive and authoritative, but seem to have power only to create petty 
mischief’ (French 243).  
At the same time, the witches could also represent ‘the outstretched shadows of 
Lady Macbeth.’ If their power and ‘dangerous’ sexuality depend on masculine 
anxieties, the play can be read as an account ‘of the Oedipus complex [which is] 
tragically unresolved’ (Barber 196). Since Macbeth has not repressed his Oedipal 
desires, he strikes at the fatherly figure and divine creator embodied in King Duncan, 





assuming that he is all-powerful and that the regicide and his murderous deeds will 
not be punished – that as ‘high-plac’d Macbeth’ [he]/ Shall live the lease of nature’ 
(IV.I.98-9) with impunity – adds to his downfall. Whereas Oedipus had defied the 
gods by ‘making man the measure of all things,’ Macbeth has defied the moral and 
sacred order of things by making ‘himself’ the measure of all things and wiping out 
anyone who stands in his way.  
Like the Delphic Oracle, the witches present Macbeth with an array of 
oracular/ocular apparitions whose enigmatic signifiers he is called upon to decipher. 
The irony lies in the fact that he attempts to interpret these visions metaphorically and 
symbolically rather than literally, not realizing, for example, that the first apparition 
of only an armoured head stands in for his own which shall later on be decapitated by 
Macduff. When he sees the final apparition, which is a regal procession of eight kings 
with Banquo’s ghost following suit, he says to Banquo: ‘Thy crown does sear mine 
eyeballs,’ then demands his eyes to ‘start’ so that ‘I’ll see no more’ 
(IV.I.113;116;118). The opposition or dialectical interplay between vision and 
blindness, wishing to see and wishing to see ‘no more’ in the same manner as 
Oedipus, is a powerful motif that runs throughout the play.  
In Act III Scene IV, for example, the interplay between vision and blindness is 
dramatically brought to the fore through the use of the banqueting table, which serves 
as one of the most important visual props in the play. ‘It speaks of hospitality and 
largesse, of the ceremonial of order and degree, of the trust and security of a well-lit, 
indoor world, safe from the darkness and danger of the night outside’ (Long 12-3). At 
the same time, it is around this ‘hospitable’ table where the nobles are gathered that 
Macbeth disrupts the ceremony and breaks the laws of philoxenia by hostilely 





killed, appear as a ghost in front of him. As Lady Macbeth remarks after the ghost 
leaves and Macbeth regains his composure: ‘You have displac’d the mirth, broke the 
good meeting/ With most admir’d disorder’ (III.IV.109-110).   
It is around this table that the tense opposition between vision and nonvision is 
played out. For it is only Macbeth who can see Banquo’s ghost. His eyes and his 
imagination start playing tricks on him, with the eye/I of vision transposing itself from 
objective reality into ‘inner’ vision and creating an unassimilable fracture between 
perception and representation. At this moment, Macbeth cannot understand what he 
‘sees’ – the ghost is an enigmatic sign which causes him to psychosomatically and 
traumatically break down. Although certain productions of the play have attempted to 
visually reproduce the ghost as a tangible and material entity through the use of 
winding sheets, there are various productions of the play in which Macbeth speaks in 
mid-air to an invisible ghost or simply to a stool (see Plate 1.6). In the latter 
productions, the audience, like Macbeth, are confronted with the enigmatic sign of 












Plate 1.6 ‘Never shake Thy gory locks at me!’ – Bob Peck as Macbeth, Royal 





At this climactic moment in the play, the spectator is called on to identify with 
Macbeth and to effect what Green calls a ‘movement of identification with the hero 
(pity, compassion) and his masochistic movement (terror)’ (qtd. in Ellmann 53). Such 
subjective identification adds to the spectatorial pleasure and heightens the theatrical 
effect. Such an identification is similar to Adam Smith’s notion of a sympathetic 
imagination through which subjectivity is constructed in an ethically just society. As 
Smith explains, it is natural for us as individuals to react in a reflective and 
sympathetic manner to the plight and suffering of others. If the suffering of another 
person is physical, then our body will resonate sympathetically to the pain and feel it 
– even if to a lesser magnitude – as the sufferer does. These psychosomatic reactions 
are mostly governed by the things we see as spectators. As Smith observes: ‘… the 
spectator must, first of all, endeavor, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation 
of the other, and to bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which 
can possibly occur to the sufferer’ (qtd. in de Bolla 75).16  
As David Gervais notes in ‘Shakespeare and Night: The Dream, Macbeth and 
Racine’ (2002), Shakespeare’s constant references to night and darkness serve to not 
only define but also universalize Macbeth and his actions. As a motif night ‘helps 
Shakespeare to push his vision to its limit’ and to make Macbeth’s special destiny ‘a 
more general instance of the human tragedy. As it is Oedipus, not the Chorus, who 
confronts the Sphinx […] so it is Macbeth and not Banquo with whom the audience 
empathises’ (21).    
Thus the audience attests to Macbeth’s distress or neurotic breakdown through 
empathetic identification. Indeed, there is a build-up of tension since this breakdown 
is foreshadowed in an even earlier scene in which vision is implicated once again. In 





a dagger besmeared with blood in his mind’s eye. It is visibly there yet intangible – ‘I 
have thee not, and yet I see thee still’ (II.I.37). By line 40 the dagger has become 
‘palpable,’ causing Macbeth to claim that ‘Mine eyes are made the fools o’ the other 
senses,/ Or else worth all the rest’ (II.I.44-5).  
That the dagger is stained with blood is important since blood, as opposed to 
milk and maternal goodness, symbolically functions as a sign of military prowess and 
masculine authority. Macbeth and his wife will literally and metaphorically become 
steeped in blood, as the dagger scene in Act II is mirrored or paralleled by Lady 
Macbeth’s attempts to remove the imaginative blood stains on her hands in her 
famous sleep-walking scene in Act V. Despite her persistent rubbing, the smell of 
blood will not go away: ‘Here’s the smell of the blood still: all/ the perfumes of 
Arabia will not sweeten this little hand’ (V.I.48-9). It is the recurrent conjuring up of 
the sight of blood which leads to Lady Macbeth’s subsequent neurosis. Even if the 
blood has been washed away and can no longer be seen, it is symbolically present as a 
marker of visual trauma.  
As French points out, Lady Macbeth’s downfall comes about because she ‘has 
violated natural law.’ She is undone because she does not ‘uphold the feminine 
principle’ and it is ‘this failure [which] plunges her more deeply into a pit of evil than 
any man [sic] can ever fall’ (245).17 While I am extremely reluctant to attribute Lady 
Macbeth with evil and supernatural qualities, it is undoubtedly true that her invocation 
of demonic spirits to ‘unsex her’ (I.V.40) and blanket heaven into hellish darkness is 
charged with excessive, libidinal energy.  It is an energy that knows not how to spend 
itself (and it is this which causes her psychic disintegration and ultimate madness). 
Thus it is telling that the erotogenic zone of Lady Macbeth’s breasts should 





a violent one of deathly ‘gall,’ a site of opposing tendencies: ‘Come to my woman’s 
breasts/ And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers’ (I.V.46-7). She is the 
perfect image of that phallic mother if ever there was one, the mother who will give 
her breast willingly only to detract it. Like the Sphinx who suffocates her victims in a 
sexual embrace with her talons, Lady Macbeth will ‘love the babe that milks me’ 
before dashing its brains out (I.VII.55). Sexuality and death become inextricably 
bound as the myth of Death and the Maiden, with the milk standing in for both the 
abject which is tied to death, in Kristevan terms, but also for purified goodness. At the 
same time Lady Macbeth’s suckling speech is demonstrative of a kind of Kleinian 
violence in reverse. 
Melanie Klein posits that the infant is vengeful of its mother as love-object 
and ambivalently comes to perceive of the breast as both good and bad or 
‘persecutory.’ In its mind, the breast and milk ‘come to stand for’ things such as ‘love, 
goodness, and security’ which the baby mourns for as being ‘lost as a result of his 
[sic] own uncontrollable greedy and destructive phantasies and impulses against his 
mother’s breasts’ (148). Lady Macbeth reverses the Kleinian formula by positing her 
own destructive phantasies first over and above those of the imagined infant. 
If at this point the play is interpreted from a Christian theological perspective, 
as French herself does, the symbology of milk actually ‘represents an embodiment of 
knowledge, the literal absorption of spiritual enlightenment’ such that the breast milk, 
as divine blessing, can even serve to encapsulate man’s intimacy with God through 
the Virgin (Giles 129). That Lady Macbeth expresses no maternal sentiment through 
her claim that she would ‘dash’ this sacred intimacy or bond with her putative child 
without a second thought has led several critics such as French to relegate her into an 





could be reductionistically conflated with ‘procreative and nourishing images of 
babies, children, the female breast, and milk’ (French 245). It is unfortunate indeed 
that French should evoke ‘Judaeo-Christian culture’ (252) in reference to Macbeth, 
particularly since the world which Shakespeare invokes in the play is ultimately pre-
Christian. 
Whatever the case may be, Lady Macbeth does appear to be ruled by forces 
beyond her control. Yet if she really is governed by ‘evil’ and unnameable forces 
which destroy her identity, it is telling that Macbeth too should be controlled by an 
unnameable power. Indeed, Macbeth is driven to commit the murderous deed even 
though he has ‘no spur/ To prick the sides of my intent, but only/ Vaulting ambition’ 
(I.VII.25-7). Of course Lady Macbeth will provide the ‘prick’ or ‘spur,’ yet Macbeth 
seems to commit the deed only out of pure and dreadful fascination. As Calderwood 
aptly points out, Macbeth lacks a real motive. The murder is something that just 
happens to him. ‘What I am suggesting is that Macbeth “falls in evil” as other men 
fall in love’ (49). Like Oedipus, he is seduced by a higher force that traces out his 
destiny with acute prophetic power. His violence becomes ‘something exterior to 
man’ and ‘a part of all the other outside forces that threaten mankind’ (Girard 31). Yet 
whereas Oedipus attempts to escape and run away from his destiny and the 
proclamations of the Delphic Oracle, Macbeth knowingly walks into the witches’ evil 
coven in the same way as Lady Macbeth calls on the ‘murdering ministers.’  
Indeed, it is almost as if Lady Macbeth doubles Macbeth in his excessive 
ambition. Like two sides of the same coin, it would seem as though Lady Macbeth’s 
identity is subsumed into that of her husband’s, so that both feel the same desires, are 
haunted by the same fears, are tainted by the stain of guilt and blood, and must 





Character-Types Met with in Psychoanalytic Work’ (1916). By referring to Ludwig 
Jekels, whose study actually remains unpublished, Freud postulates that Shakespeare 
could simply have split ‘a character up into two personages, which, taken separately, 
are not completely understandable and do not become so until they are brought 
together once more into a unity’ (323).  
Similar claims are made by Murray Schwartz, who claims that Macbeth and 
Lady Macbeth ‘are no longer separate psychologically’ (29), and Linda Bamber, who 
posits in Comic Women, Tragic Men: A Study of Gender and Genre in Shakespeare 
that there is no feminine other in Macbeth. Lady Macbeth is apparently not an other to 
Macbeth; thus their two identities or, at least their roles – subsumed under what 
Bamber calls ‘the masculine-historical project’ – coalesce:  
         There is no dialectic between the masculine Self and the feminine Other in these plays 
[Macbeth and Coriolanus] because the primary representatives of the feminine are not Other 
to the hero. They are identified with the masculine-historical project in general and the 
heroes’ own career is particular (92). 
 
While Bamber’s reading seems convincing enough, in its neat formulation of 
the erasure of the feminine other, it leaves a lot to be desired. Her rendering – as does 
Freud’s – of Lady Macbeth as merely the shadow of Macbeth’s identity completely 
does away with any sense of Lady Macbeth’s agency. Certainly there appears to be 
very little that is maternal or feminine in her. Her ‘undaunted mettle’ (I.VII.73) is 
chilling and resembles that of Volumnia in Coriolanus who likens Hecuba’s breast to 
‘Hector’s forehead when it spit forth blood/ At Grecian sword’ (I.III.42-3)’ (qtd. in 
Bamber 95). The resemblance of this conflation between suckling and bloody 
violence and Lady Macbeth’s speech quoted earlier in relation to dashing her baby’s 





have the potential for procreative power is brought to the fore by Macbeth himself, 
who tells her to bring forth or ‘compose/ Nothing but males’ (I.VII.73-4).18 
Additionally, whereas it is true to say that Lady Macbeth doubles Macbeth to a 
certain degree, it is also true that she has a very definitive role to play in Duncan’s 
murder. Whereas Macbeth commits the deed in literal fact and she commits it only in 
fantasy, Shakespeare is at great pains to show that even the thought of murdering 
Duncan is an evil sin. As Calderwood points out, Lady Macbeth is there at every step 
Macbeth takes to ensure that he commits the bloody deed successfully. Whilst 
Macbeth is in the bedchamber, ‘the emboldened Lady Macbeth’ is ‘physically outside 
listening but imaginatively inside “doing the deed” with her husband’ (45). 
 Indeed, it is the very fact that this ‘deed’ is unnameable which lends the play 
such compelling power. It is, as Calderwood very rightly points out, not just a 
murderous deed but also a sexual act. ‘That is to say, the murder of Duncan is a 
metaphorically displaced act of copulation between Lord and Lady Macbeth’ (43). If 
this is the case, then Bamber’s reading is unsatisfactory, not simply because it 
deprives Lady Macbeth of her very real and potent female agency, but also because, 
at the very least, it deprives us of the third term, the m(other) in the Oedipal 
relationship or sexual act. That there is in fact an Oedipal triangle of 
mother/father/son at work is evidenced by Lady Macbeth’s explicit linkage of 
Duncan to her own father: ‘Had he not resembled/ My father as he slept, I had done’t. 
My husband!’ (II.II.14-5). These lines which Lady Macbeth utters may, at first 
glance, seem utterly strange and alien. Indeed, it is an odd thing that at this very 
critical juncture in the play, Lady Macbeth should feel signs of compunction or guilt. 
And odder still that she should allude to her father. And yet she does. And then 





even king, but father as well. ‘As we might expect in this tri-minded play, Macbeth’s 
act is symbolically tripled, becoming an assault upon the Almighty Father, the royal 
father, and the genetic father’ (Calderwood 91). One is surely reminded here of 
Oedipus’s killing of his father ‘at a place where three roads meet’ (Sophocles l. 716). 
This triple reference is clearly important as a dramatic and diegetic device.19 
There are three witches in the play if we exclude Hecate, whose appearance is 
minimal throughout the play. We have also seen the tri-fold implications of killing 
Duncan, whose murder represents deicide, regicide and parricide all at once. At the 
same time, despite Bamber’s attempts to erase the feminine other, there is a clear 
triangulated schema or triad composed of King Duncan/Macbeth/Lady Macbeth. 
What is more, if we are to accept the Oedipal structure father/mother/child then it 
becomes plausible along a psychoanalytic axis of representation to reconfigure the 
previous schema and posit that Macbeth kills the royal father to get at the mother, 
who is represented literally by Lady Macbeth but also metaphorically by Scotland – 
the desired motherland.  
It is highly suggestive that Macbeth’s violent attempts to seize Scotland by brute 
force and murder should envelop the world in complete darkness. It is almost as if 
Scotland resists succumbing to his Frankensteinian attempts at harnessing its 
procreative forces, his constant desire, according to Schwartz, ‘to be that all-powerful 
woman and to control the means of nurturance’ (29). The play itself is steeped in 
procreative images which pit the male seed against the teeming, female womb. Yet, as 
Long points out, the dominant image is male. ‘In a way which is exceptional in 
Shakespeare’s work, the male-procreative imagery of issue and seed takes pride of 
place, not the female-procreative imagery of the womb’ (61). Arguably, and from a 





undoes him. ‘The hero […] can only live with the feminine Other as she is or die from 
his own efforts to control her’ (Bamber 22). Even though Shakespeare’s plays were 
obviously performed for a highly sexist audience during the Elizabethan age, such an 
interpretation should not be precluded.  
 At the same time, Shakespeare shows the dangers of violating both moral and 
natural order and attempting to breach the innermost recesses and ‘germens’ of nature 
where the ‘secrets of the procreative process are hidden’ (Long 60). The ‘dualistic 
cycles’ (57) of night and day, as well as the cycles of life and death, are confounded 
by such attempts. In short, the circadian rhythm of all natural life is disrupted.20  
This disruption of cycles is foreshadowed in the play from the very beginning. 
The play opens in media res and with thunder and lightning. The witches, who set the 
scene and the key note of evil, have already met before. Interestingly enough, Oedipus 
Rex opens with Oedipus describing the city of Thebes as ‘weighed down with fragrant 
smoke’ (l. 4). The city is ‘tossed’ about by the plague and ‘dies in the fruitful flowers 
of the soil,/ it dies in its pastured herds, and in its women’s/ barren pangs’ (Sophocles 
lines 25-7).   
Additionally, although order is restored by the play’s end with the accession of 
Duncan’s elder son Malcolm to the throne, the audience does not know whether 
Malcolm will prove himself to be a worthy king and ruler. Scotland is given a respite 
but whether ‘the snares of watchful tyranny’ (V.VII.96) have completely disappeared 
remains to be seen. Or rather, they remain unseen. The ‘fiend-like queen’ (V.VII.98) 
embodied in Lady Macbeth’s person may have disappeared, but there is nothing else 






Whether catharsis has been entirely achieved is a moot point. As Marjorie 
Garber explains in ‘Macbeth: The Male Medusa,’ ‘the play itself is transgressive and 
insists upon the posing of pertinent, thought-troubling questions,’ as well as 
‘resist[ing] easy resolutions’ and ‘comfortable conclusions’ (76-7). At the same time, 
the audience is divided in their feelings for Macbeth, who is both ‘butcher’ (V.VII.98) 
and tragic hero at the same time. It is this ambivalence which serves, finally, to lend 
this play such a mesmerising and haunting power and to lay it open to ever-new, 





































Theatrical Space and the Subversion of Gender in Macbeth and Oedipus Rex 
 
 
     She dreamed she bore a snake, 
     She swaddled it like a baby, laid it to rest 
     She gave it to her breast to suck 
     Blood curdled the milk with each sharp tug. 
  
                           (Aeschylus, The Libation Bearers, qtd. in Jacobs 77) 
 
        The phobic object is […] the hallucination of nothing: a metaphor that is the anaphora of  
       nothing (Kristeva 42).  
 
 
What Julia Kristeva describes in her book Powers of Horror: An Essay on 
Abjection as a phobic hallucination is seen as being both a metaphor and an 
encapsulation of a drive which, according to Kristeva, ‘has an anaphoric, indexing 
value, pointing to something else, to some non-thing, to something unknowable’ (42). 
Paradoxically, it is precisely this reference to the phobic power of the ‘non-thing’ 
which serves to usher in not only its haunting power but also its ability to function as 
a ‘something’ which can be both symbolized and represented within a referential and 
spatial framework. This chapter sets out to explore how this non-thing is a gendered 
entity which phantasmatically returns to haunt the male imaginary in various 
dramatizations of two canonical plays, Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex and Shakespeare’s 
Macbeth, within the performative space which is theatre. It is my contention that the 
woman’s absence in theatrical performances, as a symptom of gynaecophobia, 
misogyny or more general fears of her ability to effeminize and emasculate male 
actors will, paradoxically, point to her very real spatial and performative presence 





It is a well-known fact that there were no women actors in antiquity on the 
Ancient Greek stage and in Renaissance theatre. As Taxidou notes in Tragedy, 
Modernity and Mourning there is a repudiation of the feminine on the Athenian stage, 
albeit a repudiation ‘that always returns to haunt [it]’ (174). The convention of 
employing male actors to play women is already well-established in the literature, 
although strong claims have been made for female members in the Greek audiences. 
Similarly, English Renaissance theatre also made use of this convention of employing 
male actors to perform female roles. Although Stephen Orgel tries to dispute this fact 
in his Impersonations: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare’s England, he is 
willing to permit that there was a general tendency to exclude and even prohibit 
women from the stage. The reason he cites for this is an interesting one; women were 
prohibited on stage because ‘their chastity would thereby be compromised, which is 
understood to mean that they would become whores’ (49). 
Thus the woman’s theatrical presence is seen as being dangerous precisely 
because it is inextricably linked to her sexuality, a sexuality which is envisioned in 
dark, negative terms. Knight is quick to associate Lady Macbeth with demonic 
possession, saying of her that ‘she is a woman possessed – possessed of evil passion.’ 
He calls this demon which takes hold of her ‘an evil something which masters her, 
mind and soul,’ ‘a nightmare thing of evil’ (167, emphasis mine) which he fails to 
adequately define. This ‘thing’ or ‘something’ which liminally hovers above the text 
is nameless and all the more horrifying because it eludes proper definition. And it is 
not only Knight but also women writers who are quick to follow suit in making such 
interpretations.  
As Bamber points out, Shakespearean tragedy is saturated with images of evil, 





Shakespeare’s misogynistic stance since he ‘projects aggression and cruelty onto the 
feminine’ (19). Although this is a dangerous assumption, not least because it 
psychoanalyzes Shakespeare and fails, in its reductionistic manner, to acknowledge 
the complex female characters he creates, it is often the case in performance that ‘the 
woman [becomes] the microcosm of the tragic, eccentric outside world’ (23).  
 This is a similar move to the one Freud makes when he relegates women and 
their sexuality to some dark and obscure Minoan age of civilization. In order to keep 
the male subject’s phantasy of phallocentric power intact, the female body does not 
only disappear from the stage, but it also disturbingly acquires negative and sinister 
connotations. This is in keeping with Madelon Sprengnether’s view in The Spectral 
Mother: Freud, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis that for Freud the woman as mother is 
not only a procreative force associated ‘with the beginning of life but also with its 
end, so that the figure of the mother fuses with that of death’ (5). In order to avoid 
this, the male subject will strive for mastery over the female, maternal body, asserting 
his power in such a way as to kill, metaphorically and/or literally, the body of the 
mother which is associated ‘with the ultimate undoing of masculine striving and 
achievement’ (5). 
This struggle for mastery over the female body takes place within the actual 
and metaphoric space of the theatre. Yet the mother or female other resists a literal 
effacement, and her presence is literalized even within her theatrical and performative 
absence. Incidentally, the ‘feminizing’ aspect of theatre itself can account for Stephen 
Orgel’s observations that several antitheatrical writers are afraid that theatre will lead 
to ‘a universal effeminization’ and arouse homoerotic feelings or sexual 





Absence (such as spatial absence) does not necessarily imply non-presence. As 
Sprengnether notes, the mother ‘has a ghostlike function’ in Freud’s Oedipal theory, 
‘creating a presence out of absence’ (5). Thus although traditionally in Western 
philosophy and theory the character of Oedipus has almost always been accorded 
primacy, hence marginalizing the position Jocasta occupies in the play as both mother 
and sexual partner, I would argue that Jocasta reclaims agency through the very real 
potency of her sexual power and dynamic relationship to her son-cum-lover-cum 
husband Oedipus. Although Bowlby reads her as a figure of absence who ‘is hardly 
present herself as an agent in the events she recounts’ (177), it is her literal non-
presence which paradoxically attests not only to her metaphorical presence but also to 
her subversive potential. She is ‘a figure of subversion, a threat to masculine identity 
as well as to patriarchal culture’ precisely because she refuses to go away but remains 
to ‘[haunt] the house of Oedipus’ (Sprengnether 5).  
Sprengnether defines her as having a ‘spectral’ effect, ‘in the full etymological 
sense of the word’ since spectral is linked to looking, spectacle, suspicion and even 
appearance. At the same time, the word spectre implies ‘a ghost, a phantom, any 
object of fear or dread.’ For Freud all of these associations would have been relevant 
in his representation of the pre-oedipal mother who is ‘the object of his fascinated and 
horrified gaze, at the same time that she elicits a desire to possess and to know.’ Even 
as she disappears and ‘frustrates his attempts at grand theory’ she still manages to lure 
and seduce him ‘like a fata morgana, into the mists of metapsychology’ (5).1   
As Oedipus points out, his ‘poor unhappy mother’ will return in the afterlife (l. 
1373). Arguably, this is so because Oedipus has failed to kill the mother literally. And 
if we interpret the Sphinx as a metaphorical displacement of the maternal Other, as 





Oedipus’s performative action of saying ‘man’ to the Sphinx as an answer to her 
riddle was ‘a heresy, an error, or an illusion’ since not only did it fail to kill the 
monstrous mother, but it also failed as ‘a radical gesture of anthropocentering that 
suppresses her monstrosity and makes man the measure of all things’ (157). Taxidou 
makes a similar point when she points out in Tragedy, Modernity and Mourning that 
Oedipus’s ascension to ‘‘manhood’ does not do away with monstrosity and horror’ 
since the Sphinx still haunts Oedipus after her ‘death’ – he internalizes her and ‘now 
carries her murder inside him like a miasma’ (53).  
In other words, Oedipus’s punishment arises because of his attempts to foreclose 
the maternal other in his answer to the Sphinx’s riddle, attempts which are met with 
resistance and ultimate failure. Man cannot act alone. Oedipus ignores this, and Freud 
follows suit. Indeed, many feminist and literary critics have pointed to the 
fundamental error Freud makes by foreclosing the other/mother and moving away 
from an other-centred and exogenous model towards a generalized and endogenous 
one. Freud moves towards an endogenous model of selfhood and development by 
asserting that Oedipus – and by extension all of humanity – desires to kill the father 
and marry the mother. However, this model is fundamentally flawed from the outset 
since, as Rachel Bowlby astutely points out, following Jean-Pierre Vernant’s reading 
in his influential essay ‘Oedipe sans Complexe’ (1967, Myth and Tragedy), Oedipus 
did not know his real parents (174). Thus he cannot possibly have the Oedipus 
complex which Freud attributes to him.  
What this means, in spatial and conceptual terms, is that Freud’s schematic 
Oedipal phantasy and structure, which accords primacy to the male’s unconscious 
wishes yet fails to take into consideration any references to matricide or even the very 





identity formation. This is precisely because this male-dominated and 
‘phallogocentric mode of signifying the female sex,’ as Judith Butler put it after 
[Luce] Irigaray, ‘perpetually reproduces phantasms of its own self-amplifying desire’’ 
(qtd. in Schneider 96). Thus what is needed is the formulation of another structure to 
explain how Jocasta, and later on Lady Macbeth in turn, resists assimilation into the 
oppressive, dyadic binary of Freudian phallogocentrism. Amber Jacobs points to such 
a spatial model when she introduces a matriarchal law and a maternal structure with 
its own logic and structuring power that can co-exist within the symbolic order.  
Although, according to Irigaray, the woman is in an abandoned state of 
dereliction because she cannot express or have access to her own desire, Jacobs posits 
that by allowing the female subject to meet her structural desire it is possible to 
‘counter the domination of the patriarchal symbolic economy and provide her with a 
position within the social-symbolic world which would not reduce her to the state of 
dereliction that Irigaray has persistently diagnosed’ (30). I would like to suggest that 
such a reading, which allows for the creation of a new space (through theatre) or 
symbolic realm with its own structuring processes, makes it possible for feminine 
characters such as Jocasta and also Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth to be accorded their 
own subjective agency by subverting traditional genderized roles of 
heteronormativity, even heterosexuality. 
The female’s performative role is wrested away from the maternal and notions 
of nurturance, which are defined as naturally feminine constructs within the phallic 
binary system. In Oedipus Rex the phallic mother is displaced onto the figure of the 
Sphinx, who serves as a maternal foil to Jocasta, whereas in Macbeth the explicit 





speech is all too clear. It is this image of the phallic mother which constantly resists 
erasure and simply refuses to go away.  
Even if Jocasta is now dead, Oedipus finds himself yet again in a situation 
where the (m)other fantasmatically returns to reassert her sexual desire. It is telling 
that this is done by evoking the Sphinx’s sexual and destructive powers. She is, after 
all, the phallic mother par excellence. When Oedipus uses Jocasta’s brooches to 
remove his eyes, he can no longer see his incestuous desires yet he has failed to kill or 
foreclose maternal desire, only to open it out through the jouissance of his literal 
blinding, that climactic moment when sexual pleasure has ‘tip[ped] over into pain and 
psychic dissolution’ (Benstock 16) and there is a traversal of subject and object (of 
desire). The Sphinx may have leaped off the hill and out of sight but she has not 
leaped out of the frame of representation. And neither have the witches.  
In a Latin-American version of Macbeth the playwright León Felipe shows how 
the witches continue to ‘haunt’ Macbeth even after his death by taking his corpse to a 
ravine and claiming that he has an ‘appointment’ with Hell, while in other productions 
of the play the witches themselves are not presented as ugly, wayward hags but as 
beautiful and dangerous seductresses who may or may not appear in final scenes of 
the play.2 Such representations change the audience’s perception but also point to the 
difficulties directors may have in visually representing the witches on stage without 
making them seem too stilted, exaggerated or overly sensational. Whatever the case 
may be, their haunting power resonates throughout the play and until the very end.  
It is also important to remember that audience perceptions will differ according 
to gender, class and race. As Jill Dolan points out, there are ‘varied responses of 
spectators mixed across ideologies of gender, sexuality, race, and class’ (121). She 
refers to the role played by the lesbian spectator in subverting and disrupting ‘the 





informs representation and the enculturation of gender’(101). Although clearly the 
position of the lesbian subject is not the only radical spectatorial position which can 
subvert representational forms of gender, it seems that Dolan’s reading, in seeking to 
pressure the ‘male narratives of desire’ by showing how women can denaturalize and 
even exceed ‘the genderized representational apparatus’ through their performative 
practices (101), can provide a useful backdrop against which to read narratives of 




Plate 1.7 ‘Fair is foul, and foul is fair’ – Aicha Kossoko, Amanda Harris, and 
Joyce Henderson as the three witches, Battersea Arts Centre, 2000. 
 
 
It is my contention that Jocasta and Lady Macbeth exceed the genderized 
representations ascribed to them by patriarchal discourse and that any performance in 
which they are represented should attempt, at the very least, to be a strategy of 
intervention, showing how the two female protagonists are able to break out of the 
traditional mould of theatrical form and social conventions to impose their presence 








Significantly, when Macbeth hears of Lady Macbeth’s death towards the very 
end of the play, he refers to imagery linked to sound, time, movement and the theatre 
in order to show how life is like a stage on which the curtains must sometime close. 
Yet Lady Macbeth’s memory will live on perhaps until ‘the last syllable of recorded 
time’ (V.V.21). It is significant that Macbeth – and presumably the audience too – 
does not see her actual death but only hears of it from an officer. Like Jocasta, whose 
suicide is pronounced by the Chorus, the death of the female protagonist Lady 
Macbeth is left to the audience’s imagination. This is also the case with one of the 
most powerful moments in the play – the famous suckling speech in which Lady 
Macbeth traduces her maternal role as nurturing mother. The audience is left to their 
own imaginative devices when envisioning this imagined scene. 
I read this moment as an example of Lady Macbeth’s subversion of the typical 
gender-specific position of the oppressed female subject in patriarchal discourse. By 
masculinizing herself and suppressing her maternal instincts, Lady Macbeth is able to 
open the space for a new symbolic and interpretative realm which can account for her 
own desires. As Stephanie Chamberlain points out in an interesting article entitled 
Fantasizing Infanticide: Lady Macbeth and the Murdering Mother in Early Modern 
England, the mother had an ambiguous gender status because she ‘could undermine 
patrilineal outcomes,’ a factor which ‘contributed to a generalized cultural anxiety 
about women’s roles in the transmission of patrilineage.’ Maternal agency engendered 
social and political anxieties because it could alter patrilineage ‘through marital 
infidelity, nursing, and infanticide’ (73). This led to fears and anxieties about the 
female body and wet-nursing in general, a dread ‘that breast milk could be tainted 





Such contemporary anxieties and concerns are transferred on to the stage by 
Lady Macbeth. Additionally, very real anxieties about constructions of sexuality and 
gender are also brought to the forefront of the audience’s conscious perception. In 
material, aesthetic terms it must not be forgotten that men and young boy actors 
played female roles on the stage. Thus a young boy would have played the role of 
Lady Macbeth, a situation where a boy is playing a woman who is – at least in this 
instance – masculinizing herself in order to spur Macbeth to assert his ‘manly’ 
courage and determination and kill the king. Thus when Macbeth falters to commit 
the regicide, Lady Macbeth bursts out with, ‘When you durst do it, then you were a 
man;/ And, to be more than what you were, you would/ Be so much more the man’ 
(I.VII.49-51). Thus Lady Macbeth equates manliness with masculine prowess and 
violent, blood-thirsty murder; to kill the king is to become the man. That Lady 
Macbeth should show these qualities rather than her husband is heavily ironic, 
pointing to the blurring and fluidity of traditional and stereotypical genderized roles 
and conventions. 
This fluidity is also typified in the very body of the actor playing Lady Macbeth, 
who must put on the clothing of a woman in order to enact a ‘masculinized,’ 
performative role. This brings up all kinds of questions and fears about the tendency 
of cross-dressing and transvestism to emasculate the actor, together with anxieties 
relating specifically to homosexual desire. As Orgel points out, there were arguably 
very real fears that male spectators would be drawn to the male actors performing 
women’s roles. However, ‘English Renaissance culture […] did not display a morbid 
fear of homoeroticism as such; the love of men for other men was both a fact of life 
and an essential element of the patronage system’ (35-6). Indeed, it seems that the 





as the Ancient Greek concept of philia, a male conception of gender and sexuality that 
even serves to relegate heterosexual relations to a tainted, aberrant position.  
The tension lies precisely in the fact that women could not be eliminated or 
effaced from this ideal, homosexual scenario. As Taxidou aptly points out, ‘the shift 
towards a more patriarchal-nuclear type of family model creates a crisis in systems of 
kinship, lineage and inheritance’ (Tragedy, Modernity and Mourning 173). 
Furthermore, such a ‘tension between the necessity of women as child bearers, and 
the power that that may (or may not) bring with it, and the predominantly male 
function of [homosexual and homosocial] desire create one of the most significant 
tensions within Athenian tragedy’ (173). Transposing such a formulated proposition 
onto the English Renaissance theatre, and particularly in relation to Shakespeare’s 
play, would certainly afford an interesting reading, not least because of the heavily 
inflected irony that dominates the play, considering which Macbeth continually 
misses and fails to see; the metaphorical message which Lady Macbeth is 
prophetically proclaiming to him in this maternal scene which involves the ‘dashing’ 
of the baby’s brains is precisely a literal rendition of the dashing of Macbeth’s hopes 
for a future son to carry on his patrilineage – a message Macbeth fails to pick up or 
consciously register. Lady Macbeth is barren; she will fail to perform her ‘maternal’ 
function and provide Macbeth with the son he so desperately craves for. 
In such a way Lady Macbeth too, like Jocasta before her who metaphorically 
returned as the phallic mother, will open up the interpretative field and the possibility 
of another spatial and discursive site or symbolic structure within gender discourse 
analysis and theatrical discourse. In my view, both women reclaim their agency via 





manage to overturn the typical, gender-specific position of the oppressed female 
subject assigned to them in patriarchal discourse.  
As Judith Butler points out in Bodies that Matter sex cannot – and should not – 
simply be seen as a kind of voluntary performance of gender and prescribed gender 
roles. She reiterates that sex is to be construed ‘no longer as a bodily given on which 
the construct of gender is artificially imposed, but as a cultural norm which governs 
the materialization of bodies’ (2-3). Biological models of sex are no longer adequate 
and the heterosexual matrix of gender and sex norms prescribed by society no longer 
holds.  
According to Butler, this matrix is a ‘hegemonic discursive/epistemic model of 
gender intelligibility’ which is socially constructed, naturalizes bodies, desires and 
gender and ‘assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a stable 
sex expressed through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses 
female) that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory 
practice of heterosexuality’ (Gender Trouble 151). 
What I have tried to suggest in this chapter is that Jocasta and Lady Macbeth 
subvert this heterosexual matrix through their performative practices and disrupt any 
fixed notions of a stable gender. While it is true to say that this subversion of gender 
will lead to madness, in Lady Macbeth’s case, and then death for both these female 
characters, at least it allows them to die within their own terms, and having resisted 
the oppressive roles assigned to them within the male imaginary. Like Jocasta, it is 
Lady Macbeth who has the final word, and that final word, although it is not 











Orlan’s Gruesome Theatre: Religion, Technology and the Politics of Self-Mutilation 
and Violence as Gestus 
 
 
                          I make images which almost make us blind. My work stands between the folly of  
                        seeing and  the impossibility of seeing. 
 
 
                               Like Medusa, Orlan knows that certain images compel most people to close their   
                          eyes, the eyes becoming ‘black holes into which the image is absorbed willingly or by  
                          force. These images plunge in and strike directly where it hurts…’  
                          
                                                                                                                            (Orlan qtd. in Knafo 145)  
 
 
 As one watches Orlan’s Carnal Art documentary (2001), in which Orlan playfully 
recites excerpts from literary and psychoanalytic texts in front of a camera while a 
group of certified surgeons jab her with needles in order to perform ‘reconstructive’ 
cosmetic surgery on her face by slashing across her skin, ‘slic[ing] open her lips, and, 
most gruesomely of all, sever[ing] her ear from the rest of her face with [a] scalpel,’ 
one is likely to experience an unsettling feeling of malaise, at the very least, or a 
sense of physical and/or emotional shock (Davis 454).1   
 For the French multimedia performance artist, who repeatedly splays and parades 
herself on the operation table – what (in a gruesome pun) she refers to as an 
‘operating theatre’ – this drastic refashioning or cut under the surgeon’s knife allows 
her to come closer to a coincidence or consonance of body and language, outer 
perception and inner essence  or identity. The surgeries are thus (en)acted in order to 
achieve a greater unity between possession (the ‘what I have’) and being (‘what I 
am’), ‘in order to become fully being, in order to become Being “such as it is”’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 66). To quote Orlan from her Carnal Art documentary directed by 
Stéphan Oriach, skin itself ‘is superfluous since possession and being do not coincide 





dichotomy between actual reality and lived, perceptual experience, being and having 
(or feeling and having), Orlan repeatedly tears or opens out her own body, placing it 
on public display for the other or spectator and subsequently imploding any notion of 
a natural body. The body is or becomes fictional and socially constructed. It is mere 
skin, and skin can be restructured and reshaped in accordance with our own will: ‘In 
the future, bodies will become increasingly insignificant – nothing more than a 
“costume,” a “vehicle,” something to be changed in our search “to become who we 
are”’ (Davis 458). 
  In this sense, viewing the body as a physical vehicle for living precludes viewing it 
as a sacred and religious temple invested with the Holy Spirit. Rather than viewing 
the body as self-contained and impermeable, this way of viewing the body opens out 
its discursive potential and reclaims it from the hermetic sealing-off of discursivity 
which the religious model of the body implies. It also resituates agency onto the 
individual who ‘inhabits’ his or her own body, and who can thus fashion and 
refashion it at will by divesting it of its transcendental status – the body as 
transcendental sign of the Name-of-the-Father – and rooting it concretely in the 
material and linguistic realms of representation. 
  It will be recalled that for Bergson the body is a vehicle of choice. The very term 
‘vehicle’ obviously connotes movement. The body, as a vehicle, can be used and 
reused at will in Orlan’s experimentation with various identities. It is in constant flux, 
what Renata Salecl designates as ‘a changeable work of art’ over which she has 
seeming control (169). Yet before turning to the aesthetic implications of Orlan’s 
performance, or even before examining in more depth the social implications of 
Orlan’s ‘body art’ per se, I would like to linger a little on her assertion that she 





body is ultimately divorced from any materialist base or subjectivity. In her attempts 
to objectify the body – from the very moment, in fact, that she discards or renounces 
any notion of physical or psychical pain – Orlan transforms or reduces it into a 
semiotic function or abstract sign. Her project can be viewed as being based on a 
binary between semiotics and phenomenology where substance – the very experience 
of existing in a body – gives way to semiotics and where the vital and living body  
becomes for Orlan a mere conceptual or abstract image that is open to representation.  
 Such a reading is reminiscent of that undertaken by Jean Baudrillard in his highly 
evocative analysis of J. G. Ballard’s compelling sci-fi novel Crash, whose main 
protagonist Vaughan constantly (en)acts and re-enacts car crashes and simulates the 
postures of wounded bodies as they are captured by his camera. Like Orlan, Vaughan, 
although a fictional character, documents his performances. And, whilst Orlan uses 
the surgical object as a technological intervention into her own body, the protagonist 
in Crash uses the metallic-body of the car to effect his own body’s dissolution into an 
abstract surface or concept, which is further mediatized by the photographic image – 
a medium of technology to which I shall shortly return.  
 For the moment it is interesting to note that in Baudrillard’s postmodern reading of 
Vaughan’s bloody histrionics, ‘the entire body becomes a sign which offers itself in 
the exchange of body language.’2 There is nowhere any sense of the body’s organicity 
in this symbolic exchange of body language, that is, the exchange of signs which 
occurs between the body of the car or, in Orlan’s case, the surgical instrument (if one 
takes the conceptual leap and is willing to make the transposition) and the body of the 
subject, not even when the body is impacted on, and thus transformed, by the 
automobile or surgical object. As Baudrillard makes clear: 
 





     inscribed in a semiurgy of the body – not in anatomy or physiology, but in a semiurgy of  
    contusions, scars, mutilations, and wounds which are like new sexual organs opened in the 
    body. 
                                                                                                   (Two Essays, emphasis mine) 
 
    Divorced from any anatomico-physiological setting, the body is ‘reduced to the 
symbolic exchange of signifiers’ (Harris 74). At the same time, in its process of 
‘becoming,’ it also engenders the creation of a new ‘semiurgy’ or abstract system of 
signs. And, as the wound is part of the body, it too is subsumed into this system, 
becoming what Baudrillard calls a ‘symbolic’ wound, one which is deinvested of 
libidinal cathexis and functions merely as abstract or disembodied sign. As such, it is 
disseminated along the semiotic system like a signature, infinitely reproducible and 
infinitely prone to simulation. And, as Jacques Derrida aptly points out in Margins of 
Philosophy, signatures function only in so far as they are repeatable or ‘iterable,’ and 
thus able to be repeated in several different contexts: ‘In order to function, that is, in 
order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must 
be able to detach itself from the present and singular intention of its production’ 
(328).  Hence signatures, like wounds, can be endlessly counterfeited, imitated and 
simulated.  
    For Derrida experience in general is always already marked (paradoxically) by both 
iterability and erasure, repetition and loss, and whilst it is clearly beyond the scope of 
this work to fully engage in a Derridean philosophy of difference and deconstruction, 
suffice it to say that his notion of a signature – or, what I would like to call a wound-
as-signature – may shed some light on Orlan’s cosmetic surgeries as staged 
performances. In one of Orlan’s exhibitions in particular, a progressive series of forty 
photographic images of her facial surgical wounds are displayed for public view.  
These seriated photographic images show the capacity for the wound to be reproduced 





of Orlan’s body towards the other and the other’s field of vision, her attempts to make 
her wounds a sharable event – a collective spectacle, in short, rather than a private 
ideal.3 
    Orlan’s body is thus opened out, it ‘offers itself to [representation], opens upon… 
an imminent spectator, is a charged field’ (Merleau-Ponty 264).4 It is a charged field, 
in other words, to the extent that it opens itself to representation and the other’s gaze, 
implicating itself in a dialectical movement where violence functions as a kind of 
social gestus and feeds into an attempt to destabilize constructed identities. Orlan is 
constantly ‘trad[ing] among shifting, constructed identities, layered on a body that has 
experienced all of these constructions.’ Her performance arguably functions as ‘a 
noncoincidence of body and language, a Brechtian, postmodern dissociation of 
presence and discourse.’5 Yet, before attempting to reclaim Orlan’s performances by 
foregrounding them in a kind of historico-materialist discourse or gestic feminist 
criticism (assuming, of course, that this is even possible or desirable), I would like to 
pause once more over Orlan’s complete negation of pain and her complete disavowal 
of the subjective body.  
    In effect, Orlan’s belief in the complete obsolescence of the human body allows her 
to assume (even if phantasmatically) the position of a ‘posthuman self where a 
multiplicity of selves are constantly shifting and in motion’ (Ashby 48). I say 
phantasmatically because there is no way to avoid humanism – and paradoxically so – 
when positing the posthuman condition. It is all very well, pace Derrida, to say that 
the ‘post’ in humanism is always already returning, that this movement is in effect 
always taking place, but it is also the case that there is no clear way out of this very 





claiming to have left it behind is to overlook the very way that opposition is 
articulated’ (Badmington 9). 
     What this means is that despite Orlan’s protests to the contrary, she needs the body 
in her performances, and the body feels pain. For while Baudrillard sees wounds as 
primarily ‘symbolic’ and semiotic, as disembodied artefacts or signs which circulate 
in a semiotics without any meaning, it is my contention that Orlan’s gaping wounds, 
the open orifices she exposes in her photographic images, delineate a very precise 
economy of pain frozen and petrified in time. Indeed, the fact that the wounds 
themselves may be read as abstract signs does not preclude them from also being or 
becoming embodied, ‘real’ events. They may possess an ambivalent status, in their 
attribution as at once psychical and social, virtual and real, a matter of both 
representation and perception at the same time, yet it is not easy, perhaps even 
impossible, to relegate the body to some pre-subjective or even pre-objective state of 
being. (I am reminded here of a kind of Husserlian something, the something of 
consciousness, the consciousness of, which we cannot extricate ourselves from.) 
      As I mentioned previously, the body feels, even lives, pain. It is not so easy to 
abstract it from its materiality and root it in some conceptual or even pre-ontological 
discourse of semiotics. Indeed, the very question of semiotics, of language itself, 
presupposes the existence of the body, even if only as referential, material sign. As 
Lacan notes in Écrits, ‘language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is’ 
(95).  After Orlan’s ‘cosmetic’ operations, she is left with the reality of the wounds on 
her face, which serve as very real and unforgettable markers of the mediation between 
her own body and the surgical instrument, i.e. the needle, the scalpel, the surgeon’s 
knife. They form ‘an inexhaustible encyclopedia of pains and discharges’ (Ballard 39, 





markers of pain which shatter the body’s sense of unity. And, as Vivian Sobchack 
points out in her criticism of Baudrillard’s reading of Crash, a criticism which can be 
applied with the same cogent force to Orlan’s surgical practices, ‘there’s nothing like 
a little pain to bring us (back) to our senses, nothing like a real (not imagined) mark or 
wound or artificial orifice to counter Baudrillard’s postmodern romanticism.’6 
     The body is as much a subject as it is an object; it is all too easy to forget our lived 
and imagined sense ‘of the human body not merely as a material object among others, 
but as a material subject that bleeds and suffers and hurts for others because it can 
bleed and suffer and hurt for oneself’ (Sobchack). While Sobchack’s argument may 
read like a romanticized version of a nostalgic desire to recoup once more the body’s 
subjectivity, which (one may argue) has always already been disseminated and 
fragmented via artifice and technological practices, it is significant that she brings the 
notion of the material body to the fore once more. 
    For Orlan cannot escape the body. The locus or site of action is precisely her body, 
on which she inscribes her own discursive text.7 The photographic images are like a 
testament to the vulnerability of the flesh, in which the wounds map out a very precise 
representation of physical and psychical pain. It is paradoxical indeed that this should 
take place, especially considering Orlan’s complete disavowal and rejection of this 
very pain on which her work is premised. Unlike many other female performance 
artists, who tend to magnify their pain and oppression under patriarchal discourse, she 
attempts to downplay it in her theatre of cruelty, even reduce it entirely.8 As Elaine 
Scarry remarks, this type of logic is untenable precisely because physical pain, even 
when it is inscribed in an elsewhere, transferred onto another object (such as a 
photographic image, for example), will still retain or carry ‘some of the attributes of 





and torture in her astute analysis, where one individual attempts to obliterate the sense 
of an other’s pain, the fact remains that physical pain is real. As a phenomenon it 
occurs ‘not several miles below our feet or many miles above our heads but within the 
bodies of the persons who inhabit the world through which we each day make our 
way.’ Furthermore, it is ‘a sign of pain’s triumph’ when it effects what Scarry calls an 
aversiveness by ‘invok[ing] analogies to remote cosmologies (and there is a long 
tradition of such analogies)’ (4).  
    What Orlan does is to invoke the sense that each surgical operation functions as a 
kind of remote cosmology divorced from material pain. She views her operations as 
attempts to achieve reincarnation in this life, with all the religious and mystic 
undertones that this implies. The image of the wound itself obviously resonates with 
religious undertones. Wounds exude a mysterious, mystic quality. Yet this mysticism 
is not specifically grounded in Christian doctrine. The wounds themselves have been 
begotten from the perverse union of the body with technology. As such, they are part 
of a new semio-gnosis, of which Orlan is the ‘messiah’. Wounds are simply signs 
which circulate in this new semio-gnosis. There is no question of transcendence, that 
is, the wounds on the body are not transcendental signifiers; they are more like 
ambivalent signs in a constant play of signification, a neither/nor system. 
      The irony here is that Orlan’s ‘fantasy of rebirth,’ her ‘Christlike attempt to 
transcend the body and mortality’ (Knafo 150) point to her very own sense of 
embodiment. After all, even Christ was half-man. When she notes that this visual 
fantasy ‘of my body being opened endlessly’ (150) resonates with religious imagery, I 
cannot help but be reminded of Caravaggio’s painting The Incredulity of St Thomas. 
In it, Thomas is directly inserting his finger into Christ’s wound, an open orifice out 





its paradox is to be found precisely in the fact that Christ’s bloodless body bears the 
very real marks of embodiment at the same time that it presents us with a 
disembodied subject:  
 
      The paradox of Caravaggio’s painting lies precisely here: in the narrative “proof” of  
Christ’s embodiment Caravaggio paints the radical disembodiment of human love and 
subjectivity. Recording the narrative “proof” of Christ as (eternally) living body, 
Caravaggio’s painting gives us a wounded, bloodless body. An arrested frozen image, 







Plate 1.8 The Incredulity of St. Thomas – Caravaggio, c. 1601-2. Reproduced in 
Phelan (29).  
 
 
     This ‘terror of embodiment’ is the same terror I read in Orlan’s fixed 
photographic images, which denounce their sense of embodiment at the very same 
time as they reinscribe it. The flat surface of the photograph does not erase its 
Barthesian punctum, its capacity not only to designate a body which was embodied at 





attention to their own painful embodiment as they look at Orlan’s images. Some of 
her self-portaits, in fact, are composed using her own skin and blood, a visceral 
reminder once more of her message that the body is in pieces. As spectators we bear 
witness to Orlan’s fragmented body. While it has been claimed that this 
fragmentation can be empowering to the extent that it textualizes and reterritorializes 
the female body – hence reclaiming it as a site of empowerment – I would argue that 
Orlan’s project interrogates conceptions of embodied subjectivities in order to bring 
up specific concerns – feminist or otherwise – regarding spectatorship, the gaze and 
voyeurism rather than being a feminist manifesto of triumph. As Parveen Adams 
points out, there is an implicit horror in viewing Orlan’s detachable face, ‘the horror 
at seeing this, at not knowing where all this seeing will end’ (58).  
 It is almost as if the real horror for the viewer lies in the possibility that Orlan’s 
identity will cease to become recognizable or that she will even disappear. The lifting 
of her face confronts spectators with the prospect that identity is pliable, even 
erasable. The face becomes a mask or mere covering, yet a covering which we still 
cannot detach entirely in order to look underneath.  
      Since Orlan’s face can be seen in close-up during her surgical operations it is 
significant that Adams should draw attention to it. As Georg Simmel points out, the 
face has an ‘aesthetic significance’ and achieves ‘in mirroring the soul’ through a kind 
of symmetrical unity and inner mimesis (qtd. in Seltzer 243). ‘Hence any failure of 
the mimetic power of the face effects a violent “despiritualization,” which takes the 
form of imagos of the shattered body.’ Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari refer to an 
overcoded face-system ‘that “draws the entire body” into the “abstract machine of 





     Although this frame of reference serves to unroot the face and body from concrete 
materiality and locate them in a mechanized abstraction, it serves to bring up the 
importance of the face as an overloaded system of signs which decode and even 
overcode the body. I would argue that it is this explicit overcoding which becomes 
traumatic when it exceeds its interpretative frame, leading to what Seltzer calls the 
failure of the mimetic power. Even though Barbara Rose claims that Orlan’s use of 
mediated technology creates ‘a sophisticated feedback system, a vicious circle of 
echoing and self-generating images’ which spawn ‘a progeny of hybrid media 
reproductions,’ there is always the possibility that this system will break down with 
the weight of its sensory and imagistic overload. What is more, to see ‘cuts in the face 
violates our sense of separation between the visceral and the human’ (Lovelace 18).  
     Although Rose claims that Orlan creates a Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt or A-
effect by alienating her audience through the ‘sensory overload of her imagery’ and 
its visceral effects, I would argue that there is a dimension to Orlan’s work which 
elides the aesthetic because it cannot escape the corporeality of the body. Even if her 
goal is to alienate her spectators, it is arguable if she ever manages to achieve it – a 
point to which I shall return.9 
     Whatever the case may be, seeing the body literally and performatively in pieces is 
more traumatic than it is empowering. Sarah Wilson feelingly describes the pain 
involved whilst watching Orlan’s surgical performances, noting that as ‘spectators we 
witness her virtual martyrology, we know that her operations in flesh and spirit are 
both real and metonymic – an emblem for so much pain’ (9). Wilson also claims that 
Orlan refuses giving her spectators a cathartic experience: ‘We are witnesses at a 
tragedy which we are forced to experience empathetically (transexually for the male 





Theatre of Cruelty – is rigorously denied’ (16). Carey Lovelace, on the other hand, 
asserts that there is a ‘metaphysical healing potential’ in Orlan’s performances (25). 
      To begin with, there is what Lovelace calls an ‘inflammatory (in-your-face) 
quality’ to her work. Orlan wishes to evoke powerful emotions in her spectators: “I 
seek to make a visual work,” she said, “for which one has a strong bodily response, 
rather like one reacts physically listening to music” (Orlan, qtd. in Lovelace 18). 
Obviously Orlan’s claim here directly refutes Rose’s supposition of an alienating, 
Brechtian aestheticism.  
      At the same time, since catharsis is an embodied and social process in which the 
‘shuddering body’ of the subject is marred by ‘rational vision’ and subject to ‘an 
unhealthy division of self and social being – a division which only catharsis itself can 
heal and regulate’ (Diamond 154), Orlan’s desire to make her performances social 
and embodied events leads, ironically, to what Diamond calls, pace Adorno, ‘the 
shudder of catharsis,’ which, as we have already seen, is not ultra-individualistic but 
socially contingent, dependent on the other for its embodiment. Since ‘catharsis marks 
and remarks a sentient convergence of body and meaning,’ Orlan’s material body 
becomes a social and visible embodiment involving herself and her spectators (154). 
This embodiment is achieved first through the assignation of ontological status and 
consistency – as well as hermeneutic visibility – to her body, and then through a 
marking and remarking of this body as a social body which sees its own performance 
at the same time as it is seen by others.  
     In other words, it is impossible to escape embodiment. In order to make the body 
socially visible – a social construction – some sense of its materiality needs to be 
recouped. This is important if we are to open out the body’s potentialities and avoid 





Rosario astutely points out, discursive or constructivist analyses of the body may open 
‘a broader terrain for understanding the body and sex as sociological and historical 
phenomena molded, perhaps even determined, by relations of power.’ However, 
although such analyses may offer a mode of resistance for women, they ‘might [also] 
instead foreclose the possibility of resistance because of the weight of socialization 
and cultural convention, or, in Butler’s formulation, the compulsory reiteration of 
gender and sexual norms’ (179).  
     Thus it would be dangerous to claim that Orlan is fashioning and refashioning her 
body at will and simply reconstructing her gender without returning to the material 
and sentient body, not so much in order to claim there is a biological or deterministic 
inevitability which Orlan cannot escape as to posit that any social (re)marking of the 
body must necessarily start at and with the body – a stumbling block which Orlan 
cannot magically do away with. Even psychoanalysis itself, which analyses the mind 
and psyche and attempts to stop at the body, cannot get rid of the body, which 
phenomenologically appears to haunt its theoretical borders in the same way as the 
maternal body returns to haunt Freud ‘like a fata morgana’ (Sprengnether 5).  
     There is a finitude to the body which makes it resistant to what Rose calls 
‘hybrid’ reproductions. Through these operations Orlan herself becomes ‘vulnerable 
to disfigurement, even death’ (Lovelace 14). Even she realizes that her project will 
have to end sometime and that her body has limits. In a piece on corporal punishment 
in The Independent Judith Palmer quotes Orlan as saying: “I’d have to have an 
operation a month if I took up all the requests from galleries around the world” (par. 
2). After she has created the ‘perfect’ mythological face out of ‘the images of the 
“Mona Lisa”, “Diana”, and Boticelli’s “Venus” her project will be complete, her face 





representations of female beauty are stored’ (Ashby 44). (Incidentally, her choice of 
body parts from different models is reminiscent of the artwork of the Greek painter 
Zeuxis who chose to paint the most beautiful features from five different women because 
he was unsatisfied with using only one female model.) In addition, the relics of her flesh 
and blood which she sells in vials to finance some of her final operations cannot be 
reproduced ad infinitum – unless she cuts herself to death – and attest to the body’s 
corporeal limits. At the same time, these bodily relics are like excess by-products 
which she can expunge at will.    
     These bloody waste-products or ‘bits of her dislodged flesh’ (Lovelace 15) are 
like abject excretions which threaten her very identity. By refining Mary Douglas’s 
notion of defilement in Purity and Danger, Kristeva advances her theory of abjection. 
The subject’s very identity ‘is tied to the identity of the borders of the body which are 
threatened by bodily secretions’ such as blood, milk and urine. It is only by 
‘abjecting’ or ‘ejecting’ these secretions that identity is constituted (Oliver 47). Thus 
her oeuvre is marked, ironically, by the abjection of herself as performer/artist/self in 
order to delineate more clearly the borders of her own identity and the dividing line 
‘between the inside and the outside, between the clean and proper self and the abject 
other’ (47). Orlan becomes her own work of abjection. The only difference is that she 
herself orchestrates and regulates what is to be abjected at a specific moment in time, 
creating the comforting illusion of personal choice while the surgeons ‘abjectify’ her 
with their surgical implements. It is perhaps worthy to note in this context that Orlan 
has read aloud Kristeva’s texts during her surgical performances.  
     The commodification of Orlan’s flesh is reminiscent of the practices of the artist 
Piero Manzoni in the 1960s, who used his own blood, breath, and excrement in his 





the consumerist art world. This commodification may seem as a subversive and 
grotesque parody of capitalist and consumerist culture in which the female body 
becomes the object of male desire since Orlan is offering and marketing her body in 
irregular bits and pieces, as though it were some kind of a baroque figure which will 
bodily fall apart at any moment, rather than as a commodified whole to be screened 
over and appropriated by the male gaze. However, if a feminist reclaiming of the 
body entails its literal defragmentation, one wonders where the triumphalist outcome 
of Orlan’s practices is to be located. At the same time, one also wonders how her 
alleged claims of negating rather than reclaiming the body can serve feminist ends.  
     If Orlan implodes any notion of a natural and living body, her experience is 
(re)created ex nihilo, leaving us to wonder wherein lies the truth of her experience 
since it is neither to be located in materialist nor spiritual frames of reference. For 
Orlan explicitly rejects Christian doctrine as well, although her work has strong ties to 
a Catholic visual tradition. She uses the passion of Christ as a tragedy and subverts it 
by positing herself as a martyr whose alleged sacrifice remains to a certain extent 
unredeemed. By attempting to make the flesh word rather than vice versa, Orlan 
subverts theological dogma at the same time as she denounces the religious belief in 
the body’s sacred and inviolate wholeness.  
      It is interesting that Orlan should do this by making use of artistic representations 
of Greco-Roman mythological figures such as Diana, who was equated with the 
virgin goddess of the hunt Artemis, and Venus, the goddess of love and beauty. These 
female figures are seen as idealized stereotypes of feminine beauty in Western culture 
and statuesque representations of them aim at maintaining a sense of the body’s 





boundaries and its porosity, these figures attest to the body’s hermetic self-
containment. Orlan plays with this idea and posits it as a perilous fantasy.  
     As Maren Möhring points out, Greek sculpture focuses on bodily contours and 
‘aims at a body sealed off from the environment, self-contained and self-possessed’ 
(238). At the same time, Greek statues represent the female nude as chaste and 
immaculate, an idea which Orlan toys with in a dangerous way since by sculpting her 
own naked and sexualized body in public she risks entering into the zone of 
pornography rather than the aesthetic realm. Her performative work can be aligned 
with many of Carolee Schneemann’s confrontational performances in the 1960s, such 
as Eye/Body (1963), which aimed to subvert the traditional relationship between the 
pleasure-seeking gaze of the male viewer and the submissive masochism of the 
female subject who passively offers her body for spectatorial consumption. In her 
efforts to reclaim and control her body, Schneeman was often accused at the time of 
narcistically exposing it and this compromised and often stunted the radical and 
political efficacy of her project. 
    In terms of its mode of reception, inasmuch as it feeds into feminist concerns with 
the gaze and voyeuristic practices, responses have been divided and there has often 
been a tendency to downplay and even elide the aesthetic dimension of Orlan’s work 
in order to accentuate the traumatic implications of viewing, and in Orlan’s case 
physically experiencing, the real event of a body as it is surgically cut and maimed. At 
the same time, the voyeuristic aspect of Orlan’s performances draws on modes of 
theatre like freak shows and the Grand Guignol [sic], a genre focusing on horror 
shows and whose eponymous theatre originated in Paris, with brief flourishing bouts 
in London as well over the years. It was noted for ‘its gruesome depictions of gore, 





practices. ‘Eyes were gouged out, stabbed and swallowed, while blind characters played 
a prominent role in the performances’ (Freshwater 254).  
    Not only did the playwrights of this genre focus on the eye’s vulnerability as a 
bodily organ but also on its susceptibility to deception and illusion by skilfully 
presenting events which never really took place. At the same time, and apart from the 
use of such sleights of hand, they also ‘exploited contemporary anxieties about 
contagious and inherited diseases, foreigners and the impact of technological and medical 
advances’ (254). Not only does Orlan tap into such anxieties others may possess but she 
also explicitly celebrates these advances in technological progress as a welcome stepping-
stone towards her road to self-transformation.  
     It is extremely telling that all of Orlan’s performances are mediated by technological 
devices such as the camera. The eye of the camera is like a wandering and roving eye 
which probes underneath Orlan’s skin to reveal its interiority, an interiority of flesh and 
blood that is ‘objectified, thingified, imaged’ (Cadava 90). In his analysis of Benjamin’s 
Illuminations and the subject of photography, Eduardo Cadava stresses the moribund link 
between photography and death. The photograph is really its own ‘grave for the living 
dead’ because it inherently bespeaks of ‘a history of ghosts and shadows – and it does so 
because it is this history.’ The photographic image itself is a monument or testament to 
the living corpse, ‘the living image of a dead thing’ (Barthes qtd. in Cadava 90).  
    Not surprisingly, a primary signifier of the abject for Kristeva is the actual corpse 
which invokes horror as it blurs the boundaries between self and other. Ironically, 
Orlan’s photographic images during her live performances are constant reminders or 
relics that bear witness to the very real possibility of her death rather than transformation 
as she is ‘captured’ by the camera.  Her constant attempts to expose her interiority 





reminds us in The Gift of Death: ‘No manifestation can consist in rendering the interior 
exterior or show what is hidden’ (63). 
      In a sense, although Orlan attempts to imitate Greco-Roman art, which could be 
seen perhaps ‘as a mimetic form of self-formation,’ her radical reformulation of the 
body by reconfiguring its porosity is obviously closer to more modern machinic 
models of the body than anything else (Möhring 238). The modern body is 
vulnerable, exposed and permeable. At the same time, it is connected to technological 
devices, becoming a ‘prosthesis’ of the machine. The body becomes, or rather it is a 
machine, or in Artaud’s terms ‘an over-heated factory’ (qtd. in Seltzer 242). 
     Orlan exhibits a constant and obsessive fascination with removing the skin or 
outer covering of the body in order to look inside and thus make the outside mirror, or 
rather become, the inside. She claims that the lack of pain in her performances is central 
to her work because the trauma of witnessing a human body torn and ripped apart shifts 
self-reflection onto the viewer. In an interview with Robert Einright in 1998 for the 
magazine Border Crossings, she emphasizes the transgressive power of this inner/outer 
divide and of pain generally: 
                      So, this last operation is on the theme of pain, and actually the absence of pain. I intend 
to have myself cut completely open and to show the inside of my body. I would be lying 
smiling, absolutely conscious and just showing the inside of my body without any pain. And 
when you open up like that to the world, you are creating a wound which has also sexual and 
erotic connotations. This would be another stage, the stage of self-mirroring and the mirror 
brought up to the world. Then, after everybody will have looked into my body, I will simply 
have it closed back (45).  
       
 
     Orlan’s performances are like ‘an elaborate skin show’ where the skin ‘no longer 
conceals or contains, it offers itself up as text, as body, as monster’ (Halberstam 7). 
Although Halberstam is referring explicitly to the Gothic tradition, where the skin 
becomes the ultimate, divisive boundary, there is certainly a grotesque element or 
dimension to Orlan’s work which makes many of her viewers recoil in horror in the 





relentlessly flayed in horror movies. There is, in Orlan’s work, what Baudrillard has 
defined in ‘The Ecstasy of Communication’ as the obscenity of ‘transparence and 
immediate visibility, when everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable light of 
information and communication’ (130).  
      As Lovelace has pointed out, when artists and critics congregated in Soho in the 
Sandra Gering Gallery in 1993 to watch Orlan’s seventh operation from her project 
The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan on a large TV screen, the actual gallery ‘emptie[d] 
of a third of its audience’ before the performance had drawn to an end (13). Davis 
cites one of Orlan’s lectures given in Amsterdam in 1995, where she projected images 
on screen of herself during ‘reconstructive’ cosmetic surgeries. ‘The audience 
watched as the surgeon inserted needles into her face, sliced open her lips, and, most 
gruesomely of all, severed her ear from the rest of her face with his scalpel’ (Davis 
454). As Davis remarks, the complete indifference with which Orlan presented these 
images of her own body art naturally produced a shock in the audience. It takes a 
‘strong’ stomach, after all, to watch these various gruesome acts of bodily 
mutilation.10 Yet this is, on the whole, Orlan’s intention to begin with: the audience 
must be shocked if her art is to be at all effective. For ‘art has to be transgressive, 
disruptive and unpleasant in order to have a social function’ (Davis 458).  
  However, what exactly is the ‘social function’ of Orlan’s body art, and how 
effective is this art in the materialization of that very social function which it claims 
to perform? In order to answer these questions, one must return to the body once 
more and the way it is perceived. For Orlan, modern technological advances in 
cosmetic surgery, eugenics and virtual reality have now shattered any notion of a 
natural body as being nothing more than a precarious fantasy. However, as many 





transforms it ‘into language’ (Salecl 169). This is similar to Karen Sanchez-Eppler’s 
formulation in ‘Bodily Bonds’ that women can find their voice only after they 
refashion their flesh and reclaim it from patriarchal discourse.  
  From a feminist perspective, the parallelism with Orlan’s body art is not wide of 
the mark since her art has often been seen as an attempt at reclamation – the 
reclamation, that is, of the female body. It is an art which not only ‘examines the 
social pressures which are exercised upon women through their bodies,’ but also 
attempts to subvert, or at least relieve, those pressures (Davis 458). One way in which 
Orlan does this is by subversively inverting the patriarchal reading of the ‘feminine 
ideal.’ As Davis points out, her face ‘deviates radically from the masculinist ideal of 
feminine perfection’ (458) and Germaine Greer highlights that she is ‘a feminist ikon’ 
(33).  
Yet how successful is Orlan’s body art? And how does Orlan reclaim the female 
body by negating its ontological materiality? Finally, is it really possible to destroy 
the concept of a natural body? Although Orlan would answer the latter question in the 
affirmative, I am highly sceptical of her complete disavowal of physical, if not 
psychological, pain involved in her extreme surgical practices. The body is full of 
nerve endings that are receptive to pain, many of them located on the skin. To claim, 
therefore, to be a disembodied subject, incapable of feeling pain and playfully reciting 
literary texts in front of a camera ‘while her face is being jabbed with needles or cut’ 
is clearly not feasible (Davis 457).  
  In addition, it is not a very pleasant sight either for most people to witness Orlan’s 
lecture, as evidenced by the audience’s responses in Amsterdam. It is not an easy task 
to surpass the sheer ‘gruesomeness’ of Orlan’s body art and critically engage with the 





mutilative practices which are commonly viewed as perverse, Orlan’s body art can 
very easily be seen as an insane practice of a twisted mind. As Judith Halberstam 
points out in Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Technology of Monsters, it is easy to 
read the body that changes as being a sign of monstrosity. Many try to turn away 
from it because in it and through it ‘we may read the difference between an other and 
a self, a pervert and a normal person, a foreigner and a native’ (8). 
    Armando Favazza grapples with similar issues in his highly comprehensive 
Bodies Under Siege: Self-mutilation and Body Modification in Culture and 
Psychiatry, which explores the ambivalence or even dread felt by individuals when 
they are faced with self-mutilators – who are in many cases female – and their 
practices, which often seem inane and senseless. He attempts to arrive at a more 
critical understanding of the complex and multifaceted dimensions of self-mutilation 
as a practice, both on an intrapersonal and societal level.  
   As Favazza notes, ‘we normally live within our skins. All that is enclosed by my 
skin is me; everything else is not me. The skin is a border between the outer world 
and the inner world, the environment and the personal self.’ A tendency for self-
mutilative practices may occur once this border or boundary between inner and outer 
worlds starts to break down, the subject no longer being able ‘to perceive where the 
body ends and the outside world begins.’ This condition, pathological in nature, is 
commonly termed ‘depersonalisation disorder’ since it is marked by the subject’s 
own loss of any sense of personhood, a feeling that the body is unreal and ‘that time 
and the environment have mysteriously changed’ (Favazza 148; 274).   
  As it is the body that forms the locus or centre onto which self-mutilative practices 
are enacted and inscribed an exploration into the various perceptions that self-





of mutilation practices. One form of mutilation, that of self-cutting, is an often highly 
effective attempt on the part of the subject to reinstate himself or herself back into 
subjective personhood. Once the cut stimulates pain and the letting of blood, cutters 
‘are able to verify that they are alive,’ that they have a skin border and that their body 
has limits (Favazza 148).  
‘Feeling alive’ and rejuvenated after the cutting is a sensation which most, if not all, 
cutters tend to experience. John Kafka documents the story of a young woman who 
had the intense and ‘“exquisite border experience of sharply becoming alive” at the 
moment of cutting herself. She described the flow of blood as being like a voluptuous 
bath whose pleasant warmth spread over her body, moulding its contour and sculpting 
its form’ (qtd. in Favazza 161, emphasis mine). In stark contrast to suicidal attempts, 
however, such ritualized bloodletting is seen as regenerative, not ‘an exit into death’ 
but ‘a re-entrance into [life and] into a state of normality’ (Favazza 271). It makes the 
body feel real and tangible. 
  This blood-bath ritual is extremely telling. As the blood flows down the body, the 
body’s borders or ‘contours’ so to speak are clearly defined and delimited. This 
mysterious gratification which this process entails can be linked with more than just 
specific masochistic tendencies on the part of the subject: the warm embrace of blood 
in this instance is sexually, even fetishistically, gratifying.  
 This linkage between sexual gratification and cutting has also been reported as 
existing in many other cases, in which skin cutting is seen as ‘represent[ing] the 
creation of multiple little female genitalia on the skin,’ which the subject can then 
fondle at will and touch unrestrainedly (Favazza 163). The stimulation of pain here 
induces a pleasurable sensation which almost seems to match that attained during 





during orgasm: a rush of blood to the vagina and clitoris occurs at this critical 
moment. Viewed from a different standpoint also, the ‘little female genitalia’ or cuts, 
as they bleed, can also be seen as self-induced and orchestrated outlets for menses,11 
but a menses that is ‘vicarious,’ predictable and regulated (165).  
 As a result, such bloodletting, for cutters, takes on therapeutic properties, which is 
fairly reminiscent of bloodletting therapy in eighteenth-century England as practised 
by prominent surgeons such as Joseph Lister. This allowed ‘unclean’ blood to be 
discharged, thus ‘provid[ing] an opening through which the tension and badness in 
[patients’] bodies [could] rapidly escape’ (Favazza 272). This provides instant relief, 
a feeling of euphoria, and allows the cutter to release, in private, feelings of rage and 
frustration directed against the self or the outside world, in the guise of its various 
medical, political and socio-cultural institutions. Although perhaps not as effective as 
practices enacted on a broad social scale, such as public demonstrations or picketing, 
the very act of self-cutting ‘is some sort of action’ which is both therapeutic and 
‘preferable’ to complete passive resistance (273).  
   On another level, self-mutilation of this kind can be therapeutic precisely because 
of the scar which it leaves, or inscribes, on the body. The relief of watching one’s 
own blood flow gives way to the relief of watching oneself heal, the scar 
symbolically evidencing the body’s healing capacity, and also ‘mark[ing] a hurtful 
occasion’ or event (Favazza 280). The cut or wound possesses regenerative power.  
  Similarly, in other more permanent forms of body modification, such as piercing, 
the ‘mark’ of the cut also becomes ‘a very strengthening and powerful experience.’ 
After the cut you ‘bleed and then end up with something beautiful… and then it heals 
and you have it and you’re proud of it – that can be very empowering. It can be a 





 This experiential sense of ‘reclaiming’ one’s own body by modifying it according 
to one’s own specification and then watching it heal is often envisioned as a truly 
liberating event. In a case study quoted by Germaine Greer, stripper Jane Shag Stamp 
remarks of her piercing and tattooing practices, “I get off on the initial pain… And I 
come home high and treat myself to taking it easy… Some folk seem to think by 
stripping I’m offering up my body to all these men, well I like to think 
tattooing/piercing helps me to feel like it is my own” (99, italics mine).  
 While this is quite clearly an assertion of the ‘liberatory’ function of such practices 
as body piercing, it is also an equivocal response since it not only allows us to wonder 
whether it would be a truly liberatory event if it were not a response to the actual 
‘trauma’ of stripping, but also because it illustrates the inherent dichotomy between 
actual reality and lived, perceptual experience, feeling and having. For it is, after all, 
very different to ‘feel’ that the body is one’s own than it is for it to ‘be’ one’s own 
and thus be able to reclaim complete autonomous control over it. What Shag Stamp 
has overlooked, although it comes out implicitly in her discourse, is the diminishing 
of her personal agency in the process itself. It is probably the professional body 
piercer or tattooer who had the control whilst refashioning and modifying her body, in 
the same way as it is the surgeon who is holding the surgical appliances during 
Orlan’s performances. Thus it is all very well to assert that through cosmetic surgery, 
the literal ‘cut’ inscribed onto her body, she can reclaim control and that under the cut 
of the surgeon’s knife, she ‘designs her body, orchestrates the operations and makes 
the final decision about when to stop and when to go on’ (Davis 459). Indeed, it is all 
very well as long as we forget that a single cut by the surgeon in the wrong place can 





  Obviously we do not live in an enclosed vacuum. Orlan’s performative acts cannot 
be seen exclusively in ultra-individualistic terms. They necessarily draw the other into 
the visual and discursive domain. Hence, although ‘the surgeons themselves remain 
subject to the final gaze of Orlan’s camera’ and hence ‘cannot escape her watchful 
eye’ (Ashby 45), it is also inevitably the case that they are scripting her body and 
subjecting it to their own reified gaze. At the same time as her performances are 
mediated by the technology of the gaze, they also bear witness to the other within the 
visual and perceptual field.  
  As spectators, we too are appropriating her body within our scopic field. Of course 
we can make a conscious choice to avert our gaze and fix or concentrate it elsewhere, 
especially when visuality becomes excessive or, in Baudrillard’s terms, too obscene. 
For Orlan repeatedly strikes our eyes with images which ‘plunge in and strike directly 
where it hurts’ (Knafo 145). Danielle Knafo compares her to Medusa: 
Like Medusa, Orlan is both fascinating and dreadful. We wish to gaze at her as she engages 
in body mutating and life-threatening practices, yet we are aghast at the slicing of her flesh, 
frozen by the literal confrontation with bloody castration, mortality, and the uncanny 
encounter between reality and fantasy (144, emphasis mine). 
        
 
Body rituals are uncannily repetitive even as they tend to blur the boundaries 
‘between reality and fiction.’ As Freud points out in The ‘Uncanny’’ (1919), the 
uncanny is really ‘nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-
established in the mind’ (363-4). Clearly bodily sacrifice is not a modern concept. 
Even though Orlan attempts to induce shock therapy with her own radical body 
modification practices, she was not the first to engage in offensive sexual acts or 
blood sacrifices. Amongst Orlan’s predecessors were Gina Pane, who ‘was known for 
the tiny cuts she made in her body in events that had ritualistic, religious overtones,’ 





practices by maiming himself, as well as Chris Burden whose art work ‘included 
crawling over broken glass, sticking electrical wires in his chest, and having himself 
crucified on a Volkswagon’ (Lovelace 15).  
  What is more, although Knafo associates Orlan to the all-powerful Medusa, she 
forgets about the spectators who stand in for Perseus and can detach themselves from 
her transfixed and petrified stare simply by averting it or even ‘cutting’ Orlan off 
from their visual terrain. Although Orlan claims that she wishes for her spectators to 
close their eyes, refusing to look could also effectively be construed as a way of 
disengaging from the social and critical function Orlan claims to perform in her work. 
If the personal in extremis is to become political, then at the very least Orlan’s 
surgical practices should be viewed as a social and embodied involvement – at least, 
that is, if her project is to succeed.  
 In other words, the audience must be made to look if her work is to have any potent 
political force or social currency. Influenced by Artaud and his Theatre of Cruelty, 
Orlan’s work follows on from a large tradition of body artists in the 1960s who 
sought to merge audience and performance and effect social and political change. 
Artaud ‘propose[d] a theatre where violent physical images pulverise, mesmerise the 
audience’s sensibilities, caught in the drama as if in a vortex of higher forces’ (The 
Theatre and Its Double 63). In short, ‘every facet of the spectator’s sensibility’ was to 
be attacked by recourse to ‘a revolving show’ that would ‘extend its visual and oral 
outbursts over the whole mass of spectators’ (66). Sacrifice, the Dionysian festival 
and bodily mutilation were all ways of achieving these outbursts.  
  Orlan was also influenced by Bataille’s work on eroticism and the sacred, which 
removes any sense of the erotic and evokes the horror of death. As he notes in Theory 





According to Bataille, taboos imposed by culture and religion shelter us from this 
horror – taboos which Orlan herself transgresses. In a sense, there is a very real horror 
in witnessing Orlan’s transgression of the sacred through her artwork. 
 She disrupts social and monolithic constructions of sexuality, identity and religion. 
In many of her pieces she mocks Renaissance art which depicted the Virgin and other 
holy women and attempts to subvert the Catholic division of femininity into the 
stereotypes of angelic saint or whore. Whereas the ‘White Virgin’ is holy and chaste, 
Orlan praises the ‘Black Virgin’ who, like Adam’s first wife Lilith in the Old 
Testament, is autonomous and in Jewish folklore more generally represents the 
female demon-goddess. In Black Virgin Wielding White Cross and Black Cross No. 
24 (1983), Orlan plays with the opposition between white and black. Dressed in a 
black leatherette gown she wields two crosses in her hands, an upturned white one 
and a black one which faces downwards in order to symbolize its inversion of deeply 
ingrained Christian tradition. At the same time, she exposes one of her breasts, which 
is reminiscent of the way in which many artists and painters used to represent the 
Madonna, with her nurturant breast, as she suckled the baby Jesus. The breast attacks 
spectators’ sensibility as well as their visual field. With its Medusa-like quality, it is 
the quintessential example of the castrating breast which petrifies action.  
   At the same time, there is an almost defiant rejection of anything maternal since 
the breast here is not seen as a symbol of nourishment. In her corporeal performance, 
Orlan dismisses the sanctity of the breast, or rather, the sanctity with which it is 
steeped in religious tradition. It is glaringly surrounded by black latex rather than the 
virgin-like tresses of the Madonna’s robe. As a signifier of the abject, this breast 





performing breast as well, ‘rendered obscene’ by ‘its appearance outside the usual 
domestic frame’ (Giles 136). 
 
 
Plate 1.9 Black Virgin Wielding White Cross and Black Cross No. 24, 1983, 
Cibachrome on aluminum, 160 x 120 cm. Photograph by Jean-Paul Lefret. Published 
in Orlan 1964-2001, 59. 
 
     It is not difficult to see that such works as Black Virgin Wielding White Cross and 
Black Cross No. 24 have the potential to shock many of its viewers. Some of this 
shock derives from Orlan’s subversion of religious dogma and iconography. It is also 
induced by her capacity to physically enter her work and confront her viewers directly 
with the provocative gaze of the Black Virgin. In the same way as she does with her 
surgical and self-mutilative performances, Orlan uses some of her other pieces as a 
way of identifying herself with holy figures. Due to their transgressive nature, her 
aesthetic performances can very easily slip into being labelled as deranged and 





   As Favazza notes, this is often the case with self-mutilation and other practices 
which we have difficulty in understanding. And, as we have already seen, self-
mutilation does bear religious or mystic undertones, with many self-mutilators 
identifying themselves with or even as a Christ-like figure. Indeed, what is concerning 
is not so much the resonance of self-mutilation to religious doctrine, but the uncanny 
blurring of the boundaries between life and death, pleasure and unpleasure, which this 
practice seems to entail and which Freud highlights so aptly in his seminal essay 
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920). 
 The boundaries are very thin. Without clearly demarcating the boundaries between 
mutilation as grace or perversion, a source of pleasure or unpleasure, Favazza 
suggests that ‘it is easy to forget that dripping blood may accompany birth as well as 
death’ (322). The fact that people still gather round to watch Orlan is certainly 
evidence of what Mark Seltzer defines in Serial Killers as our ‘wound culture: the 
public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn and opened persons, a 
collective gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound’ (1). We are as fascinated 
as we are repelled by it all. We may be able to turn away in due time, but the cut has 

















Blood Play and Second Skins: Viewing the Cut in the Body and ‘Splatter’ in Franko 
B’s Dramatic Performances 
 
  
    In Franko B’s performance I’m Not Your Babe (1996), performed at the Institute of 
Contemporary Art in London, the Italian artist Franko B has his body painted white 
like an achromatic ghost or cadaver. Standing stark naked before his audience like a 
mute canvas or body-object, he strikes a beatific posture and kneels as a catheter in 
his arm drains his blood to the canvas floor. Some of his own blood, drained prior to 
the performance, is also poured onto him. More cuts are made onto his body by 
invisible hands off-stage ‘as (the) blood wells from the “stigmata” of his wounded 
forearm’ and drips down onto his body canvas and the stage. He then lies down in a 
pool of his own blood. Finally, ‘he is bound and suspended upside-down’ in the 
posture of an inverted crucifixion as the audience watches him in stunned silence 
(Campbell and Spackman 59).  
     Not surprisingly, the performances are taxing on Franko B and thus carefully 
regulated, with only three to four performances taking place every year. Before his 
performances roughly three pints of blood are removed from his body at four to six 
week intervals in order to be used in his performances. The temporal interludes also 
give his body the necessary time to regenerate more blood. As Simon Grant points out 
in a feature article for The Independent the whole process of the performance is in 
itself ‘staggering’ and Franko B ends it in a state of ‘near collapse from loss of blood’ 
(par. 1). Franko B says of his performances that they are not intended to provoke 





I just want to create beautiful images and survive them, like life – make the bearable 
unbearable [sic]” (par. 3, italics mine).1     
    In other words, the whole performance is geared towards the end result – the 
ultimate survival from the vicissitudes of art and life. The performance itself becomes 
a process of personal therapy, an event which is lived through to the very end and 
whose bloody outcome ensures that Franko B will emerge out of it rejuvenated and 
alive, as having persisted to the very end of his own self-martyrdom. According to his 
own evaluation of his work, the cutting and opening out of his body in order to push 
the limits of his own corporeality and self-endurance is an act of survival, an ecstatic 
moment of jouissance which ‘goes beyond sexual pleasure, beyond pleasure itself’ 
and almost tips over into ‘psychic dissolution’ (Benstock 16). As he notes of his own 
work:  
     For me, the value, the point of the performance is surviving it. Once it’s over, it’s 
freedom – I’ve done what I set out to do, I achieved it – surviving the pressure – my mind, 
my body – it’s not a macho thing – it’s like, it makes me stronger. It’s very quick, it’s quite 
amazing, you come back to the place you were before, but now there’s a purity in the fact – I 
get up and I walk off, so what – I get up and walk off  (1995, qtd. in Campbell and 
Spackman 64-5).  
 
     As Nietzsche’s famous quotation goes, what does not kill you makes you stronger. 
Yet the seeming nonchalance with which Franko B dismisses the pain involved in his 
performances in order to get to the end result is certainly suggestive, perhaps even 
disturbing. In a pre-emptive move which is reminiscent of Orlan’s, Franko B casually 
dismisses the pain – both psychic and physical – involved in attaining this state of 
‘purity’ he attests to. The declarative repetition of ‘I get up and I walk off’ – together 
with the coupling of ‘so what’ – is a blatant refusal, a downright denial of the pain 
involved in his own bloodletting. Like a snake which has just shed its own skin, 
Franko B emerges seemingly ‘unscathed’ from his performances and just gets up and 





    In effect, Franko B’s performance works on two levels; it is an act of cleansing or 
purification which points towards an accession to transcendence at the same time as it 
paradoxically shatters the possibility of its attainment. As Amelia Jones notes in 
‘‘Corporeal Malediction’: Franko B’s Body/Art and the Trace of Whiteness’ (2006), 
Franko B’s body becomes ‘an over-exaggerated signifier of a purity gone awry’ (par. 
3). His performances showcase the white male body and promise a kind of ritualized 
transcendence from ‘brute corporeality’ at the same time as they consign this body to 
the ‘continual never-ending failure to transcend’ (par. 4). 
    Every attempt at transcendence strips the flesh of its identity. As Rachel Armstrong 
points out, ‘his flesh is stripped of all means of identity. By creating an impersonal 
body, Franko creates a painful vision of what the body is, rather than what it is 
dressed up to be’ (qtd. in Marney 90). In practice, this notion of creating an 
impersonal or ‘abstract’ body is painful to watch – even frightening. Yet while it has 
been claimed that the horror derives from the fact that Franko B enacts and re-enacts 
the ominous threat of the uncontainable body only to surpass it, I would like to 
suggest that it is his ambivalent life-in-death status and his failure to escape his own 
body’s limitations which pose a greater threat to audience sensibility.  
    While some critics have claimed, in fairly clear-cut terms, that Franko B refuses to 
offer the audience a kind of cathartic release, the ease with which he ends his 
performances and his putative attainment of a state of purified ‘grace’ make the 
question of catharsis a rather moot point. Rather, it is his brief flirtations with death 
before he ‘gets up and walks away’ which are unsettling. He ambivalently wavers 
between life and death like a living corpse, a life-in-death zombie which serves to 
remind the audience of his inevitable mortality, and theirs too. As a visual artist, 





mentioned previously, it was theatre, for Herbert Blau, which ‘stinks most of 
mortality.’ 
     It is precisely this ambivalent wavering between life and death which induces 
spectatorial horror. As Franko B lies inert like a corpse on the canvas stage in a pool 
of his own blood, he becomes the perfect signifier of the abject. For Kristeva the 
abject refers to ‘that which revolts me, which makes me flee into my own skin, which 
sets my boundaries’ (Piper 104). Paradoxically, the subject attempts to expel the 
abject from outside only to realize that it lies hidden within: 
    If it be true that the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject, one can 
understand that it is experienced […] when that subject, weary of fruitless attempts to 
identify with something on the outside, finds the impossible within; when it finds that the 
impossible constitutes its very being, that it is none other than abject (Kristeva qtd. in Piper 
104).  
 
     Thus the audience attempts to identify with Franko B’s corpse by expelling it only 
to realize that the abject lies inextricably within. Recognition of the self as corpse 
may provoke anxiety or even induce horror. At the same time, however, Franko B’s 
survival in the face of death can be a positively liberating experience for him and for 
his audience. In her analysis of Marguerite Duras’s work, Karen Piper uses Kristeva’s 
notion of abjection in order to liberate the signifying possibilities of the corpse. 
Within certain realms such as ‘love or anarchy, the corpse is a figure of liberty, of 
satiated sexuality, of the ‘waiting period’ after the scream, in the space of the 
unspeakable dismemberment of society’ (111).  
     There is something frightening about Franko B’s silent endurance towards pain. At 
the same time, his work attests to the violence inherent in society and operates within 
‘the space of [its] unspeakable dismemberment.’ It is extremely significant that 
Franko B says of his work that it is profoundly about relationships. In this sense, his 





audience ‘and invites us to experience the work as not only autobiographical in terms 
of the artist, but relational – soliciting a personal, emotional, and narcissistic 
investment from the spectator’ (Doyle).2  
     Such emotional investment is often hard to achieve when the audience is already 
desensitized to the horror of violent events. Franko B’s silent and bleeding body may 
be soliciting some kind of personal response from its spectators, but the violent 
spectacle of his inflicted injuries and the bloody gore and ‘splatter’ it unleashes, 
creating a parallel as it does with freak shows and the genre of the horror film (where 
bodies splatter all the time), could actually lead to an anaesthetized stance, ‘the 
corpse-like anarchy of doing [and feeling] nothing’ (Piper 108). As Jennifer Doyle 
illustrates, this sense of anaesthetization is problematized by artists in their work: 
‘Artists who make the management of feeling and the daily alienation of people from 
their emotional selves the subject of their work often draw to the surface the difficulty 
of having feelings at all.’  
     According to Doyle, there is a ‘risk’ involved in feeling, or feeling too much, 
because ‘we have been so deeply trained [by society] to expect to feel nothing.’ We 
live in a fast-paced capitalist and consumerist world ‘criss-crossed by globalised 
networks of communication and identification, informational circuits traveling at 
warp speed’ (Jones, par. 3). We are constantly bombarded on all sides by the media 
with often violent images of human suffering. Thus, although the visibility of Franko 
B’s suffering body can elicit an emotional investment from its spectators, more often 
than not it causes emotional alienation. In ‘The Ecstasy of Communication’ 
Baudrillard takes this a step further by obliterating the distance between the spectacle 
itself and the subject through communicative and informational networks. There is no 





as actors ‘but as a terminal of multiple networks’ (128). Thus for Baudrillard 
alienation has become a thing of the past in the simulated and hyperreal world we 
now live in:  
   We are no longer a part of the drama of alienation; we live in the ecstasy of 
communication. And this ecstasy is obscene. The obscene is what does away with every 
mirror, every look, every image. The obscene puts an end to every representation. But it is 
not only the sexual that becomes obscene in pornography; today there is a whole 
pornography of information and communication, that is to say, of circuits and networks, a 
pornography of all functions and objects in their readability, their fluidity, their availability, 
their regulation, in their forced signification, in their performativity, in their branching, in 
their polyvalence, in their free expression… 
   It is no longer then the traditional obscenity of what is hidden, repressed, forbidden or 
obscure; on the contrary, it is the obscenity of the visible, of the all-too-visible, of the more-
visible-than-the-visible […]  (130-1). 
 
     All this visibility is subsumed under these networks of communication and 
information. There is no more room for affectivity or even for private decisions and 
deliberations, ‘only for reception and push-button control’ (Piper 108).  And, what is 
more, these systems of visibility endlessly reproduce themselves as they are absorbed 
by the subject. This would explain, perhaps, why such visible performances such as 
those of Franko B can even have the opposite effect of their original intention. Instead 
of sensitizing its audience to ‘the [violent and] unspeakable dismemberment of 
society,’ Franko B’s performance could have its audience sadistically clamouring for 
more gore and blood. Judith Palmer notes how ‘Franko B found the crowd literally 
baying for his blood after a performance’ given in 1995. Apparently the performance 
had not been ‘outrageous’ or violent enough, even though ‘Franko’s performance had 
left him so bruised he couldn’t walk for a week’ (par. 3).  
     Such spectatorial responses attest to the sadistic pleasure, even thrill, many people 
obtain in watching others suffer. Filmmakers of horror and ‘splatter’ films are aware 
of this and bank on it in order to ensure that their films achieve commercial success, 
using various techniques to manipulate and generate the desired responses in their 





consumerist demand for them: ‘The undead, the monsters who threaten to live 
forever, find eternal life in the circularity of consumption and production that 
characterizes Hollywood’ (177). One example of this circularity is the manifestation 
of endless sequel upon sequel documenting tales of horror, serial killings and 
splattered gore and carnage.  
     Franko B’s performances feed into this circuitous system, sustained as it is by 
sadomasochistic tendencies and drawing on scopophilic/fetishistic drives.3 Society 
often displaces these tendencies onto other systems which are judged to be neither 
heterosexist nor heteronormative. As Campbell and Spackman make clear: 
   So much in our society, Franko B. reflects, is violent, but our quotidian exposure to 
mediatized images of war, famine, and cruelty both desensitizes our responses and 
implicates us in a sadomasochism that society conveniently displaces behind the closed 
doors of the gay underworld (60).  
 
 
       In other words, Franko B is aware of the fact that he is implicated, as is his 
audience, in a social system which attempts to maintain its exclusive ideological 
constructions of gender and sexuality by displacing any discursive systems which 
resist them into an abject and sadomasochistic underbelly. By using his body as the 
site of the abject, as a body that attempts to radically perform its own presence, 
Franko B ‘can allegorise the ultimate impossibility of maintaining these typically 
exclusive and heteronormative systems as such’ (Harradine 69). His body confronts 
us with the frailty, or rather the instability, of our heteronormative systems which 
proscribe certain normative sexualities and illegitimize others.  
      As David Harradine reminds us, however, in Abject Identities and Fluid 
Performances: Theorizing the Leaking Body, this reductionistic process can only be 
supported and maintained by reference to its ‘aberrant’ obverse: ‘This process of 
reduction necessarily institutes a structure in which such nominally “normal” 





“perverted” or “aberrant”, against which this putative “normality” is defined’ (71). 
Franko B uses his work to show that sadomasochism and gay culture are the obverse 
side of the social coin, deeply ingrained as they are in our visual culture and everyday 
lives as much as we try to dispel them: 
   …for me it’s normal. And when people go on about S/M, I think S/M is an inevitable 
thing in society, it’s a general thing in society, it’s the way we grow up, it doesn’t matter if 
you’re a Muslim, a Roman Catholic, whatever – there’s this strong S/M element in life. 
When people go on about S/M and gay culture – I think, but it’s the way people behave 
everyday. For example, what I call S/M is someone sitting in their living room, making a 
cup of tea, switching the telly on and getting very excited by images of people dying and 
starving in Ethiopia. To me getting off on those images is S/M. You pay to be entertained, 
you send money – bang, bang, bang: you’re paying to take away your fucking sorrow, your 
miserable life, your loneliness at the end of the day. So you focus on somebody else’s 
misery (‘Surviving the Performance: An Interview with Franko B.,’ Campbell and 
Spackman 67).  
          
          The triple ‘bang’ at the end of Franko B’s formulation is the pivotal point 
where he forcefully drives home that even a simple gesture as watching visual images 
of suffering on TV and ‘getting off on those images’ is a form of side-tracking which 
serves to displace our own suffering by focusing on that of others. According to 
Franko B, we are all implicated in a regulative system which attempts to consolidate 
its hegemonic power by disavowing, or rather by displacing, the pervasiveness of 
S/M and gay culture onto other identifications. As Judith Butler powerfully suggests 
in Bodies that Matter, it is precisely this heterosexist imperative, constructed as it is 
by social norms, which ‘enables certain sexed identifications and forecloses and/or 
disavows other identifications’ (3). Via the operations of an ‘exclusionary matrix’ 
through which subjects assume their sexed identities, another domain is 
simultaneously produced, ‘a domain of abject beings’ who are not yet ‘subjects’ in a 
representative sense ‘but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the 
subject.’ Thus the abject is seen as ‘designat[ing] here precisely those “unlivable” and 
“uninhabitable” zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by 





           Yet what characterizes these sexed subject positions is their apparent fluidity 
and motility ‘against the rigid continuity and fixity of humanist constructions.’ As 
David Harradine forcefully suggests, any performed embodiment of abjection ‘begins 
to productively guarantee the revelation of the constitutive instability and inevitable 
collapse of these systems of division and difference; of oppressive and restrictive (and 
impossible) “identities”’ (75).   
       As we have already seen, Franko B’s performances attempt to strip the skin of its 
own identity. At the very least, they are performances which stretch the boundaries of 
the skin and body in an effort to show that they are not bounded systems of 
representation but open and permeable. Franko B makes us feel uncomfortable in our 
own skins because he uses his own to show that skin can be torn, stretched and even 
stripped away. Skin ‘is the most fragile of covers and also the most sticky. [It] 
becomes a metaphor for surface, for the external; it is the place of pleasure and the 
site of pain; it is the thin sheet that masks bloody horror’ as well as being ‘the 
destination of the gaze’ and ‘the violated site of visual pleasure’ (Halberstam 165).   
      And Franko B will not let his spectators forget that his performances are also a 
skin show in which he sheds his flesh. As Amelia Jones points out in her description 
of Franko B’s corporeal work I Miss You (2003), in which he walks several times 
across a ‘bloodied catwalk’ in Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall, ‘his feet stick to the blood 
after the first traversal, making a strange snapping, sucking sound as he extricates 
them.’ This ‘sucking sound’ is an acute reminder of his embodiment and reified 
bodily presence, his ‘thereness,’ at the same time as his live body becomes 
exteriorized and ‘staged like the objectified bodies in a fashion show, their agency 
evacuated by their production as fetishes “over there,” rendering the models “absent” 





     
 
Plate 1.10  Franko B, 'I Miss You', 2000. Photo: Manuel Vason. 
 
     Franko B’s fashion show becomes a skin show which implicates his audiences. 
Apart from his explicit desire to reach out to his audience, his performance is like a 
mock-fashion show which parodies the objectification of the subject on the catwalk. 
As Jennifer Doyle points out, ‘the blood splattered canvas Franko leaves in his wake 
is used to make unwearable, or at least, un-marketable haute-couture, to mummify 
household objects, and to make pocket-sized souvenir paintings.’ Such live art is 
reminiscent, perhaps, of the performances by the Japanese artist Yoko Ono. In her 
Cut Piece (1965) performance at Carnegie Hall in New York, Ono gave the audience 
scissors and allowed each of them to trim a portion of her dress until it was 
completely cut to shreds – a striptease in reverse. Her final performance was 
symbolically performed in Paris, the fashion capital of the world. Instead of 





demonstration of the objectifications enacted in and through consumerist and 
capitalist culture. Although Ono manages to modestly cover his breasts, her body 
remains naked and exposed. The voyeuristic aspects involved in such live 
performances can hardly be downplayed or ignored.  
     Nakedness is often linked to degradation, shame, vulnerability and even the state 
of otherness or abjection. One of the first references to nakedness occurs in the Bible 
in Genesis, when Adam and Eve become aware of their nakedness and use fig leaves 
to cover themselves. Ironically, however, although it is Franko B’s white body which 
stands naked and exposed, it is his own nakedness which leaves the audience 
emotionally vulnerable. As Doyle astutely notes: 
   When an artist successfully overrides the self-consciousness and the inhibitions that settle 
on us in places like galleries and classrooms, it comes as a shock – finding ourselves 
overwhelmed with actual emotion – finding ourselves crying, laughing, afraid, disgusted, 
aroused, outraged – can leave us feeling a bit naked.  
      
       Particularly in masculine Western society, affective and emotional responses 
have often been frowned upon as being shameful and effeminate. We are ashamed of 
showing emotion, ‘too much’ emotion – of showing our own tears. As early as the 
fifth century, Plato saw the fearful dangers of plays which unleashed uncontrollable 
grief in their spectators. As Taxidou points out, female lamentation was banned 
‘around the sixth century BCE,’ yet it does not vanish, becoming ‘one of the most 
significant impulses behind the creation of tragic performance conventions.’ 
Significantly, it is the banning of female lamentation in the Athenian polis which 
allows it to filter ‘into the civic, political and discursive world of [its] male [citizens]’ 
by way of theatrical conventions and public death rituals or funeral orations (Tragedy, 
Modernity and Mourning 89).  
        Via recourse to tragedy, the stage and public sphere can allegedly get rid of 





the chorus in Ancient Greek tragedy is often seen ‘as a simple interface between the 
individual and the collective, between form and content.’ It functions as a mediating 
force which channels female lamentation into knowledge and ‘a pedagogical 
experience’ (90). She quotes Benjamin, for whom ‘the chorus of tragedy does not 
lament. It remains detached in the presence of profound suffering; this refutes the idea 
of surrender to lamentation’ (89). Yet, as Taxidou very astutely points out, ‘choruses 
from The Persians to The Bacchae’ show clearly  that ‘they can be unruly, lamenting, 
and highly subversive’ (90).  
       With all due respect to Benjamin, the life of the mind and speculative knowledge, 
there is something unsettling – I would even venture to say callous – about 
responding analytically to the humanity of dramatic actors (and the characters they 
embody) who physically come to life before us on stage and in performance. The 
very physical presence of the actor ensures that such responses are obviated, or at 
least watered down. Rush Rehm makes a compelling case for the lively engagement 
of spectators with Greek tragedy. His argument is worth quoting at some length:  
  If a distanced, scientific, objective response were all that was intended in Greek tragedy, 
then we would expect a different kind of writing and a different mode of presentation. As 
Aristotle points out, the great advance that tragedy made over epic was the appearance of 
characters as ‘living and moving before us’ (Poetics, 1448a.24-25), that is, characters as 
embodied. The physical presence of the actor defined the earliest drama, and the actor 
remains the irremovable obstacle in the path of those who view Greek tragedy (or the theatre 
in general) as a sophisticated playground for mental conundrums, as opposed to a place of 
live, and lived, human experience (46).   
 
 
          Similarly, Franko B demands our response, our emotional investment as 
his cut and ‘leaking’ body bleeds. His performances cannot be summed up 
analytically via recourse to speculative thinking alone.4 This is because, like Orlan, 
his live performances attest to the physical presence of the body, the body as a 
material entity, as lived and embodied. It is all very well to attempt to uproot it from 
its pre-ontological status and ground it in some abstract framework of theoretical 





performs ‘its own material status.’ The body is produced and informed by complex 
‘ideological and discursive systems.’ In and of itself, the body forms ‘the locus of 
complex processes of ideological construction’ which ‘materialise the body itself in 
and through discourse, and that reveal the body as only the apparent base from which 
notions of “identity” (such as “race” “sex” “gender” “class” or “sexuality” [sic]) can 
be read’ (69).  
          This is precisely why Franko B refuses to associate his work with gay culture 
since the very notion of ‘gayness’ would seal off the interpretative field through a 
formative construction of identity which reads his body as gay. At the same time, 
however, it is impossible to do away with such ideological constructions as gender, 
race and sexuality entirely. Franko B’s body is white – indeed, it is even painted white 
to stress its very ‘whiteness’ – as opposed to being black. As Amelia Jones very aptly 
suggests, Franko B’s work points to the absence of what Frantz Fanon identifies in 
Black Skin, White Masks as ‘the corporeal malediction,’ the malediction of blackness 
as constitutive of identity. She refers to black paintings which ‘serve as a kind of 
obverse of Franko B.’s signature whiter-than-white body (literally painted in glossy 
white makeup), enacted in his performance works’ (par. 3).  
        In the same way as Harradine stresses that ‘normal’ sexualities can only be 
conceptualised through their opposite, via recourse to correlative notions of those 
which are designated as aberrant or deviant, Jones makes the pertinent point that the 
presence of Franko B’s white body is a racial marker; his body can only be defined in 
relation to the absent black body, against which this putative whiteness – his race as a 
marker of identity – is defined. By having his body cut up, however, and then 
offering it up to the audience as a sacrifice, he performs – in Christ-like fashion – the 
‘elegiac body of sorrows: Christ doloroso as icon of the ambivalence of twenty-first 





       Franko B’s performances are thus embodied performances of race as well as 
gender. There is really no essentialist notion of gendered identity because Franko B 
performs his gender constantly through the complex ways in which performative acts 
and processes of subjectivization impinge upon and (re)inscribe his body. At the same 
time, it could also be argued that each performance is a repetitive act in which he 
performs his gender differently, thus paving the way for a critical reworking of 
gender norms in and through the very act of performing the body. According to Judith 
Butler, performativity and gender identity are ritualized and socially constructed acts 
which are constantly being re(enacted) and interrogated. She says: ‘As in other ritual 
social dramas, the action of gender requires a performance that is repeated.’ What is 
more, ‘[t]his repetition is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of 
meanings already socially established; and it is the mundane and ritualized form of 
their legitimization.’ The ‘action’ of gender is thus a public action as much as it is 
individually ‘stylized into gendered modes’ (Gender Trouble 40).5   
      In terms of gender politics, then, gender is at once both a ‘thing done’ to the 
subject through a pre-existing and oppressive matrix of socially established categories 
of signification, and a ‘doing’ of the subject, a performance which constantly attempts 
to disrupt and destabilize these social categories. At the same time, since performance 
is an exteriorization of the body, it points to the potential ways in which the body can 
be ‘manipulated’ and made to ‘signify in politically useful and suggestive ways’ 
(Harradine 75). For Josette Féral the very act of performing the body marks its 
conspicuousness as a body which is always already repressed – the body-in-pieces:  
   The body is made conspicuous: a body in pieces, fragmented and yet one, a body 
perceived and rendered as a place of desire, displacement, and fluctuation, a body the 







      Through performance the body ‘tries to free’ itself (or rather to flee) from its own 
repression and the social strictures imposed upon it. Franko B enacts and performs 
the fluidity and permeability of the body as an attempt to escape such strictures. He 
turns the social system on its head by refusing the textual and ideological strictures it 
imposes on his body and by refusing to have his body ‘read’ as a closed system of 
signification. At the very least, his performances raise interesting questions about 
how the body can be viewed in performance and how it encodes itself into a kind of 
‘text through which embodied subjectivities can be enacted’ (Marney 63). 
Additionally, his performances raise the problem of maintaining essentialist notions 
of socially/discursively constructed and sexed identities.  
     The problem is further compounded by Franko B’s ambivalent status as 
performer-as-subject and/or sacrificial object, an indeterminacy which paradoxically 
allows him to liminally occupy both positions at the same time. In Christ-like fashion, 
Franko B offers himself up as a scapegoat for society’s ills and asks his spectators to 
mourn for him as he proffers them his tormented and bloodied body, and even to 
identify with the painful disruption of its seeming ‘boundedness’ and unity. As Staten 
compellingly reminds us: ‘The phenomena of the dialectic of mourning all arise out 
of the affect of self-attachment that we could describe in Freudian terms as the 
narcissistic libidinal cathexis of the boundary of integrity of the self.’ Physical pain 
and death disrupt this boundary. In effect, death, or ‘the thought of death’ can be seen 
as being ‘the ultimate psychic pain, the ineliminable gap that keeps the circle of the 
self from closing against the intrusion of the not-self’ (8).  
       As we have seen, Franko B’s performances are stark reminders to the audience of 
their own mortality. They are skin shows which perform the fluidity of the body as 





fashion, is being stripped of its flesh and is literally falling to pieces. What makes the 
performance even more compelling is the fact that Franko B is not the one who is 
making the cuts on his body. His is a body which is ‘acted upon’ by invisible hands 
off-stage. Like Christ (and unlike other sacrificial martyrs after Him), he does not 
inflict his own wounds. This functions as a symbolic reminder perhaps that the self is 
constantly being attacked on all sides by invisible and yet powerful social forces.               
Thus Franko B dispels our fantasies of the bounded and unfragmented subject.6 
      It is significant that Franko B’s performances can be read as acts of symbolic 
wounding which bear ritualistic, religious and even shamanistic connotations. In 
certain tribes the shaman is often the spiritual healer or leader who is chosen for his 
psychic capacities to mediate between the visible and spiritual worlds. As Sally 
O’Reilly notes: ‘The shamanic root relates to the recognisable traits of performance 
as ordeal, inspiration, therapy or trance, as the artist executes a ritual of cleansing or 
communication’ (2). Thus shamans take upon themselves the role of ‘healing the 
illnesses and reversing the misfortunes of the members of their community’ (Favazza 
25). In order to become a shaman an individual must undergo lengthy periods of 
bodily mutilation and intense ‘experiences of suffering’ (25).7    
       Similar initiatory rites of passage are also incorporated into Franko B’s 
performances. In some cases he ritually uses a bowl to wash his hands and then pours 
its contents over his head, a ritual which has clear associations with purification and 
baptism. Blood is often spattered all over his body and remains the most significant 
bodily fluid emphasized in his work. David Harradine correctly points this out when 
he suggests that blood ‘is perhaps the most metaphorically loaded body fluid’ (80). 
Blood can be defined as being both sacred and profane in religious practices. For 





that the abject is both defined and designated. In Powers of Horror she traces the 
restrictive strictures of Christian doctrine ranging from blood to sexual identity. She 
concludes that within this doctrine heterosexuality is perceived as being the 
normative regime, whilst homosexuality is explicitly condemned as being impure and 
unclean, and thus relegated to an abject status.  
      As Harradine suggests, it is the body of the homosexual which produces fear 
because it is a body which is ‘improperly contained and diffuse, permeable, fluid and 
penetrated.’ It is a body which has been ‘infected’ with social stigma: 
Therefore, the signification of gay male blood (blood which flows right through the 
performance pieces of Franko B.) becomes legible as a certain kind of reference to the abject 
not only as blood itself, and indeed not “only” as it becomes subsumed under the infectious 
and abject logic of AIDS discourse, but also through a feminising association with menstrual 
blood, and therefore with that which Kristeva identifies as one of the most “privileged” 
signifiers of abjection (79-80).  
 
 
 Thus although Franko B claims his work has nothing or little to do with AIDS and 
gay culture the very fact that he refuses these associations – that he claims their very 
absence – comes back to ‘infect’ his work. Absence does not mean or signify non-
presence. Through the associations of blood Franko B’s body becomes relegated to 
the status of the marginally ‘other’ in male Western society. His blood becomes 
linked to abject menstrual fluids and contagion, ‘the infectious and abject logic of 
AIDS discourse.’ We have already seen in Chapter Five how Favazza associated self-
induced cuts with orchestrated outlets for menses – female self-cutters feel more 
empowered because cutting is a symbolic form of menstruation which is ‘vicarious,’ 
predictable and regulated (165). The biomedical discourse surrounding clean and 
impure blood is more transparent; it is a discourse which operates via representational 
identifications in the service of heteronormative constructions of sexual identity. 
Clean blood marks the ‘self-contained’ and sovereign body, whereas correlatively bad 





spreads and infects all ‘representational discourses that circulate around 
contemporary constructions of sexualities and identities’ (Harradine 78).   
Thus it is significant that Franko B uses his own blood in his performances. By 
using his blood as well as other bodily fluids, he can engage with these 
representational discourses and destabilize, even implode, their normative logic.  In 
this respect, his blood play is a radical and political act.8 Therefore, his performances 
appear more like a collective spectacle than a private ordeal. Yet they are a spectacle 
of a kind of ‘holy’ communion or bloody Eucharist at the end of which the audience 
can witness Franko B’s ‘resurrected’ body. After the resurrection the members of the 
audience are not offered bread but – to quote Doyle once more – a bloodied canvas of 
‘unwearable, or at least, un-marketable haute-couture.’  
One is reminded of Peter Brook’s notion of a ‘holy’ theatre which functions as a 
communal space of catharsis. As the spectators share in Franko B’s Eucharist they too 
can experience the same catharsis as the actor and ‘enter into the performance 
emotionally,’ becoming ‘at one with it.’ This presupposes that catharsis is universal: 
‘Divorced from reality yet reflecting it, communal theatre carries artists and audience 
together to a level of universal emotional response then returns them to quotidian 
reality with a keener sense of the psychic structures shared by all people.’ Such a 
typified response attests to Carl Jung’s conception of a collective unconscious 
(Auslander 19). 
Such benign and somewhat optimistic interpretations of the theatrical experience 
would clearly have no space in Artaud’s ‘Theatre of Cruelty.’ At the same time, it 
seems too simplistic to believe that all people, no matter what their gender, ethnic or 
racial background, would emotionally (and physically) react in the same way to a live 





to be a somewhat moot point. It may be the goal of the performance itself to achieve 
this end-result, yet whether or not this result is actually achieved is an entirely 
different matter. Franko B’s abused and fragmented body, which is invaded and hence 
spontaneously spills out its interior bodily fluids, may provoke the audience’s 
identificatory sympathy, but it can also cause very visceral responses of revulsion and 
disgust. At the other end of the spectrum, it may even activate aggressive and 
sadomasochistic impulses and a ‘thirst’ for blood. We have already seen how certain 
audiences jeered Franko B off the stage and bayed for his blood.9   
 Although Franko B claims, like Orlan, that his work is not about sadomasochism, 
he is aware of the fact that we are all implicated in a society in which sadomasochistic 
acts and images are everyday fare. He himself came from a dysfunctional family. His 
father was absent during his childhood, his mother used to abuse him and call him 
‘Franko the Dog,’ and even locked him up at night in a box. For him ‘S/M is an 
inevitable thing in society’ (Campbell and Spackman 67).  As he says in an interview 
with Caryn Simonson about his more recent work, people get disappointed when he 
tells them that he is not working with blood anymore. For them he is the ‘bleeding 
man’: 
Twenty years ago nobody wanted to see blood and now they want to see it. I’m the 
“bleeding man.” When I’m asked if I might be contacted about doing some work, I want to 
be contactable to do something about nature, I want to be contacted about digging a hole. Do 
you know what I mean? We’ve done blood, we’ve done the body. People have been working 
on the body for years. We all bleed inside (322).  
 
  As Franko B makes clear, the body has limits. Thus while it has been claimed that 
he refuses to give his spectators cathartic release, he himself has ended his 
performances because of the overly taxing physical demands they impose upon the 





tap any longer” (Simonson 322). It takes extreme physical effort and a great deal of 
pain to turn the ‘inside’ outside, to make the body bleed for oneself and for others.  
     He performs the singularity of trauma within the communal context of 
remembering the marginalized ‘other’ and phenomenologically positions his body as 
a permeable and vulnerable body that bleeds and feels pain. In other words, he 
politicizes the aesthetic as much as he aestheticizes the political and the body politic. 
Through drama, theatre and performance he can ‘act out’ this trauma of the bleeding 
body that has been abjected, cast aside and ostracized in society. Through repetition 
he renegotiates the spatio-temporal relationships between performance, acting out and 
working through within the context of an ‘aesthetics’ of the traumatic. 
      The terms ‘acting out’ and ‘working through’ are taken directly from Freud, the 
former being strongly linked to repetition and transference and the latter being often 
associated with a will to remember and hence achieve a sense of recovery or end-
result. According to Dominick LaCapra the two are intimately linked and not 
oppositional. ‘In the working through, the person tries to gain critical distance on a 
problem, to be able to distinguish between past, present and future’ (2). Yet there is 
very often an affinity or ‘tendency to become fixated on acting-out, on the repetition-
compulsion, to see it as a way of preventing closure, harmonization, any facile notion 
of cure.’ At the same time, and by way of the same logic, there is an inclination ‘to 
eliminate any other possibility of working-through, or simply to identify all working-
through as closure, totalization, full cure, full mastery, so that there’s a kind of all-or-
nothing logic’ which leads us to a kind of ‘double bind: either the totalization or the 
closure you resist; or acting-out the repetition-compulsion, with almost no other 





     Such a binary system precludes the possibility of critical thinking and leads 
politically to what LaCapra identifies as ‘a kind of blank hope in the future’ (3). 
However, when Franko B opens up his body he renegotiates this double-bind logic 
and implicitly asks his audience to do the same. In short, he is asking his audience to 
take some form of responsibility for his bleeding body and to attempt ‘to work out 
some very delicate relationship between empathy and critical distance’ (LaCapra 4-5). 
It is my contention that such a balanced relationship can only be achieved through the 
possibility of Adam Smith’s notion of sympathetic identification but also through that 
of remembrance – remembrance of trauma, of the marginalized body and the 
(re)inscriptions of trauma on that body. This is why Franko B’s work has such 
political resonance. And this is evident even in works where his physical body is not 
the visual marker. 
      As Caryn Simonson points out, Franko B has used cloth in many of his 
installations and object-based pieces. ‘Cloth has an uncanny ability to trigger 
memories – its qualities can cause it to be marked temporarily or stained indelibly by 
the body leaving it permanently “scarred.”’ Like the body, cloth tells its own ‘story’ 
because it ‘can record memory and evoke this through the absorption of smell, stain, 
and other human trace’ (Simonson 315). This is particularly significant because 
Franko B uses blood-stained cloth from his own performances to wrap up some of his 
objects, which then function as works of art. The ‘trace’ of his own body can be found 
on this cloth and acts as a tangible reminder of his bleeding performances. At the 
same time, the cloth functions as a kind of ‘second skin’ which is used to wrap up the 
objects (315). It is almost as if, metaphorically speaking, the objects are bleeding from 





Like live performances, Franko B’s object-based works have a life of their own.10 
And, like his performances, they also tend to play on the idea of interior versus 
exterior surfaces. Cloth ‘touches the skin’ but also functions as a kind of outer surface 
or covering (Simonson 315). Judith Halberstam considers the theoretical 
underpinnings behind the horror film’s queer tendency to conflate outer cloth with 
inner skin in its reconfigurations of gender politics and identity. She also considers the 
Gothic as a genre which is steeped in violence and what she calls ‘costume dramas,’ 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde being a case in point. For her 
‘Gothic is a cross-dressing, drag, a performance of textuality, an infinite readability’ 
(60). It is through this outer performance of ‘dressing’ or ‘cross-dressing’ that infinite 
possibilities for ‘reading’ the skin and identity may emerge: ‘Someone’s skin, their 
hide (Hyde), precisely forms the surface through which inner identities emerge and 
upon which external readings of identity leave their impression’ (Halberstam 141). In 
the same way, Franko B’s performances and object-based works leave external 
markings and impressions of his identity. They consistently focus on the skin ‘and the 
shredding, ripping, or tearing of skin as a spectacle of identity performance and its 
breakdown’ (141). Additionally, they attest to the possibilities of skin – it can be 
stretched and ‘reused’ to create other identities.11   
Apart from worn-out, everyday objects such as shoes and bicycles, Franko B has 
also used hospital equipment such as bandages, calipers, syringes and operating tables 
in his works. In his Mama, I Can’t Sing performance (1995/6), performed at the 
London Institute of Contemporary Arts, his thorax and back are cut by invisible hands 
and he is then bandaged by ‘white-clad assistants’ (Campbell and Spackman 59-60). 
In one sequence he ‘appears as a mummified body swathed in bandages, cramped in 





protruding from his penis as he walks around the hospital setting with a drip 
(Campbell and Spackman 61-2). All of these visual images serve to emphasize the 
vulnerability of the body, as well as its passivity towards its own ‘medicalized’ and 
instrumented status.  
In The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception Foucault 
examines the passivity of the body under the clinician’s medical gaze. He traces a 
genealogical medical history which served to give rise to the ‘birth’ of the clinic and 
illustrates how in the Enlightenment period the doctor was seen as being wise and 
knowledgeable, able to examine the body with a ‘clinical’ and ‘observing’ gaze and 
thus penetrate its secrets and provide an accurate diagnosis. All symptoms and 
diseases were subsumed under a categorized rubric and yielded their secrets to the 
penetrating gaze of the clinician. He writes: 
  In the depths of its being, disease follows the obscure, but necessary ways of tissual 
reactivations. But what now becomes of its visible body, that set of phenomena without 
secrets that makes it entirely legible for the clinician’s gaze: that is, recognizable by its 
signs, but also decipherable in the symptoms whose totality defined its essence without 
residue (159). 
 
      During the Enlightenment the body became visible to the clinician’s gaze, able to 
be categorized, classified and diagnosed. In short, the whole body could be summed 
up by recourse to its body parts. New tests allowed the clinician to gaze at and 
examine the naked body. Particularly in the eighteenth century medical knowledge 
expanded and the body became an object that could be mapped with mathematical 
precision. Diseases and contagions could be classified in new ways and physicians 
now began to describe symptoms and phenomena that had eluded medical 
practitioners for many centuries, phenomena that until then had remained below the 





       In a sense, Franko B’s performances could elicit this exacting ‘medicalized’ and 
clinical gaze. As he lies down on the operating table and allows the white-clad 
assistants to cut up and dissect his body, he becomes like a passive or ‘mummified’ 
object which is surgically invaded and yet accepts and receives this invasion and 
instrumentalization of his body. Like silent clinicians, the spectators can dissect 
Franko B’s naked body under their ‘clinically’ accurate gaze. As Campbell and 
Spackman point out, ‘Franko’s unmediated work is enacted only bloody feet away 
from his watchers’ (58). They may not be privy to some of the gory details involved 
in the dissection, but they are there throughout the entire duration of the performance, 
silently observing the bloody spectacle. The effect is further compounded by the 
creation of a hospital-like setting, since hospitals are places which are traditionally 
associated with disease and contagion, even death, as well as by the technological 
presence of ‘synthesized soundtracks’ which serve to ‘remind the audience of the 
grating and whirring of machines, the occasional bleeps and sustained single tones of 
heart monitors’ (60).   
      Since Franko B does not deploy any language in his performances the occasional 
whirrs and bleeps of the machines create a space very much like Kristeva’s semiotic 
chora as opposed to the symbolic order. Kristeva is indebted to Nietzsche here for her 
formulation of the two terms: the symbolic and the semiotic. As Ellmann notes, the 
former is ‘dominated by the father, the phallus, and the law,’ whereas the latter is 
‘haunted by the vengeful traces of a lost pre-Oedipal maternal world.’ In The Birth of 
Tragedy (1872) Nietzsche sets up an opposition ‘between the Apollonian and 
Dionysian principles’ and Kristeva draws on this opposition, likening the semiotic to 
the Dionysian and the Apollonian to the symbolic. The former principle ‘is associated 





the body and the orchestration of the drives; whereas the symbolic, like the 
Apollonian, articulates these primal forces into rational, intelligible forms’ (Ellmann 
25).  
     Hence the semiotic is a place which is prelinguistic even though it is intimately 
linked with language, ‘the place where the subject is both generated and negated, the 
place where his [sic] unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that 
produce him [sic].’12 The semiotic is associated with drives, as well as with tones and 
rhythms which ‘are meaningful parts of language and yet do not represent or signify 
something’ (Oliver 38). The element of signification is achieved via recourse to the 
symbolic order, yet it is the semiotic itself which ‘provides the motivation for 
engaging in signifying processes. We have a bodily need to communicate. And, the 
symbolic provides the structure necessary to communicate. Both elements are 
essential to signification’ (38). Between structure and bodily drives, soma and psyche, 
signification becomes both possible and dynamic.  
      By the same token, Franko B uses his body to communicate. Through the semiotic 
element of language he expresses his bodily drives, the experience of having – and 
even feeling – a body. ‘The tones and rhythms of language, the materiality of 
language, are bodily. Signification is like a transfusion of the living body into 
language’ (Oliver 39). Through bodily gestures and the technological whirrs and 
bleeps Franko B is able to bring his body to life and make it materially and 
linguistically signify. Between soma and psyche, biology and representation, the 
semiotic and the symbolic, lies the potential for transforming flesh into language and 
for turning bodily pain into a linguistic register.  
      We have already noted how the body can function as a text upon which multiple 





Jones and Andrew Stephenson point out in their Introduction to Performing the 
Body/Performing the Text, the process of interpretation, hermeneutic activity in 
general, is communicative and object-based, whereas bodily performance is textual 
and constituted by and through signifying processes: 
  Interpretation is, we would argue, a kind of performance of the object, while the 
performance of the body as an artistic practice is a mode of textual inscription. The body (as 
the corporeal enactment of the subject) is known and experienced only through its 
representational performances – whether presented ‘live,’ in photographs, videos, films, on 
the computer screen, or through the interpretative text itself. Interpretation, like the 
production of works of art, is a mode of communication. Meaning is a process of 
engagement and never dwells in any one place (8). 
 
 
    To interpret is to objectify, whilst performance is a subjective activity 
around which meaning is constructed.13 This is why it is counterintuitive to assign 
decisive interpretations or conclusive readings to performative works. As Harradine 
points out in relation to Franko B’s work, ‘to ascribe a decisive interpretation’ is to 
operate ‘in contradiction to the artist’s own resistance to the rationalisation of his 
work through any one critical schema.’ At the same time, he touches upon an 
important point, ‘that to write about a performance is necessarily to change that 
performance in and through the act of writing’ (70). Because performance art is 
marked by its ontological consistency and impermanence, the very act of 
documenting it transmogrifies its status as performance art. This is why Peggy Phelan 
claims that performance art ‘cannot be documented (when it is, it turns into that 
document – a photograph, a stage design, a video tape – and ceases to be performance 
art’ (qtd. in Harradine 70). This is not to suggest, however, that the affective force of 
such performances cannot be documented, or that theoretical frameworks cannot be 
employed in our attempts to describe the performative event, to traverse the limits 
imposed upon us by the actual medium and ‘puncture and tear open theoretical skins’ 





As we have already seen, Derrida argues in Passages – from Traumatism to 
Promise that the composition of a poem, for example, marks a significant event. To 
date a work of art such as a poem is to mark it with a ‘wound’ which is effaced at the 
very moment it is inscribed. More precisely, the date of a poem’s composition marks 
its singularity as an event at the same time as that singularity is necessarily lost in that 
date’s very iterability. And this argument holds good for all experiences in general, 
since ‘all experience is the experience of a singularity.’ The aspiration to maintain this 
singularity – to keep it as it is – ‘is what effaces it right away’ (378). The performative 
event is a singular one which can never be repeated in the same way. Even if it were 
possible to do so, the event’s very iterability would (paradoxically) put that event 
under constant erasure. The singular moment of the performative act can never be 
recaptured, and neither can ‘that moment at which [the performer’s] transient 
presence fades into memory’ (Harradine 70).       
As we have noted earlier, the same can be said of any attempts to document 
traumatic events. By its very nature trauma cannot be represented. For trauma 
becomes both repetition and mimesis and is ‘not merely subject to recurrence but to 
the recurrence of recurrence itself’ (Seltzer 265). This is especially pertinent since 
Franko B, like Orlan, uses machinic and technological devices to impinge upon and 
stretch the body’s boundaries. The body’s mediation with technology both transforms 
(even cancels) it and prosthetically extends its possibilities ad infinitum. Trauma, the 
mimetic compulsion itself, is mimetized ‘in the transfers between what is inside us 
and the machine’ (265). Like other performance artists such as Stelarc, who uses the 
most advanced robotic technology to refashion his body, Franko B collapses the 
material body into the abstract body-machine-image complex by merging life and 





inseparability of materialities of communication and forms of violence in machine 
culture’ (265).  
The fact that trauma is mimetized or simulated does not mean that it is any less 
poignant; in fact, it is its very mimetization which reproduces and duplicates the 
trauma once more. Its very mimetization leads to its obliteration and effacement, 
which serves to reawaken the trauma once again in an endless, repetitive cycle. 
Although Stelarc would claim that the body is now ‘obsolete’ (Judith Palmer, par. 1), 
there really is no escaping the body. All performance art starts at the body. Franko B 
works with his body in order to mutilate and transform it with the machine technology 
near the operating table. Arguably, it is not the body which becomes obsolete but all 
fixed and rigid social constructions which surround the body and attempt to inscribe 
and define it within set parameters of sex, gender and identity.   
Franko B’s wounds, formed by technology, open out an infinite plenitude of future 
possibilities; they are inexhaustibly iterable; erotic, visual, religious and enigmatic 
signifiers which are constantly circulating in the symbolic, technical economy of his 
performances. And, as we have already seen, wounds are switch-points between 
public and private registers, inner and outer worlds. They are as much social as they 
are private, as much ‘embodied’ as they are objectified. As such, they do not 
meaninglessly circulate in this symbolic and technological economy; they mark an 
event, a performative event which in itself has made this repetitive circulation of 
signifiers or wound-signs possible. The wound-signs themselves evidence the trauma 
of the performative event; trauma returns, or rather it recurs in the circulation of these 
wound-signs. What is more, this iterable circulation of signifiers attests to the fact that 
the recurrence of the trauma itself is traumatic. The performance is a traumatic one for 





   There is a temporal gap for the spectators between the event’s performance and 
their belated interpretation of it – or rather, between its performance and their 
attempts at interpretation. To quote Diamond: ‘Is this not the relation of the realist 
actor to his/her audience – the actor produces symptoms addressed to spectators, who 
gradually understand their meanings?’ (Unmaking Mimesis 30, italics mine). The 
notion of a ‘symptom’ here takes us back to the psychoanalytic transference itself, 
‘the re-experiencing of past relations, past emotions in the presence of an 
analyst/spectator.’ At the same time the performance ‘also induces a counter-
transference, an identification of spectator with actor/character.’ According to Freud, 
this identification is a masochistic position, both feminine and passive (30).   
Brechtian theory would obviously reject such identifications in its firm 
commitments ‘to produc[ing] a spectator/reader who is not interpellated into ideology 
but is passionately and pleasurably engaged in observation and analysis’ (Unmaking 
Mimesis 44). Yet Doyle’s emotional investment in (rather than her distancing from) 
the performance, her recourse to tears as she watches Franko B performing, could 
hardly be described as an A-effect or even a ‘pleasurable’ engagement. Indeed, the 
technique of alienation seems to be a far cry from what Franko B intended, even 
though he simultaneously resists offering his body as an identifiable and fetishized 
object to his spectators.15 I would suggest that he invites his spectators to find a 
medium ground or viable position between complete identification and total ‘de-
affectation’ or emotional distancing.  
Certainly it may be difficult to identify with a performer who ‘invades’ upon his 
body with technical and surgical implements – and does so out of a personal choice. 
At the same time, however, the mediation between the body and the machine in 





Chris Gray points out in Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Postmodern Age, ‘the 
proliferation of cyborgs is the promise of monsters, the promise of possibilities. 
Horror is possible, perhaps inevitable. But resistance, even joy, should be just as 
possible’ (195).16 Blurring and transgressing boundaries between machinic and life 
processes, the body and the machine, is both dangerous and exciting. Yet it can also 
be liberating, particularly if we are able (ideally) to ‘choose the borders we inhabit 
and transgress’ (195-6). By seemingly making this transgression a self-conscious 
choice, Franko B forces us to consider our own individual choices and liberties.  
As Richard Sclove points out in Democracy and Technology, the political 
choices we make can lead to ‘a more democratic technological order’ which 
enhances, even multiplies, our individual freedoms: 
  It is possible to evolve societies in which people live in greater freedom, exert greater 
influence on their circumstances, and experience greater dignity, self-esteem, purpose, and 
well-being. The route to such a society must include struggles toward democratic institutions 
for evolving a more democratic technological order. Is it realistic to envision a democratic 
politics of technology? Isn’t it unrealistic not to? (Sclove qtd. in Gray 198) 
 
      Certainly Sclove’s vision is idyllic, even nostalgic, but not impossible. 
Performance artists like Stelarc and Orlan are already ‘hanging out with machines, 
redesigning [their] body by melding [their] flesh with the latest robotic technology’ 
(Judith Palmer, par. 1), whilst Franko B has already tested the limits of his body 
through fluid blood play in performance and through the use of technical instruments. 
While sublating the boundaries of sex and technology, body and machine, may be 
dangerous, there are also many liberating possibilities, and modern technology may 
actually benefit us in the future as well, ‘provid[ing] us with hitherto undreamed-of 
means for tapping our own psychopathologies’ (Ballard 6). New techno-sexual 
possibilities may loom in the near-future horizons of the technological landscape. By 





limitless. Who knows what the future holds, what monsters and angels lurk within its 
unfathomable realm? We can only dream or surmise. And Ballard sums it up better 
than I can: ‘Over the profiles of [our bodies] now preside the metallized excitements 
of our shared dreams of technology’ (41). 


































The main aim of my research has been to focus on the triadic relationship between 
theatre, trauma and vision via recourse to psychoanalytical, phenomenological, 
semiological and feminist frameworks. At every step along the way I have attempted 
to show how a synchronic model of trauma, that is, the notion of a trauma that crosses 
time and space and effectively transcends them, can be used as an interpretative tool 
or bulwark through which to read certain texts and performances. At the same time, I 
have tried to broaden our understanding of trauma through vision and thus illustrate 
how sight or its lack thereof can function as traumatic.   
I have specifically chosen two playwrights and two performers whose works deal 
explicitly with the question of seeing (or not seeing), various ways of looking as well 
as the tragic implications of looking ‘at’ an event, ‘away’ from it or even not at all. 
While clearly not all acts of seeing engender some form of trauma, I have started with 
the basic premise or assumption that the sense of physically looking at something 
painful or disturbing can – and often does – lead to psychological trauma. There have 
certainly been many developments in the study of psychological and physical trauma 
from the late nineteenth century onwards. More generally, there has been a relative 
shift in emphasis, starting with Freud and onwards, from physical to psychological 
trauma. At the same time, there has been a general tendency to overlook the question 
of sight in trauma theory, together with the question of how certain sights/sites both 
on and off the stage can actually lead to traumatic neurosis or even nervous 
breakdown.  
My work has attempted to briefly sketch the various developments in trauma 
theory and to look at seminal works in this area, works such as those of Cathy Caruth 





status and the notion of trauma as something external and coming from without. Since 
I envision sight as trauma and the act of looking as both literal and figurative 
manifestations, I have also drawn on theorists such as Laplanche, Abraham and Torok 
in order to show how the question of vision is linked to non-verbal and extra-
linguistic cues as much as it is rooted in material language. I have specifically chosen 
Laplanche because he differs from other theorists in the psychoanalytical field and 
because his notion of a hieroglyph or an enigmatic signifier to account for trauma can 
redress the somewhat too formalist and linguistic approach taken by Lacan (whom 
Laplanche in fact criticizes) in this area.  
While Freud studies the psychological aspects of traumatic vision in his 
examination of Sophocles’ classical play Oedipus Rex, claiming that Oedipus’s 
removal of his eyes is a variant of the castration complex, he does not specifically 
focus on the dynamics of vision and the metaphoricity involved in the literal blinding. 
At the same time, he downplays the importance of the mother-child relationship in his 
formulation of a triangulated Oedipal schema. One of Laplanche’s main strengths lies 
in readdressing and subsequently redressing this oversight.  
In Freud’s rendition of a primal scene between a young boy-child and its parents 
(Freud asserts at first that the process is somewhat similar for girls, although he later 
makes revisions and modifications such that the processes of achieving a resolution 
differ) vision is closely bound into trauma, as the little boy averts his eyes from what 
he interprets to be his mother’s ‘wound’ – the physical gap or wound, that is, of not 
having a penis. This is closely tied in with issues of knowledge and self-
consciousness, what the boy figuratively envisions in his mind’s eye as being the 





Yet what happens when there is a disjunction between what the eye/I mentally 
perceives and physically sees? Does this not lead to trauma? And if so, how is this 
trauma to be interpreted and – subsequently – assimilated into the subject’s life 
narrative? Does viewing trauma – the traumatized or wounded body – in performance 
differ in any way from this interpretative schema? And, furthermore, if it does not, 
what are the gendered implications of this in relation to differentiated acts and ways 
of looking?  
I have attempted to address all of these questions throughout my work. The 
starting point has been Sophocles’ play because it lends itself so well to what Jay 
defines as the ocularcentric discourse in Western tradition, saturated as it is in 
theatrical and contextual tropes of sight, the frantic preoccupation or obsession with 
looking (linked as it is with the question of ‘knowing’ or finding out the truth) and the 
very real dangers involved in acts of (non)looking. Oedipus’s self-blinding is the 
crucial and key moment of the play, a pivotal moment which metaphorically opens 
the floodgates of interpretation and allows us, as readers and analysts, to look for the 
answers. Additionally, while the whole play is constantly preoccupied with questions 
of literal or figurative sight and blindness, the moment where Oedipus actually 
removes his eyes is the moment where literal and metaphorical become one, where 
physical and psychological trauma are seen to interact on the level of representation.  
As viewers of this somewhat horrendous and imagined spectacle (I say imagined 
because it is not enacted on stage so we have to envision it in our mind’s eye), we 
cannot help but ‘see’ the tragedy involved in hubristically asserting one’s self-
authority at the expense of others, as well as the limitations imposed upon the 
individual by both society and biological determinants. Such a moral lesson would 





Oedipus’s self-assertion was in defiance of the gods and thus liable to exact a grave 
punishment from them. Although the notion of subjectivity was unheard of in 
classical antiquity, it is safe to assume that the play’s moral messages would have 
struck home with full force.  
Similar assumptions can be made for the viewers of the Elizabethan stage. For 
them Macbeth is a stark reminder of the grave and tragic punishment which must be 
necessarily incurred by the protagonist when he drains the blood of the fountain or 
godhead in the figure of the king, God’s divine representative on earth. For more 
modern audiences it is also a moral message on the tragic consequences which may 
accrue when one has overleaping or ‘vaulting ambition’ (I.VII.27). What is more, 
murder is a gruesome and bloody business, and the after-effects of Macbeth’s crime 
resound far and wide for him and contemporary, as well as more modern, audiences.  
It is extremely significant that, in a play so saturated with visual and theatrical 
metaphors and visual motifs, the crucial moment of King Duncan’s murder is not 
enacted onstage. The event’s violent affect is displaced belatedly onto its after-effects, 
such that the trauma is not experienced at the time of its occurrence but only 
subsequently. The belatedness of trauma, its ‘afterwardsness’ (Nachträglichkeit), is 
experienced through recurring visual markers. The blood will not come off Macbeth’s 
hands and will reappear in Lady Macbeth’s sleepwalking scene, for ‘all/ the perfumes 
of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand’ (V.I.48-9). No matter how hard Lady 
Macbeth rubs her hands, the traumatic vestiges of her crime return to haunt her in her 
sleep. Thus even if the blood is no longer there and can no longer be seen, it is 
metaphorically and symbolically present as a marker of visual trauma.  
This raises important questions about (non)vision and the circularity of trauma 





Macbeth attempts to seal off the visual and interpretative field in order to avoid 
‘seeing’ things more clearly – and hence interpreting them retrospectively. In her 
performances she repetitively performs the performativity of trauma through sight. 
Sadly, she fails to obtain a kind of mastery through repetition – the blood will not go 
away because of her persistent refusal to see it literally rather than solely through her 
dreams. She performs her trauma imagistically and through ‘iconic’ representations, 
‘on a somatosensory or iconic level’ (Rosenberg 41) and via recourse to flashbacks, 
yet fails to linguistically interpret this trauma and to make it directly available to 
experience, to link, that is, symptom with event, signifier (word/gesture) with 
signified (message/meaning). It is between this signifying gap or lacuna – the failure 
of interpretation – that trauma lies.  
As Caruth points out, there is for Freud a temporal ‘unlocatability’ in the 
experiencing of trauma. Trauma is really a ‘missed experience’: ‘[It] is thus not the 
direct experience of the threat, but precisely the missing of this experience, the fact 
that, not being experienced in time, it has not yet been fully known.’ When traumatic 
experiences occur in dreams they do not signal the experience directly. Rather, they 
signal ‘the attempt to overcome the fact that it was not direct’ and hence point to the 
‘attempt[s] to master what was never fully grasped in the first place’ (62). At the same 
time, trauma attempts to ‘speak out’ and address the other. Lady Macbeth reaches out 
to her audience and makes them bear witness to her trauma.  
We have already seen how trauma can function as a traumatic spectacle and 
performance which is endlessly simulated, reproduced or ‘mimetized.’ In short, 
trauma is performative; it is something which can be envisioned and cyclically 
reproduced or performed. It is precisely this cyclical repetition of trauma which 





already etymologically linked to sight, whereas critical interpretations of theatrical 
discourse have often linked the theatre and the stage to the body, particularly the 
maternal body. As Taxidou points out in Tragedy, Modernity and Mourning, ‘the 
relationship with the stage is primarily one of topology (of bodies, things and places)’ 
(92). Performances are, by their very nature, real and embodied events.  
Similarly, traumatic events are manifested in and through the body. As Babette 
Rothschild points out, ‘the body remembers traumatic experiences’ (3). The body is a 
storehouse of sensory experiences, somatic memories and messaging systems. In spite 
of this, most clinicians and theorists have agreed that trauma cannot be represented 
linguistically. As Adorno’s famous dictum goes, there can be no poetry after 
Auschwitz. This is not to suggest, of course, that trauma should be relegated to a kind 
of amnesic status, only to point out the very real difficulties involved in representing 
trauma and writing or speaking about it. Whatever the case may be, trauma attempts 
to speak, even if not always through tangible and linguistic forms of expression. 
Indeed, this is precisely why Laplanche’s notion of an ‘enigmatic’ signifier can prove 
useful as a psychotherapeutic tool and in our attempts to interpret the enigma behind 
traumatic experiences – their failure, that is, to lend themselves to linguistic schemas 
and definitive representations.  
Enigmatic signifiers signify the enigma of trauma itself. They are fluid, extra-
linguistic and primarily visual. Like the child, traumatized individuals have no fixed 
and pre-existing linguistic code to interpret what has happened to them. Even if they 
possessed such a code in advance, any interpretation of the event can only occur in its 
aftermath and retrospectively. And the same goes for all theatrical performances of 
trauma; the actor, as well as the spectators, can only interpret the singular and 





There is a temporal disjunction between viewing and experiencing the traumatized 
body in performance. In Chapter Six, for example, I note the difficulties Harradine 
encounters in writing about Franko B’s performances. The performances themselves, 
as well as their affective power, ‘unexpectedly intrude and interrupt only to suddenly 
disappear again, but of course never again, for that would be to deny that single loss – 
that moment at which their transient presence fades into memory – which can never 
be repeated’ (70). In the blinking of an eye, the moment of Augenblick, the 
performative moment simply fades away.  
Although writing about performances is a belated process, and although the act of 
writing about performances necessarily changes their status as real and embodied 
events through the linguistic processes of representation and documentation, this 
should not deter us from attempting to record and critically analyse the affective and 
bodily responses to traumatic representations both on the stage and in real life. In 
many cases, trauma is triggered by visual signs and markers. Thus my work has 
attempted to delineate and flesh out a theoretical model of vision or, to be more 
precise, a model of vision which functions as traumatic and against which various 
texts and performances can be read.  
Obviously there are many different ways of looking at particular traumatic events. 
Indeed, we may even specifically choose to ‘not’ look at them. Bergson has laid great 
emphasis on the fact that the body is a vehicle of free choice. Yet we are all 
implicated in various ‘acts’ of looking every day. For Foucault these acts are hostile, 
while for others they are more benign. For the French Marxist theorist Guy Debord 
we are all caught up in a society of the spectacle, and spectacle can serve as a very 
powerful and depoliticizing tool in pacifying the masses. Yet while a lot has been 





existentialists, philosophers, empiricists and literary theorists, there have been few 
attempts to integrate them theoretically within psychoanalytic, phenomenological or 
socio-cultural frameworks.  
This is nowhere more evident than in theatrical discourse. My own reading thus 
attempts to redress this oversight by taking all these various frameworks into account 
and by working from within them in order to illustrate how the existing theoretical, 
historical and psychoanalytic models of vision and trauma can be integrated in order 
to augment our understanding of trauma through vision. At the same time, these 
models can allow us to gain insight into traumatic performances and the way we view 
and perform the traumatized body both on and off the stage. In many respects, my 
work is heavily indebted to theatre theory, the precepts of Ancient Greek tragedy – 
with its stress on notions such as anagnorisis and catharsis – as well as 
phemonenological and psychoanalytical discourses.  
In all my chapters I have endeavoured to show how trauma, vision and theatre are 
interlinked. By pressuring those links I have also strived to bring out how the stage 
can serve as a text or textual space in its own right and also how it can function as a 
body or body politic upon which various visuo-spatial and traumatic themes are 
inscribed and (re)enacted. By anachronistically mapping the concerns and issues of 
Ancient Greek and Elizabethan theatre onto more modern renditions of theatrical 
discourse, I have also attempted to trace a non-teleological model of trauma which 
transcends space and time and to provide an extended analysis, through various 
performances, of how trauma and theatre come together in the optical field.  
In the same way as Jeffrey Mehlman generally superimposes Freud’s texts and 
plays them off against each other in order to effect a greater understanding of the 





performances which, albeit so culturally and temporally divorced from each other, can 
be read against each other in order to ‘unearth’ their similarities and multiple semantic 
layers. In effect, my reading envisions these plays and performances as palimpsests a 
priori with multiple layers of encoded meanings (I choose the word ‘palimpsest’ 
deliberately since it encapsulates the notion of layering, semanticity and legible 
traces, the Ancient Egyptian papyri being a good and prime example). In my view, the 
plays and performances exhibit the ‘trace’ of trauma in the same way as Derrida 
locates a trace in language.  
As Derrida notes in Writing and Difference, a ‘trace is not a presence but is rather 
the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself. The 
trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very structure of 
the trace’ (403). In the same way, trauma is unlocatable and constantly refers beyond 
itself. Yet it is its very effacement which allows it to be read, in the same way as 
metaphysical texts are made legible through the trace and its effacement. Trauma is 
never simply self-referential. It posits itself as both intrapsychical and social at once, 
as both a private, internal affair and a public, shared experience. It curiously wavers 
between the two in a neither/nor equation, in the same way as the very term itself 
encapsulates in its very definition both a physical and psychological wounding (a 
point made by Freud).  
If Greek tragedy can speak to our present state it is precisely because Oedipus’s 
wounding is both physical (from the very moment of his birth when he was pierced on 
his feet to the final, climactic moment where he gouges out his own eyes), and 
psychological, a private and a social wound at the same time. This is why Rachel 
Bowlby’s rereading of the Oedipal tragedy in Freudian Mythologies is significant to 





between private and intersocial levels and the ways in which this interplay speaks to 
our modern condition. This is nowhere more evident, perhaps, than in live 
performance art, where bodily-based performances such as those of Orlan and Franko 
B become both private ordeals and shared communal events. 
 If we are to believe Freud’s interpretation of Oedipus’s struggles, then the trauma 
is not a private one at all but has very real, social implications. We have already seen 
how Oedipus must bear the burden of his trauma by ridding the city of its miasma. 
Girard reminds us that he must become the scapegoat or pharmakos in order to purge 
the city and its inhabitants from defilement. There is a kind of mimetic violence 
implied here which, paradoxically, serves both virulent and regenerative ends. 
Through ritual, sacrifice and the repetition of violence a greater violence can be 
warded off and cordoned from the city-state. In short, ritual, myth and sacrifice can 
ward off trauma and violence. This is later displaced onto the theatrical stage such 
that the repetition of traumatic events on stage serves the exact same function as ritual 
and sacrifice in warding off violence. The actors and the audience are able to see (or, 
in many cases, envision in their mind’s eye) the violent reenactment of various 
traumatic events, and this spectacle serves a generative and cathartic function in 
purging their emotional tensions.  
In the more modern performances of trauma by Franko B and Orlan, there is a 
very real impression of these artists sacrificing their bodies in a ritualistic way in 
order to maintain their survival. While clearly both artists are doing different things 
with their bodies, their end goal seems to be to ward off death through self-
martyrdom. Certainly the theme of religious sacrifice runs strongly throughout the 
work of both performance artists, as well as the notion of rebirth or reincarnation after 





While many theorists and critics who have written about these performances are 
preoccupied with the question of catharsis and to what extent it is achieved through 
performance, my interest lies in leaving the interpretative field open rather than 
sealing it, as well as in documenting the potential affective force of the performances 
themselves. In terms of audience response, and by working within such a fluid and 
open schema of interpretation, the achievement of catharsis becomes irrelevant in 
relation to the fluidity of meaning(s) and enigmatic signifiers surrounding the 
performative and bodily acts.  Indeed, meaning becomes, or rather it is, as fluid as 
Franko B’s blood play.  
As Habermas points out, our observations, perceptual experiences and habits of 
inference always engender knowledge or truth within the realm of semiotic 
representation. He points out in Knowledge and Human Interests that it is only when 
knowledge is based on ideas that it ‘can truly orient action.’ The very word ‘theory’ 
has religious roots. ‘The theoros was the representative sent by Greek cities to public 
celebrations. Through theoria, that is through looking on, he abandoned himself to the 
sacred events. In philosophical language, theoria was transferred to contemplation of 
the cosmos’ (301). With Derrida, who invokes Nietzsche and the end of humanism, 
the interpretative and semantic fields of contextual discourse shift via recourse to a 
theory of deconstruction which accommodates a ceaseless multiplication of 
significations. 
Derrida emphasizes that reading a text depends on the historical and social 
contexts in which language is used. But such contexts are never fixed; they are always 
changeable and changing. There can be an infinite or iterable number of contexts for 
any given utterance, which makes meaning fluid and undecidable rather than 





impossible to fix on a single, definitive meaning for any given text. Indeed, any 
attempts to make sense of a specified text presuppose an act of interpretation, and 
interpretation already presupposes an endless multiplication of significations. The 
chain of signification never ends. From a similar angle, and in the same way as 
Derrida views the reading of texts, all performances themselves can be seen as 
encompassing a ceaseless multiplication of significations depending upon how the 
textual body in performance is viewed, read and subsequently interpreted.  
The aporia resides in the conflict between the decodable and rule-oriented 
grammatical and social structures in which the body is placed and their rhetorical, 
even subversive, potential that opens up vertiginous possibilities of reference. The 
readings are inexhaustible. We have already seen how Franko B’s body can be made 
to signify in various different ways: it is a marker of the abject, an instance of the 
body-image-machine complex, an elegiac body of sorrows, the body of a white man, 
the body of a gay man, even a signifier of the absence of blackness. At the same time 
as all these assumptions stand, they are also potential interpretations in an endless 
process of construal. Franko B’s body stands in referentially for all these 
interpretations (or maybe just several of them?) at the same time as it stands in for 
neither of them.  
The fully articulated meaning of Franko B’s performances inheres in the habits of 
interpretation of his spectators, which in turn are governed by their interpretative 
capacities and dispositions within their socio-historical environment, as well as by 
other sociological factors such as gender, class, sexuality, religion and ethnicity. Since 
the performance theorists who are writing about Franko B’s work are primarily white 





 In addition to this, gender and sexual identity are fluid and do not always neatly fall 
into clear-cut binaries or essentialist categories (man/woman, straight/gay). The 
performance of gender will vary according to context and spatio-temporal 
considerations. Gender roles are enacted according to situational contexts; the role is 
not a definitive and fixed one but a situated one which is both socially constructed 
and fluidly (re)constituted as the social circumstances arise. Before embarking upon 
theoretical speculations in relation to live performance art, it is important to actively 
engage with what people define or ‘know’ as ‘reality’ in their everyday, non-
theoretical or even pre-theoretical lives (Berger and Luckmann 15). The sociology of 
knowledge is not a pre-given entity but based on human activities and processes.   
      Certainly one way of looking at Franko B’s performances is to view them as a 
‘punctur[ing] and tear[ing] open [of] theoretical skins’ only to have them ‘disappear 
again’ (Harradine 70). Franko B’s work is heavily predicated on skin, as well as 
notions of inner/outer surfaces or ‘second’ skins. The trauma or punctum of his 
performances lies in witnessing the ambiguous dithering or vacillation – even collapse 
– between public and private boundaries, what Laplanche has cited as ‘a kind of 
internal-external instance’ (Life & Death in Psychoanalysis 42). Franko B’s wounds 
are made traumatic because they lie on the cusp between the private and the public, 
perception and representation, neither completely one nor the other – and yet both 
simultaneously. Franko B’s performances are both traumatic, private ordeals and 
shared, communal experiences of trauma, the trauma of bearing witness to another’s 
trauma. It is this mimetic logic which ultimately gives strength to Franko B’s 
performances. The constant collapse between inner and outer worlds can often breed 
Derridean ‘monsters’ or monstrous anxieties, some of which refuse to be neatly 





      As one witnesses Franko B’s cut and instrumented body dripping and bleeding 
to death on a white canvas, or Orlan’s ‘cosmetic’ and performance surgeries, in which 
she willingly undergoes facial procedures involving the jabbing of needles and the 
mutilative slashing of skin, one wonders to what extent such performances can be 
classified as ‘aesthetic’ works of art or simply as deranged and perverse practices of a 
twisted mind. Even though many spectators are baying for Franko B’s blood, there 
are others – such as Doyle – who weep for his bleeding and elegiac body. And there 
are others still who cannot ‘stomach’ or rationalize his bloody performances.  
       Without clearly demarcating these boundaries between art and sickness, between 
‘aesthetic’ mutilation as grace or perversion, this work has sought to encompass all 
possible readings without privileging or singling out a specific one, and, further to 
this, has attempted to engage with several theoretical models which strive to elucidate 
how the performing body has been viewed, and can be viewed, on stage. Quite 
clearly, the process of viewing and interpreting the performing body is a complex one, 
and even more especially so when this performing body visibly stands before us and 
bleeds. (Indeed, Franko B has often been identified as being ‘the bleeding body’.)  
Yet, as Favazza suggests, ‘it is easy to forget that dripping blood may accompany 
birth as well as death’ (322).  
        Franko B and other live performance artists use their body as a kind of stage on 
which to perform ritualized bodily practices. These practices are always already 
inflected and shaped by political concerns. They are political not only because Franko 
B’s body can be read as a socio-political text onto which are grafted genderized and 
sexualized identities or identifications, but also because they involve spectators from a 
wide range of different backgrounds in a kind of communal and shared event. In the 





democratic capital in order to engage in a kind of ‘participatory collective 
spectatorship’ (Goldhill 19), a spectatorship which effectively marked their role of 
citizenship within the city-state and body politic, spectators gather around Franko B’s 
bleeding and wounded body to share –  in a kind of symbolic and bloody Eucharist – 
in his performance of the violent and ritualized wounding of the social fabric when 
and as it attempts to shore up fixed humanist constructions of social identity.  
       As Seltzer forcefully reminds us, we live in a ‘wound culture’ which exhibits a 
constant ‘public fascination with [the spectacle of] torn and open bodies and torn and 
opened persons’ (1). This fascination is neither new nor uncommon. As far back as 
Roman times, the gladiators engaged in violent and civic displays, or rather contests, 
of physical manhood for the benefit of the public and the Emperor. The contests were 
strategically designed to serve as political tactics in that not only did they keep the 
plebeians under control but also demonstrated the might and strength of the Great 
Roman Empire.  
       Viewing is clearly a political act, as is going to the theatre, which is itself a ‘place  
for viewing’ (Goldhill 19). It is my contention that any act of looking is never neutral 
but always tinged, consciously or not, with social, political and even economic 
considerations. This is nowhere more evident than in the theatre, which serves as the 
place where the body and the body politic come together. It is my hope that this work, 
in its explicative analysis and theoretical exegesis of the dynamics of specific visual 
plays and performances, as well as of the associated links between theatre, vision, 
trauma and the body, is a small stepping-stone and testimony to the undeniable 










                                                 
1 I am specifically delimiting my investigation here to Western theories and interpretations of the gaze 
because of the great weight accorded to them in ontological and metaphysical discourse. Renée C. 
Hoogland points this out in her chapter entitled ‘The Gaze of Inversion: The Lesbian as Visionary,’ in 
which she refers to ‘the central role of the specular metaphor in the discourse of Western epistemology’ 
and ‘within the system of Western metaphysics.’ In Vision in Context: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives on Sight, ed. by Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 157-67 (157). This is not to suggest of course that there are no other ways of seeing. Particularly in 
theatre, where sight is such an important factor, there are clearly a number of non-Western productions 
which may lay claim to different techniques of looking and interpretative, perceptual apparatuses as far 
as sight is concerned. I am reminded here of Antonin Artaud’s descriptions of Oriental and Balinese 
theatre productions. In The Theatre and Its Double, trans. by Victor Corti (London & New York: 
Calder Publications, 1993), he draws a sharp distinction between the West and such forms of theatre, 
claiming that the latter ‘has invented a language of gestures to be spatially developed’ through ‘a whole 
ferment of sight and sound imagery’ (43-4). 
2 There is a near-frenzied obsession with the all-seeing eye and the ability to know through seeing. In 
Buddhism and Hinduism enlightenment is achieved through a ‘third eye’ which sees everything. I am 
also reminded here of Rousseau’s constant obsession to see things more clearly. Cf. Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s essay “Nature” (1836): ‘Standing on the bare ground […] all mean egotism vanishes. I 
become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate 
through me; I am part or particle of God.’ 
3 That there is no God’s-eye view of the world is clearly linked to what Martin Jay defines as an 
antiocularcentric discourse in the West which is in opposition to ocularcentrism and the heliotropic 
privileging of sight. This tradition can be traced as far back as Plato, who demonstrated the illusion and 
deceptiveness of sight in his famous example of the shadowed cave in The Republic. It finds ample 
echoes in Nietzsche’s well-known assertion in The Gay Science (1882) that ‘God is dead’ – hence there 
can be no God’s view – as well as in Bataille’s slippery linkages between the eye, sun and other 
circular shapes in order to stress, through a kind of defilement which relegates them to ignobility, the 
deprivileging of the eye’s hierarchical status. I shall turn to this antiocularcentric trend later on in my 
argument, together with the anxieties produced by scopophilia and the other’s gaze. 
4 As Mary Ann Caws points out in The Eye in the Text: Essays on Perception, Mannerist to Modern 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981) this was a question that Artaud takes up in his play La 
Place de l’amour, where the character Paolo Uccello struggles with the problem of seeing oneself see: 
‘to determine yourself, as if not being the one to determine, to look at your self with the eyes of your 
mind without it being those eyes looking. To retain the benefit of your personal judgment, all the while 
alienating the personality itself from that judgment. To see yourself and overlook your being yourself 
that you see’ (88).  
5 Similarly, the orgasm of jouissance hinges as much on death as it does on loss; for one can very easily 
lose oneself in its throes, in that spasmic rush or engorgement of blood to the genitals which, at the 
critical moment, leads to separation and ejection of fluids from self. It is telling in this instance that the 
French identify orgasm with ‘la petite mort.’ 
6 Lacan posits a masculine, phallic jouissance and one which is Other to it. Both are played off against 
each other through a complex economy of lack and desire set in motion by the phallus, the predominant 
signifier for Lacan. Since the phallus is desired by both sexes, it ‘embod[ies] jouissance in the dialectic 
of desire,’ a structural position constantly sought for (353). Along similar lines, Freud in his seminal 
essay ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920) also stipulates the dominance of the pleasure principle, 
which Lacan drew upon for his theory of jouissance. 
7 As Jill Dolan points out in The Feminist Spectator as Critic (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1988): ‘Women never assumed an active place in theatrical representation, which conspired from 
its beginnings to detach women as a gender class from their material base and to create them instead as 
a transcendent myth used to serve the male ideology cultural practices perpetuated’ (96). Such a 
reductionist approach, however, seems too simplistic and absolute. I am hesitant to attribute all 
theatrical conventions as a ‘conspiracy’ to relegate women to an inferior or mythologized status. 
Rather, it is the prominence of male ideology which occludes or prevents a fuller understanding of 





                                                                                                                                            
It seems to me that Dolan is too imbricated in asserting a male-dominated patriarchy to see that there 
could be exceptions to the rule. 
8 While I am clearly aware that there are various types of feminism, I have grouped them all under one 
common denominator for matters of pure convenience. This is not to say that they all ultimately share 
the same goal or project. For an extended analysis of the various types, such as cultural and material 
feminism, see Dolan. 
9 Timaeus, 52b. Although Bianchi explains in her footnote that she is indebted to Desmond Lee’s 
translation, it is interesting that she skips the cosmological aspects of Plato’s narration in the translated 
section in which he assigns this chora, strictly speaking, neither to the earth nor sky: ‘τὸ δὲ μήτ᾽ ἐν γῇ 
μήτε που κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι.’ 
10 I say this space is ‘almost prelinguistic’ because I wish to avoid the pitfall many feminists make of 
criticizing Kristeva for positing a utopian or ou-topic space outside culture or history. Although Judith 
Butler, for example, contends in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1990) that the chora is confined ‘to a site outside culture itself’ (88), a 
rereading of Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language shows that, in terms of her theory of 
signification, the chora ‘is not yet a position that represents something for someone’ (26). I deliberately 
read the chora as extralinguistic – even ‘paralinguistic’ – rather than strictly prelinguistic. Cf. Maria 
Margaroni in her ‘‘The Lost Foundation’: Kristeva’s Semiotic Chora and Its Ambiguous Legacy,’ 
Hypatia 20.1 (Winter 2005), 78-98 (84): ‘In this light, the chora should be perceived as neither a 
preverbal space nor as a timeless time before history. Its effect, as Kristeva has repeatedly pointed out, 
is transverbal (moving through and across logos) and transhistorical (alongside, opposite to and in the 
margins of history).’ Quite clearly, this reading dynamically situates the chora within history at the 
same time as it constrains it by its contingency on socio-historical forces. That certain feminists should 
read Kristeva against the grain is baffling indeed.  
11 Of course plays and theatrical events can engage the spectators in other ways as well rather than just 
through sight. In his examination of contemporary French companies, Richard Webb comes to the 
following conclusion: ‘Experiments which involve the spectator in the performance or which extend to 
him [sic] a creative role in the dramatic process must call into question our conventional understanding 
of theatre and artistic creation’ (qtd. in Bennett 14).  
12 I am using the term ‘performative’ in a very specific way here in order to distinguish performativity 
from actual performance. As Elin Diamond stipulates in Unmaking Mimesis (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1997), ‘Though ‘performativity’ is not an ‘act’ but a ‘reiteration’ or ‘citation,’ why should 
we restrict its iterative sites to theory and to the theorist’s acts of seeing?’ (47). Diamond’s formulation 
of performativity as a ‘reiteration’ rather than an act opens out the possibility of imagining 
performative acts or gestures as more than just embodied or repetitive events or even visual markers. 
They can be reconfigured and reimagined in different ways and along different trajectories or chains of 
signification. In the same way, although trauma can be seen as being a performative and repetitive 
event, its permutations allow for a plenitude of interpretative possibilities along the axis of 
representation. Trauma is both embodied in that it is materialized through the body – and hence felt – 
and performative in so far as it is enacted and re-enacted in performance, a (re)enactment which often 
has the paradoxical effect of erasing this body’s materiality. I will take up these issues again in Chapter 
Five when I explore Orlan’s radical, performative practices. Such practices are explored in order to 
bring out the interpretative quality of performance. Cf. the Introduction to Performing the 
Body/Performing the Text, ed. by Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1999), where Jones and Stephenson point out that the collected chapters in the edition are 
committed ‘to the dual project of exploring practices that enact the body or subject in a performative 
fashion (Performing the Body) in order to point to the act of interpretation itself as a kind of 
performance (Performing the Text),’ (1). 
13 Written from within this theoretical milieu of ‘reader-response theory’ and strategies of reception, 
Jean E. Howard’s Shakespeare’s Art of Orchestration (1984) seems to be quite an attractive reading: ‘I 
assume that in writing plays for performance Shakespeare was partly writing with an eye to the 
potential responses of the audience; that is, as he orchestrated the play, he was indirectly orchestrating 
the theatrical experience of the viewer’ (qtd. in Bennett 14). While it is impossible to verify this, it is 
safe to assume that in later theatrical productions of Shakespeare’s plays, directors would play with 
visual effects in order to create specific responses in their audiences, an argument to which I shall 
return. 
14 Another reading (which may seem paradoxical) is to assert that the power or potency of pain can be 
negated through repetition. I find J. B. Pontalis’s formulation of psychic pain quite adept in relation to 





                                                                                                                                            
trans. by Catherine Cullen and Philip Cullen (London: The Hogarth Press, 1981): ‘Sometimes obvious, 
noisy, repeated suffering serves as a screen for pain. Is not the function of some suffering to evacuate 
psychic pain, and I am thinking in particular of sado-masochistic suffering in which the subject is his 
own producer and master of his own scenario. To suffer a lot, at the necessary time and for the 
necessary duration in order not to suffer too much, and for ever?’ (203-4). This would lend some 
credibility to Orlan’s asserted refutations of pain had it not been for her adamant refusal to associate 
her performances with masochistic practices. 
15 Postmodernist theory is certainly not without its opponents. Judith Butler finds the term 
‘postmodern’ to be vague and reductionistic, if not meaningless. Her theory of performativity, 
however, has been very popular with many postmodern feminists in the 1990s. In Gender Trouble she 
points to how gender is a social construction which is performatively produced. 
16 Cathryn Vasseleu argues of course that Irigaray should not be criticized for her pronouncements 
against visual supremacy in a male-dominated economy since her theorizations also extend to an 
‘assessment of the workings of heliocentrism’ in relation to ‘Derrida’s naming of woman as writing or 
différance’ (129-30) and her eroticization of the Platonic sun’s light, where the sun is construed by 
Irigaray as being phallic. While I am sensitive to Vasseleu’s claims, and while it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to fully engage in Irigaray’s specular analyses and her arguments about the regrettable 
complicity of photology and phallocentrism in Western philosophy and its metaphysics of presence, 
which serves to reduce women to the other of the one or sameness of the one, it is true that her recourse 
to a somewhat Diderotian move of asserting the value of touch in her theorization of women’s 
autoeroticism through ‘vaginal lips that touch’ is an attempt to posit a tactile discourse for women 
which clearly moves away from visual concerns and somewhat deprivileges them. 
17 In an interesting self-help book on how to heal past traumas entitled Waking the Tiger: Healing 
Trauma (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1997) Peter A. Levine uses the Medusan myth to provide a 
somewhat optimistic reading in relation to how trauma resolution can be achieved: ‘If we attempt to 
confront trauma head on, it will continue to do what it has already done – immobilize us in fear. Before 
Perseus set out to conquer Medusa, he was warned by Athena not to look directly at the Gorgon. 
Heeding the goddess’s wisdom, he used his shield to reflect Medusa’s image; by doing so, he was able 
to cut off her head. Likewise, the solution to vanquishing trauma comes not through confronting it 
directly, but by working with its reflection, mirrored in our instinctual responses’ (65).  
18 Clearly I am not suggesting that the audience is infantilized in this process. It is only to illustrate that 
suggestive and often fruitful links can be made between psychoanalysis and audience reception. There 
has been a growing fascination with teasing out and pressuring these links in the film industry. The 
famous British film director and producer Sir Alfred Hitchcock was well-versed in Freudian theory and 
used it to his advantage in manipulating his audiences. In ‘Death Drive’s Joy Ride: David 
Cronenberg’s Crash,’ Other Voices: The (e)Journal of Cultural Criticism 1:3 (January 1999), Manuel 
Camblor describes the effects of David Cronenberg’s film Crash on its audiences in specifically 
psychoanalytic terms. If, as Manuel Camblor illustrates, sexuality for Lacan is ‘the reality of the 
unconscious,’ then ‘the eroticized emission and reception of a signifier […] effectively establishes an 
area of contact with the unconscious.’ The erotic signifier is both transmitted and received, always 
reaching its ‘destination,’ which is the unconscious. Camblor’s analysis is interesting because it 
demonstrates how the characters’ signifying wounds within the film could become traumatic if they are 
visually perceived and ‘received’ by the spectator as erotic, if they succeed, that is, in reaching their 
destination and broaching the spectator’s unconscious. Yet while the spectators of the film may be in a 
potentially dangerous situation, in so far as they recognize these wounds as highly erotic and painful 
markers which can activate their own unconscious fantasies and desires, this is not to say that 
spectators of theatrical performances are not confronted with the same dilemma. The viewing medium 
may be different but the psychoanalytical framework still holds.  
19 As Seltzer points out, this public fascination with wounds and violence, which he associates 
primarily with America, has led to ‘a radical mutation and relocation of the public sphere, now 
centered on the shared and reproducible spectacles of pathological violence’ (254). Yet, while there has 
been a growing ‘pathological violence’ in the public sphere, this is not to say that public displays of 
violence did not exist before, only that perhaps there has been an increasing assimilation or 
pathologization of the violence itself. Note, for instance, Michel Foucault’s fascinating documentation 
in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 
1991) of how in the early modern period pillory, scaffolding, and other forms of torture or execution 
had to be public events in order for the juridical system to work: ‘And, from the point of view of the 
law that imposes it, public torture and execution must be spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as 





                                                                                                                                            
centralized around the sovereign state, this does not necessarily imply that the spectators constantly 
gathering around the scaffold to witness the spectacles of violent torture are in any way fundamentally 
different from the spectators who gather today around other violent spectacles. Who is to say, for 
instance, that the former did not find the public execution of the condemned man as fascinating? As 
liable to trigger within them a violent desire to simulate the torture in some form or other? Whatever 
the case, it must not be forgotten that in both instances the violence becomes a communal event in the 
(pathological) public sphere. All this is opposed, of course, to Jürgen Habermas’s notions of the public 
sphere as freely democratic and ‘the alternative to the sphere of public violence (the domain of the state 
and of the police)’ (Seltzer 253). 
20 This is of course not to debase the invaluable work of many feminist writers who have also 
undertaken the same project. Although I will often explore how they have grappled with the issue of 
assigning agency to the female other, I would like to note from the outset that my primary concern is 
with Laplanche’s formulation of an enigmatic signifier which functions as an extra-linguistic and visual 
sign or hieroglyph. Although sadly Laplanche’s work has often been overlooked by many writers, I feel 
that his theory of the signifier is important because it not only brings the female other to the fore but 
also ushers in and explains, or rather gives primacy to, the nexus between the primary caretaker (who is 
usually the mother) and the child. As the psychiatrist Felicity de Zulueta has demonstrated by recourse 
to the work of clinicians, zoologists and anthropologists in her From Pain to Violence: The Traumatic 
Roots of Destructiveness, 2nd ed. (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2006), ‘the disruption and 
abuse of the primary attachment relationships can have devastating effects on the self and engender 
considerable violence, a violence that is usually turned against the self.’ Thus, the greater the 
psychobiological trauma in childhood the greater the violence in later life. Although de Zulueta’s links 
between child abuse, human destructiveness and terrorism need further substantiation, it is worth 
considering her claim that studies of primates and humans have ‘show[n] that the most effective 
transmission of cultural values occurs through manipulation of the infant-caregiver attachment system’ 
(7). 
21 Paradoxically, the absence of women on the stage is also seen as undermining this very phantasy. As 
Stephen Orgel notes in Impersonations: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare’s England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), several antitheatrical writers are afraid that theatre 
will lead to men’s effeminization and arouse homoerotic feelings or sexual licentiousness in its 
spectators. ‘For such writers, the very fact that women are prohibited from the stage reveals the true 
etiology of theatre: what the spectator is “really” attracted to in plays is an undifferentiated sexuality, a 
sexuality that does not distinguish men from women and reduces men to women – the deepest fear in 
antitheatrical tracts […] is the fear of a universal effeminization’ (29). Such antitheatrical sentiments, 






1 In Immanuel Kant’s existentialist metaphysics the rupture which clearly exists between perception 
and representation, the perceived object as it is conceived in the mind and the way it is physically 
represented, can be bridged by recourse to reason and experience. ‘Our representation of things, as they 
are given, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but [that] these objects as 
appearances conform to our mode of representation,’ in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Qtd. 
in Marina Warner, The Inner Eye: Art Beyond the Visible (London: National Touring Exhibitions, 
1996-7), p. 10. 
2 Julia Kristeva, ‘Is Sensation a Language?’, in Writing and Psychoanalysis: A Reader, ed. by John 
Lechte (London & New York: Arnold, 1996), p. 199. 
3 I use the term ‘semantic function’ here deliberately to depict the body’s ability to function as a 
signifier or sign which is involved in and mediated through ontological discourse. The term is 
employed by Paul Youngquist in ‘Ballard’s Crash-Body,’ Postmodern Culture 11.1 (September 2000). 
For an interpretation of how language functions as an ontological system, see Lacan, who points out in 
Έcrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London & New York: Routledge, 2003) that language is 
not an abstraction but a material body: ‘language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is’ 
(95). 
4 This is certainly not to suggest that the auditory and tactile sense-perceptions which precede sight are 





                                                                                                                                            
and hearing are of course significant, what primarily concerns me is the visual apparatus and its 
capacity to perceive material objects in the existential world. 
5 Most of Plato’s work centres, in fact, on the question of the Idea. His Theory of Forms is posited at 
large in The Republic and Symposium, seminal works which, together with those of Aristotle, helped 
shape much of Western thinking and philosophy.  
6 In a similar vein, and in a line of thinking which seems to run parallel to that of Plato’s, John Berger 
et al. note in Ways of Seeing that ‘an image is a sight which has been recreated or reproduced. It is an 
appearance, or a set of appearances, which has been detached from the place and time in which it first 
made its appearance and preserved – for a few moments or a few centuries’ (9-10). 
7 The Neoplatonist alchemist Robert Fludd captures this idea by way of a diagram, in which an adult’s 
mental consciousness is seen as a cinematic screen onto which visual images are projected. In Marina 
Warner, The Inner Eye: Art Beyond the Visible, p. 12. 
8 Of course this notion that knowledge is founded on sight is challenged by plays such as Sophocles’ 
Oedipus Rex, a play which I shall explore in great depth in the second chapter. 
9 Although my analysis is at present concerned with images that are rooted in a concrete materiality, it 
is clearly important to bear in mind that there are those images, more aptly defined as abstract symbols, 
which do not neatly conform to this mode of representation since they are always already, in and of 
themselves, disembodied. I shall return to the question of metaphoricity later on in my argument. 
10 Bataille himself served in the army. In ‘W.C. Preface to Story of the Eye’ he gives an account of how 
his abandoned and mad father died in 1915 ‘in a bombarded town, a few miles from the German lines.’ 
It is interesting to note that in referring to his father Bataille compares himself to Oedipus: ‘My father 
having conceived me when blind (absolutely blind), I cannot tear out my eyes like Oedipus. Like 
Oedipus, I solved the riddle: no one divined it more deeply than I’ (77). Although beyond the scope of 
my analysis, it seems that this preface may provide fertile ground for psychoanalytic explorations into 
Bataille’s obsession with sight. 
11 For different readings of eye enucleation see Armando Favazza’s Bodies Under Siege: Self-
mutilation and Body Modification in Culture and Psychiatry, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), where he links it to self-mutilators’ investment in religious symbolism, as well 
as Jean-Joseph Goux, who claims in Oedipus, Philosopher (California: Stanford University Press, 
1993): ‘Gouging out an eye, for example, does not symbolize castration; it is a different way of 
symbolizing the sacrificial severing that emphasizes not its sexual meaning but its relation to 
knowledge, to “light.”’ Although Goux sees Oedipus as being a hero, thus lending him a subjectivity 
which Sophocles disallows, his reading is interesting to the extent that it opens up the interpretative 
field of signification, what Goux calls a ‘nuanced wealth of meanings’ (44).  
12 Interestingly, Phelan associates this hole with the vagina and suggests that the eye itself ‘can be slit 
open like a dilating vagina’ (39). What is more, this way of looking at the eye does not preclude the 
more captivating possibility of envisioning it as a ‘slit in the male body.’ (I am reminded here of 
Bataille’s linkage of the eye to a solar anus.) Thus Phelan sees the penetrating, male gaze in high art 
and pornography as ‘contingent upon the unmarked possibility of men’s penetration of the bodies of 
men’ (40). In Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories (London & New York: Routledge, 1997). 
13 Here is the full quote: ‘As Griselda Pollock says, “Neither veiled as enigma and mysterious other, 
nor punished by our foolish desire to ‘assimilate’ to the figures of power, we have to return a steady 
and resilient look at our culture. The game is not to strip away the veil and expose the truth – it is to 
know what masks we wear, to define the texts we perform and to accept the necessity for critical 
knowledge as the condition for new pleasures, a ‘new language of desire’” (199). 
14 I use the term ‘dynamic’ here to define the Laplanchean model specifically because the very notions 
of seeing and sight, which function as non-verbal signifiers, are tied in with the concept of vision as a 
dynamic process which bonds both the self and the other. As Berger et al. point out in Ways of Seeing, 
‘our vision is continually active, continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around 
itself, constituting what is present to us as we are.’ Furthermore, this process is a dialectic one and what 
Berger et al. define as ‘the reciprocal nature of vision’ (9). That the primary caretaker in Laplanche’s 
model should see her child in a specific way is an important determinant which will govern her 
treatment of it and behaviour towards it. This in turn will affect her non-verbal (and verbal) cues. 
Additionally, the child will pick up on certain of these non-verbal cues, however subtle, which the 
primary caretaker emanates and attempt to translate them into a coherent and unified synthesis. 
Incidentally, an interesting reading which sees the suckling child as more actively involved in the 
process of breastfeeding can be found in Christopher Badcock’s Oedipus in Evolution: A New Theory 
of Sex (Oxford & Massachusetts: 1990). There Badcock stipulates that the child, antagonistic of 





                                                                                                                                            
the longer it stalls the mother’s ability to conceive. Additionally, the child interrupts its parents’ love-
making at night with this express intention in mind: ‘Quite apart from its undoubted significance for 
oral behaviour, night-time waking at a later age may perhaps relate to the infant’s need to monitor its 
parents’ sexual activities and perhaps to frustrate them whenever possible by crying, defecating and 
urinating, or even by just being seen to be awake’ (92). While this theory is debatable in so far as it 
accords less primacy to the child’s basic needs, it remains an interesting theory nevertheless. 
15 Indeed, this becomes the whole point of analysis, during which ‘the whole movement of 
symbolisation consists in adding new signifiers with the purpose of displacing, transposing, and thus 
binding the most traumatic signifiers’ (130). For a quick overview of Laplanche’s more recent 
developments on this process of binding or unbinding of traumatic enigmatic signifiers see John 
Fletcher’s article entitled  ‘The Scenography of Trauma: a ‘Copernican’ reading of Sophocles’ Oedipus 
the King,’ in Textual Practice 21.1 (2007), pp. 17-41.  
16 Borch-Jacobsen, qtd. in Maud Ellmann’s ‘Introduction,’ in Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism 
(London & New York: Longman, 1994), p.14. Cf. Jerry Flieger, qtd. in ‘Introduction’ to 
Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reader, ed. by Sue Vice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 12-3: ‘Every 
human subject lays claim to his or her humanity by a textual process […] a speaking or writing of 
desire deflected from the original short-circuit of the incestuous family foyer and diverted to the larger 
audience beyond.’ 
17 As Rebecca Schneider points out in The Explicit Body in Performance (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1997), the object of desire can never be attained. The viewer or spectator ‘does not “get” 
what he desires – he [sic] is destined to spend himself unseen, un(re)marked by the blinded object of 
his gaze, to try and try again, ritually stabbing at his own eyes like Oedipus’ (70). Cf. Anne Ubersfeld’s 
description of desire as being marked by limitations of pleasure and loss, in Susan Bennett, Theatre 
Audiences: A Theory of Production and Reception, 2nd edition (London & New York: Routledge, 
1997): ‘The limits of pleasure are marked by desire, ‘desire as lack.’’ Thus the spectator or viewer 
‘cannot arrest or touch the object of desire. Indeed, desire moves from object to object and should it 
stop and fix on a particular object, then the role of spectator is relinquished, the theatrical experience 
denied’ (73). 
18 Rosenberg explicitly links trauma with assimilation and states that trauma is to be located precisely 
at that definitive moment where assimilation fails. ‘And experience is the crux; the failure of 
experience to inhere assimilation is precisely what trauma is’ (31).  
19 For a critique of this tendency in psychoanalysis see Claire Stocks’ article ‘Trauma Theory and the 
Singular Self: Rethinking Extreme Experiences in the Light of Cross-cultural Identity,’ in Textual 
Practice 21.1 (2007), pp. 71-92. There Stocks argues that psychoanalysis falsely predicates its 
assumptions on Western notions of identity as being coherent and whole. Thus ‘the shared emphasis on 
the reintegration of a consciousness fragmented by an unassimilable event assumes the pre-existence of 
a state of perceived psychic unity that ‘healing’ aims to restore’ (74). 
20 The process whereby positive or negative feelings that had previously been invested in the parents 
are now transferred onto the therapist is called transference. As Elizabeth Wright succinctly points out 
in her definition of transference in Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice (London & New 
York: Methuen, 1984), it ‘is a mode of investing persons and objects with positive and negative 
qualities, according to our early memories of significant experience of familial figures and the 
expectations founded thereon’ (15). 
21 This is Freud’s notion of Nachträglichkeit (deferred action). Arguably, in the same way as a child 
may fail to assimilate the enigmatic signifiers of a primal scene – which functions in itself as a 
scenographic performance – a spectator too may fail to assimilate the enigmatic signs of an actor. The 






1 Cynthia Chase in ‘Oedipal Textuality: Reading Freud’s Reading of Oedipus,’ makes the important 
observation that the English translation does not tally with the German one: ‘The original German text 
refers to an inner ‘voice which is ready,’ not to ‘something which makes’ it ready, to perform the act of 
recognition.’ In Maud Ellmann, Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism, p. 60. Obviously the German 
translation would suggest a much greater willingness on the part of subjective consciousness to 
recognize such Oedipal desires than the English one, which seems to imply that these desires are 





                                                                                                                                            
2 Cf. Cynthia Chase in ‘Oedipal Textuality’: ‘Sophocles’ play portrays Oedipus as the one person in 
history without an Oedipus complex in the conventional sense: he has murdered his father and married 
his mother in an appreciation of expediency rather than in satisfaction of a desire,’ (62).  
3 Foreclosing the other/mother obviously has high stakes for feminism as well. Foreclosure not only 
refuses to take account of the mother’s desire but also leads to her metaphorical death. In On 
Matricide: Myth, Psychoanalysis, and the Law of the Mother (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), Amber Jacobs provides an interesting reading of Aeschylus’ Oresteia by claiming that 
Clytemnestra is not the only mother who is murdered, even though this is overlooked by Freud and 
Irigaray. ‘Metis, Athena’s mother, haunts the Oresteia as the matricide that is hidden and unspoken’ 
(60). She shows how, starting from this founding myth where Zeus raped and then swallowed Metis 
whole, the mother is often excluded from discourse. For my purposes, I would like to draw attention to 
Irigaray’s identification of the Oresteia with Oedipus Rex and how she uses the former play ‘to 
intervene into the logic of oedipal discourse’ (Jacobs 100). Irigaray contends that Oedipus has already 
‘killed’ Jocasta before her literal suicide: ‘Hasn’t the mother already been torn to pieces by Oedipus’s 
hatred by the time she is cut up into stages, with each part of her body having to be cathected and then 
decathected as he grows up?’ (qtd. in Jacobs 100).  
4 I am using the term ‘introjection’ very specifically here. Abraham and Torok explain that the term is 
often confused and cite the psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi who invented the term. Going back to 
Ferenczi’s formulation, then, introjection is ‘an extension to the external world of the original 
autoerotic interests, by including its objects in the ego’ (qtd. in Abraham and Torok 112). What 
Oedipus has failed to do is to include the object in his ego and thus extend and broaden it.  
5 It is not unworthy to note here that the term hamartia would have been understood somewhat 
differently in Sophocles’ time. To my knowledge, the term is deployed by Aristotle in Poetics to 
denote some tragic error on the part of the hero which inevitably leads to his downfall. E. R. Dodds, in 
his ‘On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex,’ Twentieth Century Interpretations of Oedipus Rex, ed. by 
Michael J. O’Brien (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968) notes how ‘in ordinary usage [the term] is 
sometimes applied to false moral judgements, sometimes to purely intellectual error – the average 
Greek did not make our sharp distinction between the two,’ pp. 18-9.  
6 This linkage of vision to sin resonates, of course, with religious undertones. One is reminded of the 
Biblical injunction in the New Testament where Christ asserts that if the eye causes you to sin, you 
should pluck it out. The verse of Matthew 18:7-9, of which I shall quote a part, provides a rule of 
conduct that is an interesting parallel to Oedipus’s deed: ‘What terrible things will come on the world 
through scandal! […] If your eye is your downfall, gouge it out and cast it from you! Better to enter life 
with one eye than be thrown with both into Gehenna.’ 
7 Although it is crucial that this tragic play forms part of a Greek oral tradition, it has been handed 
down to us, with all its controversial emendations and fragments, as a literary text. However, I should 
like to stress once more that while I am sensitive to its literary dimension, I am more interested in 
examining Oedipus as an actor for the most part rather than a patient. This is something that has also 
been taken up by Olga Taxidou in her chapter on Oedipus in Tragedy, Modernity and Mourning 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). See Chapter 2, ‘Oedipus/Anti-Oedipus: The 
Philosopher, the Actor and the Patient.’  
8 ‘Repetition for Itself,’ in Writing and Psychoanalysis, pp. 19-40 (29): ‘Repetition is constituted only 
with and through the disguises which affect the terms and relations of the real series, but it is so 
because it depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operates above all by 
displacement.’  
9 As the eminent physician/philosopher Paracelsus observed roughly five hundred years ago in a classic 
formulation: ‘He who enters the Kingdom of God must first enter his mother and die’ (emphasis mine). 
Qtd. in Iona Miller, ‘Demeter/Persephone: Return to the Womb,’ Psychogenesis II: Chaosophy 2000, 
Imagination: The Voice of Creativity. Setting aside the religious resonances, Paracelsus’s evocation of 
death as a fundamental biological necessity, rooted as it is in a simplistic theory of origins – ‘we die 
where once we began’ – curiously adumbrates Freud’s theories in his seminal essay ‘Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle’ some four hundred years later.  
10 Incidentally, that Oedipus is punished for a crime which Laius has committed in the past is referred 
to in the literature, although this seems to slip Goux’s memory. At the same time, Oedipus’s 
empiricism, sinful as it is, bears resemblances to that of Eve’s, the first woman in the Bible who 
challenged God’s authority. Lot’s wife, who turned into a pillar of salt when she disobeyed God’s 
command, is another example. Defiance of divine authority has often been represented in the literature 
as leading to disastrous consequences for the sinners. As Ellmann notes in her ‘Introduction’ 





                                                                                                                                            
than the crimes revealed; like a psychoanalysis, its terror lies in the interpretive activity itself, the sheer 
audacity of looking back into the past and rediscovering the violence of childhood. Thus it is curious 
that many myths revolve around the prohibition of the backward glance: Lot’s wife turns into a pillar of 
salt when she looks back at her homeland left behind; Orpheus is permitted to conduct Eurydice out of 
the underworld only under the condition that he does not look back at her’ (8-9). Thus Oedipus is 
punished for looking back into his past.  
11 As Christopher Booker notes in The Seven Basic Plots: Why we tell stories (London & New York: 
Continuum 2004), when faced with a man such as Oedipus some spectators may feel ‘a long-repressed 
sense of guilt about their own lives.’ He notes ‘how, during a particularly powerful production of the 
play at Stratford-on-Avon in the 1950s, a good many people in the audience, as the Tragedy moved 
towards its climax, could evidently take no more and stole out of the theatre. Although these people 
had not literally killed their fathers and married their mothers, the more general sense of unease the 
play aroused in them became too much to bear’ (520, footnote 2).  
12 See also Jean Laplanche’s highly illuminating chapter ‘Why the Death Drive?’, in Life & Death in 
Psychoanalysis, trans. by Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976; repr. 1985), pp. 103-126, where he invokes thermodynamic and graphic models to show the 
illogical discrepancy in Freud’s algorithmic method of conflating two completely divergent principles: 
‘Thus, insofar as they are related within a single system to the same type of quantifiable energy, a zero 
principle and a constancy principle are irreducible to each other’ (114).  
13 Thus there have been many productions of Sophocles’ play. In Myth and Tragedy Vidal-Naquet 
describes Angelo Ingegneri’s production in Vicenza in a Roman theatre in 1585, a production in which 
‘masks were deliberately excluded’ although the director knew the instrumental role they played in 
Ancient Greek theatre (371) and also examines subsequent revivals and revisions of the play by French 
writers and dramatists such as Corneille and Voltaire. In Modernism and Performance: Jarry to Brecht 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2007) Taxidou looks at a more modern staging of the play by Max 






1 As Freud notes in ‘Some Character-Types Met with in Psychoanalytic Work’ (The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIV, trans. by James Strachey, London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1957), the illness which follows after ‘success’ is intimately connected to the 
Oedipal complex and its concomitant feelings of guilt: ‘Psycho-analytic work teaches that the forces of 
conscience which induce illness in consequence of success, instead of, as normally, in consequence of 
frustration, are closely connected with the Oedipus complex, the relation to father and mother – as 
perhaps, indeed, is our sense of guilt in general’ (331). We presume that the success of Macbeth – and 
by extension Lady Macbeth who serves as his acolytic double – centres on Duncan’s murder, the 
accomplishment of the dreadful deed of patricide/regicide. It is to be lamented that Freud does not 
explicitly make this connection in reference to the play. Since it is only a general observation made 
towards the end of the second section entitled ‘Those Wrecked by Success,’ the reader is left to fill in 
the blanks. Cf. G. Wilson Knight in ‘Macbeth and the Metaphysic of Evil,’ in The Wheel of Fire: 
Essays in Interpretation of Shakespeare’s Sombre Tragedies (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 
pp. 154-74, who points out that the characters in the play ‘lack will-power: that concept finds no place 
here. Neither we, nor they, know of what exactly they are guilty: yet they feel guilt’ (167).  
2 This is in keeping, of course, with the Elizabethan belief in the Divine Right of Kings. As God’s 
divine representative on Earth, the king is the epitome of royal and godly virtues. In his person are 
subsumed all the qualities and virtues such as mercy, courage, grace and bounty. In short, he represents 
greatness, and this is why Macbeth at first recoils with horror from his regicidal thoughts. As Macduff 
aptly says upon witnessing the bloody corpse of Duncan: ‘Most sacrilegious murder hath broke ope/ 
The Lord’s anointed temple, and stole thence/ The life o’ the building!’ (II.III.49-51).  
3 There are myriad references to darkness in the play. For a detailed analysis see G. Wilson Knight’s 
excellent chapter on the metaphysic of evil. As he points out: ‘Darkness permeates the play. The 
greater part of the action takes place in the murk of night’ (159). Additionally, that Shakespeare 
symbolically plays off light against dark is clear. As Caroline Spurgeon points out in ‘Shakespeare’s 
Imagery’: ‘Another constant idea in the play arises out of the symbolism that light stands for life, 





                                                                                                                                            
Macbeth, ed. by Bernard Groom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954). All the textual quotations of the play 
were taken from this edition. 
4 Incidentally, a similar parallel can be found in Julius Caesar. Calpurnia’s prophetic dream in Act II 
Scene 2 clearly illustrates what happens when kings die or – more specifically – when they are 
murdered by their own subjects. The graves will ‘yield up’ their dead, blood will stream over the 
Capitol, horses will neigh and lionesses will whelp, and ghosts will besiege the streets of Rome. The 
unnatural killing of a king will thus cause both nature and human nature to lose all balance and turn 
topsy-turvy. 
5 ‘Extracts from Holinshed.’ In Appendix IV of Macbeth. For more information on the stage history of 
the play and the use Shakespeare made of Holinshed’s Chronicles see Michael Long’s prefatory 
remarks in a section entitled ‘The Stage History.’ 
6 Cf. Vernant: ‘Like birds that eat the flesh of birds, to borrow Aeschylus’ expression, [Oedipus] has 
twice satiated himself with his own flesh, first by shedding the blood of his father and then by 
becoming united with the blood of his mother’ (121-2).  
7 Although Girard seems to view katharsis as a phenomenon which produces similar results on both an 
individual and/or collective level, the process itself is clearly more complicated. As Andrew Ford notes 
in ‘Katharsis: The Ancient Problem,’ in Performativity and Performance, ed. with an Introduction by 
Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (New York & London: Routledge, 1995) the term actually 
allows Aristotle to make political and social distinctions among certain ranks of his audience. It is not 
simply that the theatre or Dionysia festivals in Ancient Athens in honour of the god Dionysus ‘already 
inscribed significant social distinctions in its very seating of the audience’ but also the fact that their 
response to katharsis, its very regulation, ‘enable[d] Aristotle to sustain a nest of political distinctions 
within a single audience, between professional and amateur, free and unfree, noble and common’ 
(122).  
8 Even when sacrificial violence takes place within a city’s walls it is carefully regulated. In ancient 
times Athens always maintained a certain number of victims who functioned as katharmata or 
pharmaka for the polis. ‘The city of Athens prudently kept on hand a number of unfortunate souls, 
whom it maintained at public expense, for appointed times as well as in certain emergencies. Whenever 
some calamity threatened – plague, famine, foreign invasion, or internal dissension – there was always 
a pharmakos at the disposal of the community’ (Girard 94). For a brilliant cultural and theoretical 
analysis of the pharmakos and related rituals see Dennis D. Hughes, Human Sacrifice in Ancient 
Greece (London & New York: Routledge 1991). As Hughes points out, it was a common custom to 
expel pharmakoi in many Greek cities. ‘In Ionia and Athens the rite was performed during the Apolline 
festival of the Thargelia’ (139). Whilst certain sources claim that the pharmakoi were not simply driven 
out of a city’s borders but often pelted with stones and killed when the city itself was afflicted with 
plague or famine, Hughes explains that these sources remain uncorroborated and that there is little 
evidence of cannibalism or human sacrifice in Ancient Greek culture. Having said this, he is willing to 
allow ‘that human sacrifice flourished nowhere in ancient Greece so much as in Athens, upon the tragic 
stage’ (189).  
9 See in particular Stephen Orgel, ‘The Play of Conscience,’ in Performativity and Performance for an 
in-depth explication of its poetic and medico-biological definitions.  
10 As Bennett points out, German theorists such as Husserl and Heidegger used a familiar term called 
the ‘horizon of expectations’ to refer to a reader’s response to a particular text in light of dominant 
ideologies and the other texts already extant and in circulation. The same applies for a performance. 
The work of Hans Robert Jauss is particularly illuminating in this respect. For further explication, see 
the section entitled ‘Reader-Response Theory’ in Chapter 2 of Bennett’s Theatre Audiences: A Theory 
of Production and Reception. 
11 It is certainly not without reason that Plato condemned the theatre in his Republic since he felt that it 
stirred unruly passions in the audience. 
12 Note the implicit tautology of this assertion. Catharsis both divides the subject’s body on an 
intrapersonal level and, through its very divisiveness, heals and regulates it back into social 
embodiment.  
13 It is not accidental, of course, that I begin the very first chapter by referring to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s work. I feel that a return to phenomenological roots can provide very fruitful ways of reading 
the body in the field of drama, ways which resist the anti-theatrical readings of semioticians and 
poststructuralists.  
14 See also p. 125. Derrida is referred to in both these sections. For his reading of hospitality see 





                                                                                                                                            
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). For his reading on friendship or philia 
refer to The Politics of Friendship (London and New York: Verso, 1997). 
15 Sophocles, Antigone, trans. by E. F. Watling (London: Penguin, 1974). These events are crucial, of 
course, to the dramatic action, but they take place off-stage or off-scene because they are obscene. In 
fact, the very word ‘obscenity’ has its roots in Greek etymology. 
16 I have somewhat oversimplified Smith’s theatre of ethics and morality. In a sense, Smith complicates 
the question of the spectatorial gaze by explaining that the spectator can see himself observing. Thus 
‘subjectivity is precisely not positioned in the eye of the beholder, but, rather, in the exchanges that 
occur in the phantasmatic projection of what it might feel like to be constituted as a subject by looking 
on the onlookers of our selves.’ This question is complicated further when Smith brings up the notion 
of an ‘impartial spectator,’ an idealized condition or situation which we are constantly striving to attain 
in an ethically sound society (de Bolla 75-6).  
17 Cf. G. Wilson Knight who says of her, ‘she is a woman possessed – possessed of evil passion.’ He 
calls the ‘demon’ which takes hold of her ‘an evil something which masters her, mind and soul,’ ‘a 
nightmare thing of evil’ (167, emphasis mine). Knight’s is obviously a very particular reading and is 
inflected with a misogynist bent. That Marilyn French should follow suit and call Lady Macbeth 
‘supernaturally evil’ (245) is worthy to note, if only because it attests – and regrettably so – to the 
tendency to dehumanize Lady Macbeth and undermine her incredible will-power and strength of 
character. As A. C. Bradley reminds us in Shakespearean Tragedy (1905): ‘However appalling she 
may be, she is sublime’ (368).  
18 Although it is of course important that Macbeth’s line will not continue, which is suggestive of Lady 
Macbeth’s incapacity to give him an heir, it is not her sterility or barrenness which is relevant. What 
interests me here is simply the fact that Macbeth has pointed out to her potential capacity to procreate 
and give birth. In my view, this at once sets her apart from him as an other. At the same time, the 
reference to the maternal breast is significant. I am reminded here of Aeschylus’ The Libation Bearers 
where Orestes confronts his mother Clytemnestra face-to-face and is ready to draw his sword to strike 
her down when she exposes her breast. As Jacobs points out, Orestes cannot act when he sees this 
breast. ‘Like Medusa, the monstrous all-powerful archaic mother figure, Clytemnestra’s breast is an 
image that freezes action.’ In contrast, Lady Macbeth invokes her breast in order to incite Macbeth to 
act. However, both breasts ‘threaten [the men] with impotence/castration’ and infantilize them (114). It 
is also interesting that by the end of the play Macbeth, like Medusa, is decapitated.  
19 I am reminded here of Tzvetan Todorov’s three-part narrative structure as well, in which the 
narrative opens with a form of equilibrium, which is then disrupted only for it to be later regained at the 
end through either a new one or the return of the opening one.  
20 For a comprehensive analysis of biorhythm and circadian cycles, as well as what occurs when these 
are disrupted, see David Healy, Images of Trauma: From Hysteria to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 





1 For a different interpretation of the spectre see Prema Prabhakar, ‘Invoking the Spectral Body: A 
Study of Potential Corporealities in the Work of Marina Abramovic and Francesca Woodman,’ 
Excursions 1.1 (June 2010), 91-101. As Prabhakar points out, the spectre is political, historical and also 
personal. She cites Derrida who ‘creates a specific genealogy of haunting, a specific idea of what type 
of body can claim, and has a responsibility to, history; it is a genealogy that is male, powerful, white 
and traditionally educated; this male ‘genealogy’ senses the spectre through the auditory and tries to 
speak to the spectre.’ Prabhakar takes note of this genealogy and proposes another one which is visual 
and ‘that creates through its body the visual depiction of its death and resurrection’ (92).  
2 For the Latin-American version of the play see Bernice Kliman and Rick Santos. Latin American 
Shakespeares (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005), particularly pp. 103-4. In Orson 
Welles’s black production set in Haiti, the three witches are represented as being ‘voodoo priestesses.’ 
In Susan McCloskey, ‘Shakespeare, Orson Welles, and the ‘Voodoo’ Macbeth.’ Shakespeare Quarterly 
36.4 (Jan 1985), pp. 406–416 (406). 
3 Clearly, not all feminist theory would privilege the subject’s point of view or even the female 
subject’s position. In Histoire d'amour (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1983), Julia Kristeva laments the fact 
that feminist theory is often ‘too existentialist’ (242). At the same time, the feminist claim that the 





                                                                                                                                            
or governed by existing political structures and arrangements, but also structure those arrangements in 
turn. Feminist theory has sought to understand and explain how systemic or pervasive political and 




CHAPTER FIVE  
 
1 Davis provides a comprehensive overview of Orlan’s body art, citing one of her lectures given in 
Amsterdam in 1995 where she projected images on screen of herself and her surgical wounds to an 
assembled audience. 
2 ‘Two Essays: “Simulacra and Science Fiction” and “Ballard’s Crash,”’ Science Fiction Studies 18.3, 
(November 1991). Net web page: http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/55/baudrillard55art.htm 
[accessed 11th July 2011]. 
3 I use the term ‘mediation’ of the photographic image here rather deliberately. While for Baudrillard, 
for example, ‘the photo is no more a medium than is the technology or the body – all are simultaneous 
in this universe where the anticipation of an event coincides with its reproduction, and even with its 
“real” occurrence”’(Two Essays), I read the photographic image as a medium which does not lack 
‘depth’ of affectivity simply because it is reproducible, but has the ability, through its mediation with 
the body, to ‘wound’ or puncture it. As Roland Barthes points out in Camera Lucida (London: Vintage, 
2000), there are certain photographs which have a punctum, a Latin word which ‘refers to the notion of 
punctuation’ and serves to designate the mark or wound made by this sharp ‘element which rises from 
the scene [of the photograph], shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me’ (26). Cf. Walter Benjamin 
in Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1992), where the camera is seen as 
‘penetrating’ into the unconscious, and drawing forth an ‘unconscious optics’ which would otherwise 
have remained invisible to the naked eye: ‘Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than 
opens to the naked eye – if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space 
consciously explored by man’ (230). It is, in fact, precisely Orlan’s aim to ‘punctuate’ the other’s 
consciousness, to effect a wounding or shock in the other, by her explicitly graphic visual images. 
4 While I am acutely aware of some of the limitations and critiques of phemonelogy as a perceptual and 
philosophical system, such as its presupposition according to Jill Dolan in The Feminist Spectator as 
Critic ‘that there is a universal way of looking, that any perceivable object has a stable, universal 
essence that can be read the same way by any individual’ (pp. 46-7), I am borrowing some of its 
concepts here because its positing of the individual as the centre of the cosmic universe seems to me to 
be especially relevant to Orlan’s work and the perceptual field it engenders. It is by no means to imply 
that there is a universal way of reading Orlan’s practices, only to suggest that her work firmly and 
squarely puts her at the centre of her own universe – and, it should be added, encompasses the spectator 
in that universe also. 
5 Taken from Jill Dolan, ‘In Defense of the Discourse: Materialist Feminism, Postmodernism, 
Poststructuralism… and Theory,’ in A Sourcebook of Feminist Theatre and Performance, ed. Carol 
Martin (London & New York: Routledge: 1996), p. 104. 
6 Vivian Sobchack, ‘Baudrillard’s Obscenity,’ Science Fiction Studies 18: 3 (November 1991). Net 
web page: http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/55/forum55.htm [accessed 11th July 2011]. 
7 I use the term ‘inscription’ deliberately here because of the not uncommon metaphorical status 
ascribed to the ontological body as text, as a site onto which multiple discourses and ideologies are 
re(inscribed) and re(interpreted). Karen Sanchez-Eppler, for example, in ‘Bodily Bonds: The 
Intersecting Rhetorics of Feminism and Abolition,’ The New American Studies: Essays from 
Representations, ed. Philip Fisher (California, University of California Press, 1991) reads the body as a 
text. Although her essay is primarily an exploration of the critical intersection of feminist and 
abolitionist practices in nineteenth-century slavocratic America, her focus on the human body of 
women and (female) slaves is particularly enlightening. She understands the body as ‘attain[ing] the 
status of a text,’ as being the site onto which the inscription of patriarchal readings takes place. For the 
woman to ‘reclaim’ her body she must ‘invert patriarchal readings,’ and find her voice by subversively 
refashioning the way her flesh is ‘read’ against her. ‘For women the ability to speak was [and is] 
predicated upon the reinterpretation of [her] flesh,’ which leads to her subsequent reinscription into 
subjective personhood (230). I find Eppler’s formulation particularly intriguing, particularly in relation 





                                                                                                                                            
8 Cf. Imogen Ashby, ‘The Mutant Woman: The Use and Abuse of the Female Body in Performance 
Art, Contemporary Theatre Review 2000, 10.3 (Malaysia, OPA: 2000), pp. 39-51 (45): ‘Interestingly, 
Orlan has been keen to underplay the pain involved in what she does and this is in stark contrast with 
other body artists who have used the pain inflicted to represent the oppression, or otherwise, that they 
experience.’ Instead of using the politics of pain as a powerful force against which to reinscribe herself 
in patriarchal discourse, it is almost as if Orlan seeks to sidestep it or eliminate it from her field of 
vision by a radical subversion of its norms. 
9 Barbara Rose, ‘Orlan: Is it Art? Orlan and the Transgressive Act,’ Art in America 81.2 (Feb 1993), 
pp. 83-125. Net web page: http://www.stanford.edu/class/history34q/readings/Orlan/Orlan2.html 
[accessed 11th July 2011]. 
10 Although there is a modern trend which seeks to rephrase self-mutilation by calling it self-harm, I 
feel that the latter term serves to deflect from the emotional resonance with which the former term is 
heavily loaded by effectually glossing it over. The term mutilation drives home with the full extent and 
force the recognition that there is a grotesque dimension to Orlan’s practices, even though she herself 
has refuted such a claim.   
11 It is quite interesting to note in this respect that most self-cutters have been identified by Favazza et 
al as being primarily female. A study by Richard Rosenthal has also found that ‘more than 60 percent 





1 This is most probably a misprint. Cf. Patrick Campbell and Helen Spackman, ‘With/out An-Aesthetic: 
The Terrible Beauty of Franko B, in The Drama Review (1998-) 42.4 (Massachusetts, MIT Press: 
1998), pp. 56-74 (60): ‘Franko B. wants his audiences to confront the unbearable. His is no facile 
collusive pact with the spectators. His aim, he states, is to “show what is unbearable to look at – I want 
to make it bearable whether you like it or not, you’re going to go away with that image in your 
memory” (Franko B. 1995).  
2 I am using this notion of the performer/actor giving her or himself up to the audience in a very 
definitive sense here. In From Acting to Performance: Essays in Modernism and Postmodernism 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997) Philip Auslander refers to Jerzy Grotowski, for whom the 
performers were ‘holy actors’ who saw performance as being ‘an act of self-sacrifice.’ Auslander 
quotes Grotowski’s basic principle: ‘It is all a question of giving oneself’ (22). The sacrificial elements 
of Franko B’s performances, as he stands, Christ-like, with ‘stigmata’ in his forearms and strikes a 
beatific pose, seem to me to be an apt example of Grotowski’s call for the performer’s self-abnegation. 
As Grotowski illustrates: ‘[The actor] must learn to use his role as if it were a surgeon’s scalpel, to 
dissect himself […] The important thing is to use the role as a trampolin, an instrument with which to 
study what is hidden behind our everyday mask – the innermost core of our personality – in order to 
sacrifice it, expose it’ (Grotowski qtd. in Auslander 23). Thus the performance is an act of self-
exposure which ‘dissects’ the actor’s personality. It must be noted, however, that whilst Grotowski is 
clearly speaking in metaphorical terms, Franko B’s performance is a literal dissection, a visceral 
process of performative self-discovery. Additionally, while Grotowski’s model creates a kind of 
leeway or aesthetic distance between the actor and the character whose role he or she embodies, Franko 
B’s performances are slightly more complex to the extent that he conflates the two; in short, he does 
not simply take on the role of another character – he actually is that other character whom he is 
performing on stage. From this perspective, he is, or rather he gradually becomes, a lived embodiment 
of his own work, a discursive subject-in-process.   
3  It is important to note at the outset, as Campbell and Spackman do, that Franko B’s work cannot be 
neatly categorized. Hence I am not suggesting that his work is explicitly ‘about AIDS, sadomasochism, 
and the predicament of being queer in a straight society’ (60). Such formulations close off the 
interpretative field instead of opening it out to a plenitude of possibilities. I would agree with Campbell 
and Spackman that there is added significance to the fact that Franko B does not use language in his 
work, only images. What I am suggesting, however, is that his work can easily lend itself to 
sadomasochistic critiques – even despite his intentions – because it feeds into the sadistic desires of 
certain sectors or echelons of society to witness the pain of an other (since Franko B objectifies himself 
in his work) and derive pleasure from it. At the same time, there could be an easy slippage since Franko 
B’s work can lead to vicarious identification or sympathy for the other in reverse, as the other mirrors 
for us a position we could have been in, yet have escaped from in the nick of time. Franko B reminds 





                                                                                                                                            
subtle transitions confuse the boundaries between self and other, life and death, presence and absence. 
Thus the interpretative field is still pregnant with multiple possibilities depending on how open (or 
even conscious) the spectator is to such slippages. It is also worthy to note that Franko B has little, if 
any, control regarding the reception of his work. He may demand our sympathy and protest that his 
work is not about sadomasochism but from the very moment that he gives himself up to the spectator 
his work becomes open to the spectator’s interpretation. Similarly, in The Death of the Author (1977), 
trans. by Richard Howard, Barthes claims that the author of any text must metaphorically ‘die’ in order 
for the reader to be born: ‘We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant 
antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, 
or destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of 
the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.’ Net web page:  http://evans-
experientialism.freewebspace.com/barthes06.htm [accessed 29th January 2012].  
4 This is not to suggest that such performances cannot engender critical thinking, only that the mode of 
thinking needs to be an embodied one as well. As Taxidou points out in Tragedy, Modernity and 
Mourning: ‘The fact that the relationship with the stage is primarily one of topology (of bodies, things 
and places) does not imply that it is anti-critical or anti-intellectual in general. The kind of ‘thinking’ it 
generates is at the level of concepts rather than ideas, mirroring the opposition of symbol to allegory’ 
(92). 
5 See also Judith Butler’s essay ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in 
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,’  Theatre Journal 40.4 (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1988), pp. 519-
531 (525): ‘The act that gender is, the act that embodied agents are inasmuch as they dramatically and 
actively embody and, indeed, wear certain cultural significations, is clearly not one’s act alone. Surely, 
there are nuanced and individual ways of doing one's gender, but that one does it, and that one does it 
in accord with certain sanctions and proscriptions, is clearly not a fully individual matter.’ 
6 Cf. Judith Butler, in Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), where the subject is described as being ‘discontinuous’ and incomplete, ‘never 
coherent and never self-identical precisely because it is founded and, indeed, continually refounded, 
through a set of defining foreclosures and repressions that constitute the discontinuity and incompletion 
of the subject.’ Butler draws on Žižek’s account of the fluid contingency of all subjective identity.  For 
Žižek subjectivity is never a fully coherent, self-enclosed or self-referential system. It is always marked 
by what exceeds symbolization, what must be left out of signification or foreclosed in order for identity 
to constitute itself. Thus ‘every signifier [of identity] is the site of a perpetual méconnaissance; it 
produces the expectation of a unity, a full and final recognition that can never be achieved’ (pp. 190-1). 
Thus appellations such as ‘woman’ or ‘gay’ are only ‘phantasmatic’ markers of identity. The self is 
constantly being shaped by social and ideological discourses – the subject is always a discursive 
subject-in-process. 
7 Favazza’s description of the process of shamanic initiation is quite an interesting one. It involves 
‘go[ing] through a traditional sequence of mystical events’ in order to resolve crisis and emerge finally 
into a state of ‘resurrection’ or grace. The would-be shamans are transported through trances into ‘Hell’ 
where their heads are decapitated and their bodies dismembered. Once they ‘learn the secrets of 
healing’ they can ‘emerge from the underworld with a new personality, that of a true shaman’ (25). 
Interestingly, Favazza claims that such people ‘have discovered the therapeutic value of self-
mutilation’ (26). Franko B has often asserted in the past that his work has allowed him to give meaning 
to his life and to make it worthwhile. I am also reminded here of Orlan’s use of religious symbolism in 
her work and her explicit desires to attain ‘a new personality’ through reincarnation. That she dubs 
herself as ‘Saint Orlan’ is a case in point.  
8 I am using the terms ‘blood play’ here in a very specific way and as a pun or variation on Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s concept of wordplay. For the philosopher Wittgenstein language was a kind of game in 
which words acquired meaning by being used in specific contexts. There was space for some 
manoeuvring but meaning was usually constructed within a predefined set of grammatical rules and 
almost never out of context. In this respect many philosophical questions such as ‘What is truth?’ 
become meaningless wordplay. Incidentally, Wittgenstein used the word ‘queer’ in relation to 
experience and Jonathan Katz makes much of this in his essay entitled ‘Dismembership: Jasper Johns 
and the body politic,’ in Performing the Body/Performing the Text, ed. by Amelia Jones and Andrew 
Stephenson (London & New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 170-85. He talks of ‘queer’ knowledge 
which, ‘because it is felt more than thought, cannot be communicated to another except through 
metaphors or other approximations. It divides us from one another – unlike most other forms of 
knowing, such as language, which unite us.’ To ‘queer’ a body is to open it out to a multitude of 





                                                                                                                                            
knowledges’ (172). For the British psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott the ‘play’ between the patient and 
therapist was an integral part of the psychotherapeutic process. By playing with his own blood, Franko 
B is therapeutically healing himself and reaching out to his spectators/analysts at the same time. 
Metaphorically speaking, blood play makes all fixed social constructions of sex, identity and gender 
into ‘fluid’ entities, or rather, and due to its very nature, it ‘fluidifies’ them.  
9 It could be argued that the varied responses to Franko B’s performances are due to the different ways 
in which the spectators interpret the cuts on his body. The cuts are like enigmatic signifiers – of sexual 
difference, abjection and unstable identity positions. As well as this, they can also function as erotically 
charged wounds or as ‘stigmata’ in religious and iconic terms.   
10 To push this point further, it is interesting to note that Franko B uses only scrap objects as opposed to 
new ones. He gives marginalized and seemingly worthless objects a new lease on life. He says of his 
work that it is not really intended to ‘humanize’ the object ‘but give something else a second chance to 
have a life of its own, to give love to an object, like a broken TV.’ He stresses that he wouldn’t buy a 
car because that ‘would change the object’s meaning and the work’ (Simonson 317; 318).  
11 This is nowhere more evident, perhaps, than in Orlan’s work. Barbara Rose notes: ‘As the French 
representative to the Sydney Biennial in December 1992, she included in the exhibition vials 
containing samples of her liquefied flesh and blood drained off during the “body-sculpting” part of the 
operations. These relics are also intended to be marketed to raise funds for the two remaining 
operations.’ See note 9, Chapter 5. I am also reminded of the famous American killer Ed Gein who 
used to cut off women’s body parts and use them as ornaments around his farmhouse in the late 50s. 
He had used human skin to make a lampshade and had even created a ‘skinsuit’ from a female torso. 
Upon his capture many of his personal items were auctioned off and he became something of a 
notorious celebrity, attesting to the public’s fascination, but also disgust, with his bloody exploits. He 
was the inspiration, in fact, for mainstream films such as Psycho and The Texas Chainsaw Massacre. In 
many cases, skin, blood and gore are not only voyeuristically fetishized but also commercialized in 
consumerist culture.  
12 Kristeva, qtd. in Michel Beaujour, ‘A Propos of a Separation in Julia Kristeva’s La Révolution Du 
Langage Poétique,’ pp. 15-35 (33, note 6). In The Kristeva Critical Reader, ed. by John Lechte and 
Mary Zournazi (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003).  
13 Cf. Shoshana Felman’s critical stance of the relationship of psychoanalytic interpretation to 
literature. For her, ‘literature is considered as a body of language – to be interpreted.’ In contrast, 
‘psychoanalysis is considered as a body of knowledge’ whose task is ‘to interpret. Psychoanalysis, in 
other words, occupies the place of a subject, literature that of an object; the relation of interpretation is 
structured as a relation of master to slave’ (qtd. in Ellmann 10). This draws on the Hegelian master-
slave dialectic and serves to illustrate the processes involved in hermeneutical activity: ‘To some 
degree or other all interpretation must curtail the meanings of the text in order to render them 
intelligible. Perhaps this is why so many of our words for understanding also carry connotations of 
possession, violation, and constraint: we ‘grasp’ or ‘seize’ or ‘apprehend’ the things we know, much as 
we might apprehend a fugitive from justice’ (Ellmann 10-1).  
14  In psychoanalytical terms, erotic signifiers always reach their destination, which is the unconscious. 
We have already seen how Manuel Camblor links psychoanalytical frameworks with scholarship 
regarding spectatorial responses. If, as Camblor forcefully suggests in ‘Death Drive’s Joy Ride: David 
Cronenberg’s Crash,’  sexuality for Lacan is ‘the reality of the unconscious,’ then ‘the eroticized 
emission and reception of a signifier […] effectively establishes an area of contact with the 
unconscious.’ Camblor is, of course, referring specifically to David Cronenberg’s film Crash, and how 
the characters’ wounds within the film could be made to signify, thus becoming traumatic wounds if 
they are visually perceived and ‘received’ by the spectators as being erotic – if they succeed, that is, in 
reaching their destination, which is the spectator’s unconscious. When the unconscious is thus 
broached, spectators may potentially recognize these wounds as highly erotic and painful markers and 
this can activate their own unconscious fantasies and desires. The spectators in Franko B’s 
performances may also be confronted with the same dilemma. As we have already seen, wounds are 
highly charged with erotic energy. And, not only do they function as erotic signifiers, but they also 
have the potential to broach the spectator’s consciousness in unexpected ways. Spectators are as much 
attracted to Franko B’s body as they are repulsed by it. Revulsion, even fear, is a permutation of desire. 
At the same time, the audience may also be stunned into silence by the religious symbolism elicited by 
the cuts-cum-wounds-cum-stigmata. See note 18 of the Introduction section. 
15 It should be noted here that Diamond is using Brechtian theory for very different purposes and to 
achieve other ends than those of other feminists in theatre and performance studies. Namely, she is 





                                                                                                                                            
discourse for feminist theory and thus propose an intertextual way of reading and interpreting theatre 
criticism. My focal angle, on the other hand, and  in terms of spectatorship, encompasses more than just 
one gender-specific or even feminist/theoretical topos. In short, I am looking at spectatorship in 
general as opposed to specific subgroups. It could also be argued that Brechtian discourse cannot be 
fruitfully employed in relation to Franko B’s performances since Verfremdungseffekt necessarily 
implies, as a property of acting, the distancing between the actor’s body and the character he is meant 
to resemble or act out. Yet Franko B is both actor and character at the same time – the character he acts 
out is his own.  
16 I am reminded here of Derrida’s assertion that ‘the future is necessarily monstrous: the figure of the 
future, that is, that which can only be surprising, that for which we are not prepared […] is heralded by 
species of monsters’ (From Traumatism to Promise 386-7). Yet this monster is somehow made 
‘legible’: it is inevitably accommodated, acculturated, even normalized. By the same token, future 
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